Termination of Judicial Probationer Quashed: Principles of Article 311(2) and Natural Justice Upheld by Punjab & Haryana High Court

Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed the termination of a judicial probationer in the case of Peeyush Gakhar v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana and Another. The court held that the termination of the petitioner’s services was violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and principles of natural justice. The petitioner was ordered to be reinstated with continuity of service, back wages, and seniority.

The court ruled, "If the foundation of termination is allegations of misconduct, Article 311(2) safeguards are mandatory. A termination order camouflaged as innocuous but rooted in punitive action cannot stand without a fair hearing."

Peeyush Gakhar, a probationer in the Haryana Civil Services (Judicial Branch), was terminated from service on January 8, 2010, following allegations of misconduct stemming from a complaint by his estranged wife, Ms. Gomati Manocha, a fellow judicial officer.

The petitioner was appointed as a judicial officer on October 3, 2006, and joined service on October 25, 2006. After completing his training and passing the departmental examination in 2007, his performance was consistently rated as “Good” in his Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs). However, his marriage to Ms. Manocha in May 2009 deteriorated, and she filed a complaint alleging misconduct, prompting the involvement of the Administrative Judge.

In a report dated December 9, 2009, the Administrative Judge concluded that the petitioner was “unbecoming of a judicial officer” and characterized his conduct as “depraved.” The report formed the basis for the Full Court’s recommendation to terminate the petitioner’s services. The termination order was issued without initiating any formal disciplinary proceedings or issuing a charge sheet.

The petitioner challenged the termination order before the High Court, arguing that it was punitive in nature and violated the safeguards under Article 311(2) of the Constitution.

Termination Found to Be Punitive, Not Innocuous

The court analyzed whether the termination order was a simple discharge of a probationer or a punitive action necessitating procedural safeguards under Article 311(2). Citing the principles established in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831, the court emphasized the distinction between the "motive" and "foundation" of a termination order.

The court observed: “If the termination is founded on allegations of misconduct, it is punitive in nature, even if it is worded as an innocuous discharge. The substance of the order, not its form, is decisive.”

The court found that the termination was based on the complaint filed by Ms. Manocha and the subsequent adverse report of the Administrative Judge. These formed the foundation of the termination order. It was noted that no charge sheet was issued, no disciplinary inquiry was held, and the petitioner was not provided an opportunity to defend himself.

The court held: “The petitioner was deprived of a fair opportunity to defend himself. The report of the Administrative Judge, which was based on the complaint of the petitioner’s former wife, was acted upon without granting the petitioner a chance to present his case. Such an action violates Article 311(2) of the Constitution.”

Probationer’s Rights and Applicability of Article 311(2)

While probationers do not have an inherent right to confirmation, the court reiterated that their services cannot be terminated in a punitive manner without adhering to procedural safeguards. The court referred to K.H. Phadnis v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 1 SCC 790, and Abhay Jain v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 2022 (2) SCT 124, to underscore the principle that the substance of a termination order is critical in determining whether Article 311(2) applies.

The court observed: “In the present case, the foundation of the termination was allegations of misconduct. When misconduct forms the basis of termination, procedural safeguards under Article 311(2) are mandatory. The respondent’s failure to follow these safeguards renders the termination order unsustainable.”

"Shamsher Singh Principles Reiterated"

The court relied heavily on the principles laid down in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831, which held that:

If the termination is based on unsuitability (motive), procedural safeguards under Article 311(2) are not attracted.

However, if the termination is based on allegations of misconduct (foundation), it is punitive, requiring compliance with Article 311(2).

The court noted: “The Administrative Judge’s report, which formed the foundation of the termination order, stigmatized the petitioner as a person of depraved character. This clearly demonstrates that the termination was not a simple discharge but a punitive action.”

The court emphasized that the principles of natural justice were flagrantly violated in this case. The petitioner was neither informed of the complaint against him nor given an opportunity to respond to the allegations. The court observed:
“Substantially, it can be concluded that the report of the Administrative Judge is based on the complaint filed by the petitioner’s former wife. The petitioner was deprived of a fair opportunity to defend himself. Such action offends the fundamental principles of natural justice.”

The court further noted that the petitioner’s performance as a judicial officer was consistently rated as “Good” in his ACRs, and no significant issues were raised regarding his professional conduct.

Concluding that the termination was punitive and violative of Article 311(2), the court quashed the termination order and directed the petitioner’s reinstatement with continuity of service, seniority, and back wages. The court, however, granted liberty to the respondents to initiate disciplinary proceedings, if deemed necessary, in accordance with the law.

The court held: “Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and discussion, this court is left with no choice but to order the petitioner’s reinstatement with continuity of service, back wages, and seniority. However, the respondent shall have the liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings, if so advised.”

The judgment reaffirms the principle that even probationers are entitled to constitutional safeguards under Article 311(2) if their termination is based on allegations of misconduct. The court's emphasis on substance over form ensures that authorities cannot circumvent procedural fairness by disguising punitive actions as innocuous terminations.

Date of Decision: January 17, 2025