Wife Voluntarily Deserting Husband Without Just Cause Disentitled To Maintenance Under Section 125 CrPC Irrespective Of Husband's Income: Gujarat High Court

"Once the very foundation of the applicant's claim that she was compelled to live separately on account of cruelty and dowry-harassment at the hands of respondent no.1 and his family is found not proved, and on the contrary, it is found that she has, without sufficient and reasonable cause, withdrawn from the society of respondent no.1, the question of granting or enhancing maintenance does not arise, since a spouse who has voluntarily deserted the other without just cause is disentitled... from claiming maintenance under Section 125 of the Code, irrespective of the paying capacity of the other spouse," Gujrat High Court.

Reiterating that voluntary desertion disentitles a spouse from maintenance, the Gujarat High Court bench of Justice S.V. Pinto on October 23 held that where a wife fails to substantiate allegations of cruelty and voluntarily withdraws from the husband’s society without reasonable cause, she cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, regardless of the husband's financial capacity.

The revision application arose from a judgment of the Family Court, Nadiad, which had dismissed the applicant-wife’s application under Section 125 CrPC and recalled an earlier ex-parte maintenance order of ten thousand rupees per month. The wife had alleged that her husband, an Indian Army personnel, and his family subjected her to physical and mental cruelty over dowry demands and drove her out of the matrimonial home in March 2010. Conversely, the husband demonstrated that the wife had terminated her pregnancy in 2008 without his consent, resided continuously at her parental home since then, deserted him without just cause, and lodged a false criminal complaint under Section 498-A IPC which ended in an acquittal.

The primary legal issues before the High Court were whether a wife who voluntarily withdraws from the society of her husband without sufficient cause is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC solely on the basis of the husband's income, and whether the revisional court under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC can reappreciate evidence to overturn factual findings of desertion arrived at by the trial court.

Examining the supervisory nature of revisional powers, the High Court emphasized that jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC cannot be treated as appellate jurisdiction to re-evaluate the record.

Revisional court cannot reappreciate evidence absent glaring perversity or gross miscarriage of justice.

Citing the Supreme Court ruling in State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, the bench observed that the High Court calls for records only to satisfy itself regarding the legality, correctness, or propriety of the finding. Referring also to Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, the Court reiterated that Section 397 CrPC is circumscribed and exercisable only where there is a palpable error, non-compliance with statutory provisions, or an arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion.

The bench noted that the Family Court’s finding on desertion and cruelty was rooted in a comprehensive assessment of oral testimony, the wife's admission of undergoing pregnancy termination without spousal consent, and her continuous separate residence since 2008.

Acquittal in Section 498-A IPC proceedings confirmed lack of reasonable cause for separate residence.

The Court underscored that the wife’s criminal complaint under Section 498-A IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act had culminated in an acquittal that attained finality without appeal, demolishing her plea of being driven out for dowry. The bench found that the applicant had failed to show any error of law or demonstrate that the trial court ignored material evidence or admitted inadmissible proof.

Addressing the petitioner’s contention that the Family Court ought to have enhanced the maintenance amount rather than rejecting it outright, the High Court held that such an argument misunderstood the foundational prerequisites of Section 125 CrPC.

Voluntary withdrawal from matrimonial society disentitles spouse to maintenance irrespective of paying capacity.

The Court affirmed that when the underlying premise of cruelty is disproved and voluntary abandonment is established, statutory maintenance cannot be awarded or enhanced merely because the husband has sufficient pensionary or salary income. The Court observed that a spouse who withdraws from the society of the other without just reason is legally disqualified from demanding maintenance under the Code.

Concluding that the Family Court’s decision was a plausible view supported by the record and free from jurisdictional infirmity or perversity, the High Court dismissed the criminal revision application and affirmed the order rejecting the maintenance claim.

Date of Decision: October 23, 2026