Civil Law – Institution of Suit under Section 92 CPC – Orders Without Leave Held Void – Petitioners filed scheme suit alleging mismanagement of People’s Education Trust and sought interlocutory reliefs – District Court passed interim orders including formation of ad hoc committee – Held: Leave under Section 92 CPC is a jurisdictional prerequisite – Without such leave, plaint remains inert and Court has no power to pass interim directions – Orders dated 02-05-2025 and 11-06-2025 quashed as without jurisdiction [Paras 10–15].

Interim Relief – Formation of Ad Hoc Committee – Lack of Statutory Basis – District Court formed an ad hoc committee citing urgency due to approaching summer vacation – Held: Imminent vacation does not constitute valid legal justification to override statutory requirement under Section 92 CPC – Interim arrangement made without jurisdiction – Entire order and subsequent proceedings declared non est [Paras 10–15].

Order 40 CPC – Appointment of Receiver – Requires Validly Instituted Suit – Petitioners sought appointment of receiver under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC – Held: Such application can be entertained only in a properly instituted suit – Since leave under Section 92 CPC was not granted, application was premature and without legal basis [Para 11].

Precedent – Binding Nature of Coordinate Bench – Judgments of Other High Courts Not Applicable – Petitioners relied on decisions of Kerala and Allahabad High Courts – Held: Coordinate Bench decision in W.P. No. 9267 of 2022 squarely applies and is binding – Leave under Section 92 CPC is mandatory even for passing interim orders – Judgments of other High Courts only persuasive and not binding [Paras 12–14].

Supreme Court Precedent – Bhupinder Singh v. Joginder Singh – Distinguished – Held: Supreme Court recognises that leave under Section 92 CPC is mandatory though it may be granted ex parte in emergent situations – Does not support proposition that interim orders can be passed without leave – Trial Court's orders rendered without granting leave were thus unsustainable [Paras 13–14].

Decision – Writ Petition No. 17445 of 2025 Allowed – Writ Petitions Nos. 16971 and 16223 of 2025 Dismissed – Orders dated 02-05-2025 and 11-06-2025 passed by District Court quashed – Trial Court given liberty to act in accordance with law after properly instituting the suit by granting leave – All pending applications disposed of accordingly [Para 16].

Civil Writs – Ragging Law - University Discipline – Death of Student Due to Ragging – Disciplinary Action Against Dean and Assistant Warden – Petitions Dismissed – The petitioners, Dean and Assistant Warden of Kerala Veterinary and Animal Sciences University, challenged the disciplinary proceedings initiated against them after the death of a student due to ragging – Held: The Chancellor acted well within his powers under Section 9(7) and 9(9) of the KVASU Act to order an inquiry and seek reports from the Management Council – University wrongly interpreted the Chancellor’s communication as a bar to proceed with disciplinary action – Writ petitions dismissed with directions to conclude the disciplinary proceedings within 3 months [Paras 24-26].

Chancellor’s Powers – Scope under Section 9 KVASU Act – Explained – The Chancellor has wide and overarching supervisory powers over University affairs, including the power to conduct inquiries, suspend decisions, and issue binding directions – The argument that the Chancellor cannot interfere in disciplinary proceedings against staff members is untenable – Chancellor’s directions are binding on the University authorities, including the Management Council [Paras 24.2-24.5].

Ragging – Institutional Responsibility – Failure of Dean and Assistant Warden – Upheld – Commission of Inquiry and Three-member Committee both held that the Dean and Assistant Warden failed to maintain discipline, conduct inspections, and prevent ragging despite prior incidents – Their negligence contributed to the tragic death of a student – University directed to complete disciplinary action promptly [Paras 8, 8.2, 24.1, 26.2].

Anti-Ragging Measures – UGC Regulations and Supreme Court Directives – Reiterated – Despite the UGC Regulations, institutional failure persisted – Supreme Court’s directions in Vishwa Jagriti Mission v. Central Govt. and University of Kerala v. Council of Principals emphasized – Failure to implement measures like CCTV, hostel supervision, and active anti-ragging committees led to the tragic incident [Paras 19-23].

Judicial Review – Misinterpretation of Chancellor’s Communication – Held: The University’s decision to reinstate the petitioners based on a misconstrued interpretation of the Chancellor’s letter dated 12.08.2024 is unjustified – The letter merely sought an opinion and did not bar disciplinary proceedings – The Management Council acted contrary to the statute and the express powers of the Chancellor [Paras 25-26.1].

Policy Recommendation – Need for Stringent Anti-Ragging Law – Observed – The Court observed that the UGC Regulations alone are insufficient to curb ragging – Suggested that the State Government enact stricter laws providing severe punishments to prevent ragging-related deaths in educational institutions [Para 26.4].

Decision – Writ Petitions Dismissed – University directed to conclude disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners within three months in accordance with law – Petitioners directed to cooperate – University further directed to take action against the students responsible for the incident [Paras 26.2-26.3].

Bail – Interim Bail – Mother with Minor Children – Interim Bail Granted – The petitioner sought interim bail for 90 days citing the need to care for her two minor children, including a newborn delivered in jail – Held: Considering that the applicant has been in judicial custody since 12/12/2024, the investigation is complete, the chargesheet has been filed, the co-accused are on bail, and the applicant’s need to care for her newborn, interim bail for 90 days is granted on furnishing personal bond of ₹25,000 with one surety of the like amount subject to conditions [Paras 6-7].

Bail – Non-Bailable Warrants – Prior Default in Appearance – Not a Bar to Interim Bail – While the State opposed bail citing the petitioner’s previous non-appearance and declaration as a proclaimed offender, the Court held that the applicant’s circumstances, including childbirth in custody and inability to care for her minor children, warranted interim relief – Bail is granted with stringent conditions to prevent misuse [Paras 3-7].

Criminal Procedure – Conditions for Interim Bail – The applicant is directed not to commit any offence, not to tamper with evidence or influence witnesses, and not to leave the NCT of Delhi without prior permission – The applicant must also keep her address and mobile number updated with the Investigating Officer/SHO during the bail period [Para 7].

Decision – Interim Bail Allowed – The application is disposed of with an order granting interim bail for 90 days from the date of release on specified conditions – A copy of the order is directed to be sent to the Jail Superintendent for compliance [Paras 7-9].

Criminal Law - Rash and Negligent Driving – Acquittal – Sections 279, 337, 338, 304A IPC and Section 3 and181 of Motor Vehicles Act – Conviction Set Aside – The accused was convicted by the Trial Court for causing death and injuries by driving a jeep in a rash and negligent manner – Appellate Court confirmed the conviction – Held: There was no clear evidence establishing rash and negligent driving – Key prosecution witnesses including complainant admitted they reached the spot after the accident and did not witness the occurrence – Spot inspection and motor vehicle report (Ex.P33) showed mechanical defects in the steering system, supporting the defence case – Prosecution failed to examine the Motor Vehicle Inspector, raising a serious lacuna – Held: Benefit of doubt must go to the accused – Conviction set aside and accused acquitted [Paras 13-23].

Mechanical Defect – Burden of Proof – Defence Probabilized – Accused successfully established the probability that the accident occurred due to mechanical failure of the steering worm – Defence witness DW1, an experienced mechanic, corroborated this fact – The Court held that the defence does not need to be proved beyond reasonable doubt but only needs to raise sufficient doubt in the prosecution’s case – Non-examination of the Motor Vehicle Inspector by the prosecution was fatal to its case – Finding of the lower courts rejecting the defence unsustainable [Paras 14-17].

Witness Credibility – Eye-Witness Testimony Doubtful – Prosecution Witnesses Not Reliable – Complainant and other witnesses admitted reaching the spot after five minutes of the accident – Witness PW6 turned hostile – Several witnesses admitted the presence of a curve at the accident spot which was not considered by the Investigating Officer in the spot mahazar – Prosecution failed to establish rashness or negligence – The Court held that mere high speed without proven negligence does not constitute an offence under Sections 279, 337, 338, or 304A IPC [Paras 18-22].

Driving Licence – Non-possession of Licence – Not Proved – Allegation that accused did not possess a valid driving licence was not substantiated – The accused’s explanation that his driving licence was lost due to head injury in the accident was plausible – Conviction under Section 3 r/w Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act also set aside [Paras 10, 23].

Decision – Revision Petition Allowed – Conviction and sentence under Sections 279, 337, 338, 304A IPC and Section 3 r/w Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act set aside – Accused acquitted of all charges – Fine, if paid, ordered to be refunded [Para 23].

Constitutionality – Right of Appeal – Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 – Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 16 for not providing a right of appeal to children/relatives against orders under Section 9 – Court noted pending legislative amendments aimed at extending the right of appeal to children/relatives – Interim maintenance order of ₹3,000/- per month upheld – Tribunal directed to consider and dispose of the pending petition within three months [Paras 1-18].

Maintenance Tribunal – Interim Order – Tribunal’s interim order directing children to pay maintenance to parents upheld – Court emphasized balance of convenience in favour of aged parents with medical expenses and insufficient income – No interference with interlocutory order as maintenance amount is not excessive [Paras 15-16].

Decision: Writ Petition disposed of – Maintenance Tribunal directed to dispose of MP No.145/2022 within three months [Para 18].

Criminal Law -- Quashing – Section 168 IPC – Public Servant Engaging in Trade – Final Report Quashed – The petitioner, a public servant employed with Andrew Yule & Company Ltd., was charged under Section 168 IPC for allegedly working as a private PF & ESI consultant to various companies including Adyar Ananda Bhavan – Held: The petitioner was governed by certified Standing Orders which did not impose an absolute prohibition but merely required prior permission for other employment – Since there was no express legal prohibition, the essential ingredient of being 'legally bound not to engage in trade' under Section 168 IPC was not satisfied – The activity of professional consultancy does not constitute 'trade' within the meaning of Section 168 IPC – Consequently, the Final Report in C.C. No.8045 of 2017 was quashed – Criminal Original Petition allowed [Paras 13, 16, 19, 20].

Definition of Trade – Applicability to Professional Services – Section 168 IPC – The term 'trade' refers to the exchange of goods or services for profit but does not extend to sporadic professional consultancy services – Relying on Supreme Court judgments in State of Gujarat v. Maheshkumar Dhirajlal Thakkar and Competition Act definition – Held: Consultancy for preparing PF & ESI returns does not fall within the meaning of 'trade' under Section 168 IPC [Paras 14-16].

Legally Bound Not to Engage – Requirement under Section 168 IPC – The concept of 'legally bound' under Section 43 IPC applies only where the act is explicitly prohibited by law or rule – Standing Orders merely require prior permission, not an outright prohibition – The failure to seek permission constitutes a disciplinary issue but not a criminal offence under Section 168 IPC [Paras 17-19].

Conflict Between Standing Orders and Conduct Rules – Certified Standing Orders Override Conduct Rules – As per established legal principles, where Certified Standing Orders exist, they prevail over general Conduct Rules – Since Standing Orders applicable to the petitioner permitted other employment subject to permission, the general Conduct Rules relied upon by the prosecution were inapplicable [Paras 11-12].

Final Decision – Offence Not Made Out – Elements of Section 168 IPC Not Satisfied – Petitioner’s act of working as a consultant without prior permission may constitute misconduct but does not amount to a criminal offence – Final Report quashed – Criminal Original Petition allowed – Miscellaneous Petition closed [Paras 20].

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR - Public Servant – Engagement in Private Consultancy – No Legal Prohibition – Prosecution Quashed – The petitioner, employed with a government enterprise, was charged under Section 168 IPC for allegedly working as a private consultant for PF & ESI matters – The Court held that Standing Orders applicable to the petitioner do not prohibit such engagement, but only require prior written permission – Further, the activity was professional consultancy and not 'trade' within the meaning of Section 168 IPC – Held: No offence made out, and proceedings quashed [Paras 11–19].

Criminal Law – Definition of 'Trade' under Section 168 IPC – Consultancy Not Trade – Referring to Supreme Court rulings, Court held that consultancy services, especially when not involving trade or exchange of goods for profit, do not amount to 'trade' – The petitioner’s professional assistance in filing returns for a fee did not fall within the scope of prohibited activity under Section 168 – Held: Section 168 not attracted [Paras 14–16].

Standing Orders vs. Conduct Rules – Binding Nature – Court clarified that once certified Standing Orders are applicable to an employee under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, they prevail over general conduct rules – The Standing Orders allowed permission for external employment, which was not shown to be denied – Held: No legal bar was shown under which petitioner was bound to abstain from such activity [Paras 11–12, 18].

Criminal Proceedings – Quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Lack of Legal Ingredient – The Court held that even if all allegations in the final report are accepted as true, no offence is made out under Section 168 IPC – Held: Continuing prosecution would amount to abuse of process – Proceedings quashed [Para 19].

Decision – Petition Allowed – Criminal Original Petition allowed and Final Report in C.C. No. 8045 of 2017 quashed – No offence under Section 168 IPC made out on admitted facts – Connected miscellaneous petition closed [Para 20].

Criminal Law - Bail – Cancellation – Maintainability – Section 483(3) of BNSS – Petition Not Maintainable – The petitioner sought cancellation of bail granted to the accused under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and relevant BNSS provisions – Held: Cancellation of bail primarily lies before the court that granted it – Section 483(3) of BNSS (equivalent to Section 439(2) Cr.P.C.) does not confer appellate or revisional jurisdiction over discretionary bail orders of the Sessions Court – Mere disagreement with the bail order without showing violation of conditions or supervening circumstances is not a ground for cancellation – Petition dismissed as not maintainable [Paras 11-15].

Criminal Procedure – Bail – Supervisory and Inherent Powers – Limited Scope – The Court clarified that in the absence of legislative provision allowing an appeal or revision against a bail order, the remedy against a bail order passed erroneously lies under Article 227 of the Constitution or Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (inherent powers) – Routine invocation of Section 483(3) to challenge discretionary bail orders is impermissible unless supported by compelling reasons like breach of conditions, interference with witnesses, or tampering with evidence [Paras 14-16].

POCSO Act – Heinous Offence – Grant of Bail – Discretionary – While acknowledging that offences under the POCSO Act are serious and heinous, the Court held that unless the accused violates bail conditions or fresh circumstances arise, mere gravity of offence is not sufficient to warrant cancellation once bail is granted with conditions – No exceptional circumstances demonstrated in the present case [Paras 10-13].

Decision – Petition Dismissed – Criminal Petition under Section 483(3) of BNSS seeking cancellation of bail is dismissed as not maintainable – Liberty reserved for the petitioner to avail appropriate remedies under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or Section 482 of Cr.P.C. if so advised [Paras 16-17].

Taxation Law - Income Tax Act - Reassessment Proceedings – Validity of Notice – Notice Time-Barred – Reassessment quashed – The petitioner challenged the notice dated 29.07.2022 issued under Section 148 and the order dated 29.07.2022 passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act for AY 2013-14 – Held: In view of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, notices issued under TOLA between 1.4.2021 and 30.6.2021 must comply with the timeline prescribed therein – Since the petitioner’s notice dated 30.6.2021 allowed only one day for issuing the final notice post the mandatory reply period after the judgment in Ashish Agarwal (21.5.2022), the notice dated 29.7.2022 was beyond limitation and thus invalid – Impugned notices quashed [Paras 8-14].

Limitation for Reassessment – Interpretation of TOLA – Supreme Court Clarification Applied – Held: As per Rajeev Bansal, the legal fiction created in Ashish Agarwal suspended limitation during the pendency of deemed notices but required the final notice under Section 148 to be issued within the surviving period post-reply – The Revenue’s failure to issue the notice by 17.6.2022, the computed deadline, rendered the notice dated 29.7.2022 time-barred – Applying Rajeev Bansal, the Court held the entire reassessment invalid [Paras 10-12].

Effect of Supreme Court Judgments – Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal – Binding Precedent – Held: The Gujarat High Court reiterated that the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal apply pan-India and bind all High Courts and authorities – Any reassessment notices issued beyond the surviving period of limitation are invalid [Paras 10-12].

Decision – Assessment Order and Notice Quashed – The Court quashed the impugned order dated 29.07.2022 under Section 148A(d) and the reassessment notice dated 29.07.2022 along with the initial notice dated 30.06.2021 – Petition allowed – Rule made absolute – No order as to costs [Paras 13-14].