There Is No Law That Presumes Guilt Merely Because Accused Could Not Explain — Calcutta High Court Acquits All Accused In Triple Murder Case

Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked where prosecution fails to prove even the presence of the accused —  On April 2, 2025, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court setting aside the conviction of Uma Dey, Tapan Dey, and Baikuntha Nandi who were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment till death by the Special Court (Sessions Trial No. 352 of 2009). The accused were charged under Sections 498A, 302, and 201 IPC for allegedly torturing and murdering Pratima Dey and her two minor daughters. 
 
The Court held that “The prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the presence of appellant Tapan Kumar Dey and Baikuntha Nandi in the house of the deceased. The question of shifting the burden of proof under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, therefore, does not and cannot arise.” 
 
 “There is no law that presumes guilt merely because the accused could not explain” —  Court dismisses Trial Court's reliance on Section 106 Evidence Act 
 
The incident dated February 20, 2009, involved the tragic death of Pratima Dey and her two daughters, allegedly due to strangulation followed by setting them on fire. The prosecution relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, statements of relatives and neighbors, and the claim that the accused were last seen with the victims. However, the High Court found that crucial procedural safeguards were absent. 
 
The Court categorically noted that "no prior complaint of cruelty under Section 498A existed even after 15 years of marriage," and observed that the allegations were “vague and omnibus.” Referring to the Supreme Court’s precedent in Digambar v. State of Maharashtra (2024 INSC 1019), the Court held that “mere allegations of torture without specific details or prior complaints are insufficient to constitute an offence under Section 498A IPC.” 
 
The Bench also highlighted a critical flaw — “The prosecution has not explained the suspicious delay of over two weeks in recording the Section 164 CrPC statement of PW15, the so-called star witness.” The Court emphasized that statements under Section 164 are expected to be spontaneous, reliable, and recorded without undue delay to prevent fabrication. Relying on B.N. John v. State of U.P. (2025 INSC 4), the Court reiterated that “when a crucial fact is missing from the FIR and later introduced through delayed statements, it appears to be a belated formulation.” 
 
“Poor investigation is not an excuse, but prosecution must still prove its case beyond doubt” — High Court disapproves Trial Court’s findings 
 
The Court severely criticized the manner in which the post-mortem was conducted. The PM doctor admitted that he was not a forensic expert and that the dissections were performed by an untrained Dom. The Court remarked: “The unprofessional and disgraceful post-mortem report fails to support the case of the prosecution,” casting serious doubt on the prosecution’s theory of homicide. 
 
The Bench also ruled that Section 106 Evidence Act could not have been invoked as the prosecution had not proved the presence of Tapan Dey or Baikuntha Nandi at the crime scene. Referring to Arvind Singh v. State of Maharashtra [(2021) 11 SCC 1], the Court stressed that “Section 106 does not relieve the prosecution of its primary burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.” 
 
Further, the Court rejected the application of the “last seen theory,” noting that, except for one witness (PW-8) who saw only the mother-in-law Pushpa Dey (now deceased), no other evidence established the accused’s presence at the scene. The Bench underlined, “Prosecution has failed to prove the presence of any of the appellants in the house of the victims.” 
 
Conviction Set Aside, Accused Acquitted 
 After examining the entirety of evidence and procedural irregularities, the Court concluded, “The chain of circumstances against the appellants is neither complete nor unbroken.” The judgment ordered the immediate release of Uma Dey and discharge of the bail bonds of Tapan Dey and Baikuntha Nandi. The appeals were allowed, and the conviction was set aside. 
 
The judgment ends with the affirmation that criminal jurisprudence mandates that “suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.” 
 
Date of Decision: April 2, 2025