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by Admin
07 May 2024 2:49 AM
Exclusive Right Over Route Does Not Exist—Private Operators Cannot Object to Temporary Permit Without Showing Specific Prejudice - Karnataka High Court dismissed writ petitions filed by private bus operators, who had challenged the grant of a temporary permit to the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) on the Mangaluru–Karkala route. The Court, in a detailed and reasoned order, ruled that the permit was validly issued under Section 87(1)(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and not under Section 87(2)(i), which requires a court restraint for validity.
Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde, upholding the Regional Transport Authority’s (RTA) decision, declared: “The larger public interest appears to have weighed in the mind of the competent authority while granting the permission. In a situation where the Authority has given a finding that there is demand from the students and public from the rural area, this Court does not find valid reasons to interfere.”
“Court Never Restrained the Authority—So Section 87(2)(i) Does Not Apply, But Permit Still Valid Under 87(1)(c)”
The main argument of the petitioners was that the RTA wrongly invoked Section 87(2)(i)—which applies only when a court or authority restrains permit issuance under Sections 72, 74, or 76—and since no such restraint existed, the permit was without jurisdiction.
While agreeing that Section 87(2)(i) could not apply, the Court examined the application filed by KSRTC on 31.07.2023, seeking a temporary permit to meet a particular temporary need, which falls under Section 87(1)(c). It found: “As already noticed, for the same route, the permanent permits were issued in favour of the respondent-Corporation and were later set aside in revision. Pending reconsideration of those applications, the temporary need remains valid.”
Thus, the Court concluded: “It cannot be concluded that the permits are issued only in exercise of power under Section 87(2)(i). Considering the contents of the application dated 31.07.2023 and the second application dated 07.12.2024, the permits are rightly issued under Section 87(1)(c).”
“No Monopoly Over Routes—Private Operators Must Show Actual Prejudice, Mere Permit Issuance Is Not Sufficient”
Rejecting the petitioners’ claim that their existing route permits were infringed upon, the Court noted that no monopoly over public transport routes exists, and temporary permits do not annul existing valid permits.
The Court emphasized: “The petitioners do not have the exclusive right to operate on the said routes. Under the existing law, permits can also be issued to the State Road Transport Corporation if conditions are met.”
Moreover, it held that the petitioners had not even alleged that the newly issued permits clashed with their bus timings or otherwise caused operational prejudice.
“Second Application May Not Be in Prescribed Format—But That’s No Ground for Challenge from Third Parties”
The Court also addressed the procedural objection that the second application by KSRTC on 07.12.2024 was not in the prescribed statutory format. Justice Hegde was unpersuaded, observing: “Merely because the second application is not in the prescribed format, it cannot be considered that the petitioners’ interests are prejudiced. They are not entitled to a hearing at the stage of consideration of a temporary permit application.”
The Court harmonized this view with the principle laid down in W.P. No. 51756/2012, and concluded that the earlier application of July 2023 was effectively revived and modified by the second application.
“Temporary and Permanent Needs Can Coexist—Temporary Permits Valid Even While Pakka Permit Is Pending”
The petitioners contended that once the permanent permit matter was pending after remand by the appellate authority, no temporary permit should be granted.
The Court rejected this, relying on the Constitution Bench decision in MP State Road Transport Corporation v. B.P. Upadhyaya, which held: “The contention that whenever there is a permanent need, there cannot be a temporary need is erroneous. Both may coexist.”
“No Cause for Interference Under Article 226—Administrative Orders Based on Public Demand Must Be Respected”
Finally, the Court held that public demand for connectivity between rural and urban areas, especially for students, was a sufficient reason to uphold the temporary permits. The nature of such administrative decisions, when made with public interest in mind, warrants deference under writ jurisdiction.
It concluded: “In exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, this Court does not find valid reasons to interfere in the order issuing temporary permits in favour of respondent-Corporation, that too when there is no showing of procedural malice or personal prejudice.”
This judgment reinforces that temporary permits issued for public interest, especially where the applicant is a State Transport Corporation, are entirely lawful so long as the statutory structure under Section 87(1)(c) is followed—even if the permanent permit is yet to be decided. The Court sent a clear message to private operators: “Existence of permit is not exclusion of others—no prejudice lies in co-existence.”
Date of Decision: 4 March 2025