Third Party to Contract Cannot Challenge Decree of Specific Performance: Andhra Pradesh High Court

“Where findings of fact are supported by admissible evidence, reappreciation is impermissible in Second Appeal” – High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati delivered a decisive judgment in Second Appeal No. 364 of 2015, affirming the specific performance of a registered possessory agreement of sale executed in 1979. The Court, speaking through Justice V. Gopala Krishna Rao, dismissed the appeal filed by the third defendant, who was not a party to the original agreement, emphasizing that “findings of the First Appellate Court based on evidence cannot be reopened in a Second Appeal unless shown to be perverse or contrary to settled law.”

The ruling assumes significance for its reiteration of the narrow scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and for reinforcing the settled legal position that third parties unconnected with the contract of sale cannot challenge the decree of specific performance granted against vendors or their legal representatives.

Execution of Registered Sale Agreement Undisputed: “Possession Delivered, Consideration Paid”

The case centered around a registered possessory agreement of sale dated 09.03.1979, executed by one K. Suryanarayana in favour of the original plaintiff, Tanala Rama Rao. As per the record, the entire sale consideration of ₹5,000 was paid at the time of execution, and "possession of the property was simultaneously handed over to the plaintiff," who also secured an electricity connection in his name in the same year.

The plaintiff contended that after the death of Suryanarayana, he made repeated oral demands to the legal heirs (defendants 1 and 2) to execute a regular sale deed. However, no action was taken, and the plaintiff was eventually forced to initiate proceedings for specific performance in 1992.

The First Appellate Court, reversing the Trial Court’s dismissal, granted the decree of specific performance and directed execution of a regular sale deed. It also ordered eviction of the third defendant—plaintiff’s own brother—who was found to be in permissive possession and not a lawful tenant.

“Third Defendant Had No Locus”: Court Refuses to Entertain Challenge from Stranger to the Agreement

Justice V. Gopala Krishna Rao dismissed the appeal of the third defendant, holding that he was not a party to the contract of sale and had no legal standing to challenge the decree passed against defendants 1 and 2, who had remained ex parte throughout the proceedings and never appealed the decree of specific performance.

“The defendant No. 3, who is unconnected with the agreement of sale, cannot question the enforceability of a contract that stands unchallenged by the executant’s legal representatives,” the Court held, relying on Zarina Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam and Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao.

The Court further noted that the defendant No. 3 had not proved any independent tenancy rights and instead admitted in his written statement that he had been residing in the property allegedly as a tenant under Suryanarayana. However, in his testimony, he contradicted this by naming a different original owner—an inconsistency which, the Court held, exposed his “intent to mislead the Court.”

The Court concluded that the possession of defendant No. 3 was only permissive, having been allowed by the plaintiff when the latter borrowed ₹10,000 from him. Once that amount was repaid, the defendant had no legal right to remain in occupation.

Oral Demand Can Satisfy Section 16(c) If Sufficiently Proven: Plaintiff Demonstrated Readiness and Willingness

The appellant's counsel had argued that the suit should fail for lack of notice under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, citing non-compliance with Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A, CPC. Rejecting the contention, the Court observed:

“Oral demand by the buyer, if strongly and unimpeachably proven, is sufficient compliance with the law,” citing Baddam Prathap Reddy v. Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy.

In the present case, the plaintiff had clearly pleaded and proved his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract during the lifetime of the vendor and thereafter from his legal heirs. The Court noted that:

“The plaintiff made oral demands to the vendor, and later to his sons, who did not deny execution or payment. Their silence and absence from the witness box attract an adverse presumption.”

Certified Copy of Lost Sale Agreement Admissible: Cyclone Led to Loss of Original

One of the key issues raised was the absence of the original agreement of sale, which the plaintiff claimed was lost in a cyclone in 1990. He produced a certified registration copy obtained from the Sub-Registrar's office.

Accepting this, the Court held that the execution of the sale agreement was not disputed by defendants 1 and 2, and “in such circumstances, secondary evidence in the form of certified copy is admissible under law.”

No Substantial Question of Law: Scope of Section 100 CPC Reaffirmed

Justice Rao observed that none of the appellant's grounds raised any “substantial question of law” as required under Section 100 CPC. The High Court cited Supreme Court precedents (Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh, Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai) to reiterate:

“High Court cannot interfere with findings of the First Appellate Court unless they are perverse, contrary to law, or based on inadmissible evidence.”

The First Appellate Court had, based on oral and documentary evidence, found the agreement genuine, execution established, and readiness and willingness duly proven. Hence, the High Court found no basis to interfere.

Eviction Upheld, Second Appeal Dismissed

In conclusion, the High Court confirmed the First Appellate Court’s decree of specific performance against the legal heirs of the original vendor and the consequential eviction of the third defendant from the suit property. The Court directed that no costs be awarded and closed all pending applications.

This ruling is a reaffirmation of settled principles of contract law and appellate jurisdiction. It underscores that once the legal representatives of the executant do not dispute a registered agreement or deny its execution, third parties cannot reopen the issue. It also highlights the limited grounds available in a second appeal, serving as a caution against re-litigation of factual findings already adjudicated upon.

Date of Decision: 20.01.2026