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by kapil
29 October 2026 4:48 PM
"Though the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 was introduced by CPC (Amendment) Act, 2002, the same does not mean that the Plaintiff in a pre-2002 suit can amend the plaint at any point of time." Bombay High Court has held that the non-applicability of the post-trial due diligence proviso under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to suits instituted prior to the 2002 CPC amendment does not grant a litigant an unfettered license to carry out belated, mala fide, or time-barred amendments.
Justice Sandeep V. Marne, in a judgment delivered on 28 October 2026, affirmed a trial court order rejecting a plaintiff's attempt to substitute the suit property's Gat number and challenge decade-old alienations after valuable third-party rights had accrued.
The plaintiffs had instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 85 of 1995 seeking declaration of title and possession over agricultural lands described as Gat Nos. 583 and 612. After the suit was dismissed for default in 2000 and restored nine years later in 2009, an amendment was permitted in 2013 to challenge a 2008 sale deed exclusively regarding Gat No. 583. Subsequently, in November 2017, Plaintiff No. 1 moved an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC seeking to substitute Gat No. 612 with Gat No. 602 under the guise of an inadvertent typographical error and assailed numerous registered documents executed between 2006 and 2008. The 2nd Joint Civil Judge Senior Division, Vadgaon Maval, Pune rejected the application at Exhibit 70 on 23 April 2018, leading to the writ petition.
Whether a plaintiff in a suit instituted prior to the enforcement of the CPC (Amendment) Act, 2002 is entitled to amend the plaint at any belated stage to alter property particulars and introduce time-barred challenges to alienations?
Whether the exception carved out in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi exempting non-signatories from the three-year limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to suits claiming absolute ownership rather than the protection of an undivided co-ownership share?
Examining the record, the High Court observed that the proposed modification of the suit property from Gat No. 612 to Gat No. 602 was not a bona fide typographical correction. Justice Marne highlighted that the boundaries expressly detailed in the 1995 plaint corresponded solely to Gat No. 612 and that no amendment to the boundary descriptions had been prayed for.
Pre-suit correspondence and deliberate omissions demonstrated conscious prosecution qua original property
The Court observed that the plaintiffs had consistently asserted rights over Gat No. 612 even in their pre-suit revenue proceedings initiated before the Collector in 1994, accompanied by the 7/12 extract of Gat No. 612. The bench emphasized that when the plaintiffs previously amended the plaint in 2013 to assail a sale deed dated 26 December 2008 which encompassed both Gat Nos. 583 and 602, they consciously restricted their challenge to Gat No. 583 alone.
Justice Marne held that having deliberately omitted Gat No. 602 in the earlier round of amendment, the petitioner made an unequivocal representation that Gat No. 602 was not the subject matter of the dispute. Permitting such a substitution after decades would fundamentally alter the character of the litigation and defeat accrued third-party interests.
Third-party rights and gross negligence bar belated property substitution
The Court underscored that multiple innocent third-party purchasers had acquired portions of Gat No. 602 through registered conveyances after verifying that the land was unencumbered by pending litigation. The bench observed that a grossly negligent litigant cannot turn around decades later to alter the description of the suit property to the prejudice of third parties.
Turning to the challenge mounted against the conveyances executed between 2006 and 2008, the bench turned down the petitioner's reliance on the Supreme Court ruling in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi. Justice Marne distinguished the precedent, holding that the dispensation from Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is confined to co-owners who seek an incidental declaration that an unauthorized alienation by another co-owner does not affect their undivided share.
Article 59 of Limitation Act attracts where plaintiff asserts sole title and seeks cancellation of deeds
The Court explained that the plaintiffs in the present dispute were not admitted co-owners, but were seeking an affirmative declaration of absolute title over the entire suit property while branding the defendant's deeds as void. In such actions, an express declaration setting aside the conveyances is indispensable, rendering the prayers governed by Article 59 of the Limitation Act.
Justice Marne reiterated the principles crystallized by the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited, noting that where the proposed relief is ex-facie time-barred or introduced with mala fide intent to force negotiating concessions, courts are justified in disallowing the amendment. The Court observed that the petitioner had suppressed the 2013 amendment and failed to implead the proposed new defendants in the writ petition.
Pre-2002 institution does not license endless amendments to prolong lis
Addressing the contention that the restrictive proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC does not govern suits filed prior to the 2002 amendment, the bench clarified that the absence of the statutory proviso does not mean that litigants hold an untrammeled right to amend pleadings indefinitely. The Court warned against permitting endless iterations of amendments designed to drag defendants through protracted litigation spanning over three decades.
The High Court affirmed the trial court's order, holding that the proposed amendments were hopelessly barred by limitation, lacked bona fides, and would severely prejudice third-party rights, and consequently dismissed the writ petition.
Date of Decision: 28 October 2026