Landlord-Tenant Dispute – Recovery of Possession – Arrears of Rent – Suit Allowed – Plaintiff, a registered Sangam, sought recovery of possession of a marriage hall and movables (furniture and utensils) leased to the defendant, along with arrears of rent, damages, and mesne profits – Defendant admitted tenancy but failed to pay fair rent fixed by the Rent Control Tribunal and did not vacate the premises despite termination notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act – Held: Plaintiff proved ownership and entitlement to possession through oral and documentary evidence – Defendant failed to rebut claims of arrears or establish the existence of a valid lease – Civil suit allowed with costs, ordering ejectment and payment of arrears and damages [Paras 18–24].

Fair Rent – Use and Occupation – Damages and Interest Awarded – Plaintiff claimed arrears of ₹2,17,000/- for the period 01/06/2021 to 10/04/2022 and sought damages of ₹1,50,000/- per month for unauthorized use and occupation of immovable and movable properties – Defendant failed to prove payment of rent or justify continued possession – Held: Fair rent of ₹1,00,000/- per month for the building, as fixed by the Rent Control Tribunal in prior proceedings, accepted as damages for unauthorized occupation – Additional rent of ₹25,000/- for movables allowed – Plaintiff entitled to arrears with 6% interest and mesne profits [Paras 23–24].

Lease Agreement – Termination Notice – Applicability of Rent Control Act – Lease initially governed by written agreements, later continued orally after expiry in 2010 – Rent Control proceedings initiated by both parties were nullified on technical grounds as the lease was composite (building and movables) – Plaintiff subsequently issued termination notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act – Held: Termination notice valid, and defendant had no right to continue possession post-expiry of the lease [Paras 20–23].

Procedural Delays – Defendant’s Conduct – Applications to Reopen Evidence Dismissed – Defendant sought to reopen and recall plaintiff's witness after multiple opportunities were granted for cross-examination – Defendant repeatedly delayed proceedings and failed to file evidence or produce documents despite adjournments – Held: Defendant’s conduct amounted to abuse of process, justifying rejection of applications to reopen evidence – Plaintiff’s evidence remained uncontroverted [Paras 17, 19].

Decision: The Civil Suit is allowed with costs - Defendant directed to vacate and deliver possession of the schedule ‘A’ property (immovable property) and return the schedule ‘B’ property (movables) to the plaintiff immediately - Defendant directed to pay ₹2,17,000/- as arrears of rent for the period 01/06/2021 to 10/04/2022, with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the suit till realization - Defendant directed to pay ₹1,50,000/- per month (₹1,25,000/- for the immovable property and ₹25,000/- for the movables) from the date of the suit till delivery of possession.
 

Criminal Law – Quashing - Cheating and Money Laundering – Ingredients Not Satisfied – The Applicants challenged the issuance of process under the PMLA and IPC, arguing that no criminal act was involved and the dispute arose solely due to delays in obtaining an Occupation Certificate (OC). The Court held that the contractual obligations between the parties were fulfilled, barring minor unfinished works, and payments were made as per mutual agreement. The dispute was deemed civil, not criminal. – Held: No cheating or money laundering established; process quashed. [Paras 17–38]

Territorial Jurisdiction – Invalid Order by Metropolitan Magistrate, Andheri – The Court found that the Metropolitan Magistrate, Andheri, lacked territorial jurisdiction, as the transactions and subject premises were situated in Malad. The complainant’s alleged meeting at Hotel Orchid, Vile Parle, was an afterthought to bring the case within the jurisdiction of Vile Parle Police Station. – Held: Orders passed by Andheri Magistrate and actions by Vile Parle Police Station null and void. [Paras 42.3–42.7]

Prevention of Money Laundering Act – Absence of Proceeds of Crime – The Enforcement Directorate’s claim of "proceeds of crime" was rejected, as the amounts received by the Applicants were payments under contractual agreements that were substantially fulfilled. The Court criticized the ED for failing to consider evidence of compliance with agreements and acting without due diligence. – Held: No proceeds of crime or money laundering; ED’s attachment order set aside. [Paras 16–39]

Civil Nature of Dispute – Abuse of Process – The Court observed that the dispute was purely contractual, concerning delay in possession due to lack of an OC. The complainant filed civil suits for recovery of amounts, reinforcing the civil nature of the case. Criminal proceedings were deemed a misuse of the legal process. – Held: Criminal proceedings quashed; exemplary costs imposed on complainant and ED. [Paras 36–42.10]

Decision: Criminal proceedings quashed. Process issued under IPC and PMLA is set aside. Attachment of properties by ED is cancelled. Exemplary costs imposed on the complainant and ED.
 

Civil Writ - Maternity Leave – Third Pregnancy – Second Wedlock – Interpretation of Rule 101(a) of Fundamental Rules – Petitioner, a staff nurse in Government Rajaji Hospital, Madurai, was denied maternity leave for her third pregnancy on the ground that she already had two surviving children from her first marriage—Held: Petitioner had not availed maternity leave for her first two children due to contractual employment at that time—Right to maternity leave should be considered based on service period and not biological order of childbirth—Limiting maternity leave based on the number of children, without considering prior leave usage, violates the intent of maternity benefits [Paras 10-12].

Doctrine of Purposive Interpretation – Maternity Leave as a Right – Population Control Policy Consideration – While Rule 101(a) limits maternity leave to two surviving children, its purpose is to regulate population control, protect financial resources of the State, and ensure women’s health—However, the rule should not be applied mechanically to deprive a woman of maternity benefits she never availed before—Relying on Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal, (2023) 13 SCC 681, maternity benefits should be granted twice in service tenure, irrespective of biological childbirth sequence [Paras 12-15].

Medical Board Report – Denial of Medical Leave – Arbitrary Decision – Petitioner applied for alternative leave after rejection of maternity leave—Medical Board declared her fit for duty five days before her expected delivery date—Held: Such a decision is arbitrary, lacks medical justification, and violates the principle of fairness—Authorities directed to grant maternity leave as per service regulations [Paras 14-16].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Impugned orders rejecting maternity leave set aside – Authorities directed to grant maternity leave for 365 days as per Rule 101(a) of Fundamental Rules within 12 weeks [Para 16].
 

Trademark Infringement – No Deceptive Similarity – "BundlePe" & "LatePe" Not Confusingly Similar to "PhonePe" – Plaintiff alleged that defendants' marks "BundlePe" & "LatePe" were deceptively similar to "PhonePe" and likely to confuse consumers – Held: The word "Pe" is not inherently distinctive and is commonly used in digital payments – Defendants' marks contain distinct prefixes, making them visually and phonetically different – No likelihood of consumer confusion – No infringement established [Paras 13-14].

Passing Off – Lack of Consumer Confusion – No Misrepresentation – Plaintiff claimed that defendants were misrepresenting their services as being associated with PhonePe – Held: Defendants' services differ from plaintiff’s – No substantial evidence of actual consumer confusion – Mere phonetic similarity of "Pe" does not constitute passing off – Claim rejected [Paras 15].

Trademark Dilution – No Evidence of Harm – Common Use of "Pe" in Industry – Plaintiff contended that the use of "Pe" in "BundlePe" & "LatePe" diluted the distinctiveness of "PhonePe" – Held: "Pe" is commonly used in the fintech industry (e.g., Google Pay, Paytm) – No exclusive rights over the word "Pe" – No proof that defendants' use of "Pe" weakened the plaintiff’s brand identity – No dilution established [Paras 21].

Domain Name Dispute – No Consumer Confusion – No Injunction Granted – Plaintiff sought injunction against defendants from using "bundlepe.com" & "latepe.in" – Held: The domain names contain distinct prefixes differentiating them from "PhonePe" – No substantial evidence of consumer confusion or damage – No injunction granted [Paras 18].

Well-Known Trademark – "PhonePe" Not Recognized as a Well-Known Mark – Plaintiff sought declaration of "PhonePe" as a well-known trademark under Section 2(zg) & Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act – Held: Common use of "Pe" in the digital payment industry diminishes its exclusivity – "PhonePe" does not meet the threshold for well-known status – Claim rejected [Para 20].

Jurisdiction – Suit Maintainable in Madras High Court – Defendants challenged jurisdiction, arguing lack of cause of action in Chennai – Held: Plaintiff has a branch office in Chennai – Defendants’ services accessible in Chennai via digital platforms – Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act permits jurisdiction where plaintiff carries on business – Suit maintainable [Para 12].

Use of "Pe" – No Exclusive Right Over a Generic Term – No Infringement – Plaintiff argued that "Pe" was an essential part of its brand identity – Held: "Pe" is a transliteration of "Pay" in Hindi and is commonly used – Rule 28 of the Trade Marks Rules allows transliteration between Hindi & English – No exclusive monopoly over "Pe" – Defendants’ use does not infringe plaintiff’s rights [Para 22].

Damages & Account of Profits – No Proven Financial Loss – Claims Rejected – Plaintiff sought ₹10,00,000 as damages and an account of profits – Held: No evidence of financial loss or unjust enrichment by defendants – No trademark infringement or passing off established – No damages or accounting ordered [Paras 16-17].

Decision: Suit dismissed – Plaintiff failed to establish trademark infringement, passing off, dilution, or consumer confusion – No injunction granted – No damages awarded – Plaintiff not entitled to reliefs sought.
 

Taxation Law - Section 80IA of the Income Tax Act  - Transfer Pricing – Use of Indian Energy Exchange (IEX) Rates as External CUP – IEX Rates Not Comparable to SEB Rates – The Revenue challenged the ITAT’s decision to reject IEX rates as a comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) for determining ALP under Section 80IA(8) of the Act for electricity transferred from the Assessee's captive power units to non-eligible units – Held: IEX rates are unreliable as the transactions differ materially from SEB transactions in terms of predictability, reliability, and terms of supply – The IEX is a short-term trading platform for surplus electricity with high price volatility, whereas SEB transactions represent regulated, continuous supply agreements – ITAT rightly applied SEB rates as appropriate CUP for benchmarking the electricity transfer [Paras 46-53].

Market Value under Section 80IA(8) – Applicability of SEB Rates – Following the Supreme Court's decision in CIT v. Jindal Steel and Power Limited (2023), market value under Section 80IA(8) refers to the price at which SEBs supply electricity to industrial consumers, as it reflects an open market rate – Rates at which electricity is traded on IEX cannot qualify as market value under the CUP method due to inherent differences in the nature of transactions – ITAT correctly upheld SEB rates as internal CUP for benchmarking electricity transfers from eligible units [Paras 54-59].

Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) Method – Product and Transaction Comparability – For the CUP method to be valid, the tested transaction and comparable uncontrolled transaction must exhibit a high degree of similarity – IEX transactions involve electricity traded on spot markets for short-term needs, whereas SEB transactions involve regulated, continuous supply for industrial consumers – Material differences make IEX transactions unsuitable as CUP – ITAT rightly relied on SEB rates, which share sufficient comparability with captive unit transactions [Paras 42-56].

Judgment and Outcome – The High Court upheld ITAT’s findings, affirming that the Assessee had correctly benchmarked power transactions using SEB rates – Deletion of TP adjustment of ₹26.52 crores was justified – Questions of law answered in favor of the Assessee – Appeal dismissed [Paras 60-61].
Decision: Appeal dismissed – ITAT’s decision upheld – Revenue’s proposed adjustment of ₹26.52 crores deleted.
 

Bail Application – Repeated Petition – No Substantial Change in Circumstances – The petitioner, facing charges under multiple sections of the BNS, filed a third bail application under Section 483 of BNSS—Previous bail applications had been dismissed—Petitioner failed to demonstrate any substantive change in circumstances—Held: Once a bail application has been rejected on merits, a subsequent bail plea without new grounds amounts to an abuse of process – Decision: Bail denied [Paras 5, 18].

Cyber Crime – Sextortion – Organized Blackmailing Racket – The complainant, a 73-year-old doctor, was blackmailed into paying ₹1.34 crore after being manipulated into an explicit video call—Petitioner’s husband allegedly part of the syndicate—Recovery of ₹6 lakhs from petitioner’s residence—Held: Petitioner’s role in laundering extorted money through bank accounts establishes prima facie involvement – Decision: Bail denied [Paras 8-11].

Cyber Crime and Sextortion – Growing Threat and Public Interest Considerations – Sextortion and digital blackmail have become a widespread cybercrime—Involvement of organized syndicates operating across different states—Held: Courts must adopt a strict approach to prevent misuse of digital platforms for blackmail and cyber fraud – Decision: Bail denied [Paras 11-13].

Evidence – Digital and Financial Trail – Prima Facie Guilt – Investigation revealed a trail of transactions linking the petitioner to the crime—Digital records, communication logs, and financial transactions showed active participation—Held: Strong prosecution evidence and absence of false implication established prima facie involvement of petitioner – Decision: Bail denied [Paras 13-17].

Parity with Co-Accused – Juveniles Granted Bail – Not Applicable – Petitioner sought parity with two juvenile co-accused who had been granted bail—Court distinguished juveniles from an adult accused—Held: Juvenile Justice Act applies differently to minors; petitioner cannot claim parity – Decision: Bail denied [Para 3].

Impact of Bail on Investigation – Risk of Tampering with Evidence – Given the organized nature of the crime, release of petitioner could impede investigation—Risk of influencing witnesses and tampering with evidence—Held: Releasing petitioner would be prejudicial to justice and public interest – Decision: Bail denied [Para 14].

Decision: The High Court dismissed the third bail application, citing the absence of any new grounds justifying reconsideration. The Court emphasized the seriousness of cyber sextortion crimes and the need for deterrence. Petitioner’s role in the laundering of extorted money and connection to an organized cyber crime syndicate justified continued custody.
 

Service Law - Challenge to the disciplinary proceedings - Judicial Review – Departmental Proceedings – Limited Scope of Court’s Intervention – The petitioner challenged the findings of the disciplinary proceedings and the penalty of compulsory retirement awarded – Held: Judicial review is limited to examining whether the inquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice and applicable regulations, and whether the findings are based on evidence – Interference with findings of fact in disciplinary inquiries is restricted to instances of perversity, procedural irregularity, or malafide conduct [Paras 11-14].

Proportionality of Punishment – Doctrine of Proportionality Applied – The petitioner alleged that the punishment of compulsory retirement without service benefits was disproportionate to the charges proved – Held: The absence of allegations like misappropriation of funds or personal financial gain by the petitioner differentiates this case from more severe misconduct – The penalty imposed is excessive and disproportionate, necessitating judicial interference – Directions issued to reconsider the quantum of punishment [Paras 15-22].

Principles of Natural Justice – Fair Opportunity to Respond – Petitioner contended that relevant documents and evidence were not provided during the inquiry, affecting his ability to present an adequate defense – Held: The inquiry adhered to procedural fairness, and the petitioner was afforded multiple opportunities to present his defense – No procedural infirmity warranting interference in the findings of the inquiry was found [Para 14].

Parity in Punishment – Inconsistent Approach by Bank Disciplinary Authority – The petitioner highlighted instances where employees accused of more serious misconduct were awarded lesser penalties – Held: While parity in punishment cannot be claimed as an absolute right, inconsistency in disciplinary measures reflects arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion – Bank must ensure consistency in disciplinary decisions to uphold the principles of fairness and equality [Paras 16, 21].

Reconsideration of Penalty – Punishment Reviewed for Disproportionality – Court held that the penalty of compulsory retirement not only terminated the petitioner’s career abruptly but also deprived him of financial and service benefits – A more measured penalty would uphold discipline while mitigating undue hardship on the petitioner – Matter remanded for reconsideration of penalty, with the court directing that no penalty of compulsory retirement, removal, or dismissal be imposed [Paras 22-23].

Decision: The writ petition was partly allowed. The penalty of "compulsory retirement without service benefits" was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the penalty in accordance with law. The court directed that any fresh penalty imposed must be proportionate to the gravity of charges, and penalties of compulsory retirement, removal, or dismissal from service should not be imposed.
 

Specific Relief – Grant of Specific Performance – Discretion under Section 20 of Specific Relief Act – Pre-Amendment Position – Appellant contended that the court was bound to grant specific performance if statutory conditions were met – High Court clarified that under the unamended Section 20 of the Act, courts retained discretion in granting specific performance, exercised judiciously – Appeal dismissed as the respondent had no title in the property, precluding performance of the agreement [Paras 18-21].

Partial Specific Performance – Applicability of Section 12 of Specific Relief Act – Appellant argued for part performance regarding residual rights – High Court rejected the claim, stating that the respondent lacked ownership, making the agreement unenforceable – Section 12 inapplicable as no part of the agreement could be lawfully performed [Paras 26-28, 30-31].

Possession and Protection under Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act – Appellant sought relief under Section 53-A, claiming possession as part performance of the contract – High Court held that Section 53-A provides only a defense against eviction and does not establish a basis for specific performance – Relief denied [Paras 22-24].

Limitation – Clause in Agreement Allowing Deed Execution on Demand – Suit filed in 2007 based on refusal by the respondent to perform the agreement – High Court held that the cause of action arose in 2007, making the suit within limitation – Appellant's delay in asserting rights did not bar the suit [Paras 10, 17].

Alternative Relief – Claim for Damages – High Court observed that the appellant did not seek damages as an alternative relief, despite possession of the property for three decades – Failure to pursue this claim rendered the discussion academic [Para 32].

Decision:

The appeal (F.A.T. No. 47 of 2018) was dismissed. The High Court affirmed the judgment and decree dated 26.10.2017 by the Sixth Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta, in Title Suit No. 3500 of 2007. No costs were awarded.

Eviction Proceedings – Jurisdiction of Estate Officer under the Public Premises Act – Appellant alleged that proceedings under the PP Act were not maintainable due to the existence of bona fide disputes regarding lease renewal – High Court held that the Estate Officer has jurisdiction under the PP Act as the property is public premises and no ownership dispute exists – Dismissed petition challenging the eviction order [Paras 10, 13, 19].

Bona Fide Dispute – Ownership and Lease Renewal – Petitioner argued that unresolved disputes regarding the renewal of a 10-year lease constituted bona fide disputes – High Court rejected the claim, holding that mere pendency of requests or litigation regarding lease renewal does not amount to a bona fide dispute as per Kaikhosrou (CHICK) Kavasji Framji v. Union of India [Paras 6-7, 15-16].

Alternative Remedy – Appeal under PP Act – High Court emphasized the statutory remedy of appeal provided under Section 9 of the PP Act – Dismissed the writ petition and granted liberty to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority with lenient consideration of delay due to prior writ proceedings [Paras 18, 22].

Bias Allegations – Estate Officer as a Captive Tribunal – Petitioner contended bias and lack of independence of the Estate Officer – High Court rejected the claim, citing absence of pleadings or evidence of bias and reliance on Supreme Court rulings upholding the PP Act's framework [Paras 11, 15].

Jurisdictional Bar – Applicability of Civil Court – High Court reaffirmed that jurisdiction of civil courts is barred under Sections 10 and 13 of the PP Act – Upheld the finality of orders passed under the PP Act unless appealed through prescribed mechanisms [Paras 10, 17].

Decision: The writ petition (WPA 29578 of 2024) was dismissed, affirming the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer under the PP Act. The petitioner was granted liberty to file a statutory appeal within 12 days, with the Appellate Authority directed to consider the delay leniently. No costs were imposed.