Supreme Court Rules Section 498A IPC Extends To Live-In Relationships In The Nature Of Marriage With Intent To Marry

"Where a man induces a woman to believe that she is lawfully married to him, and thereafter subjects her to cruelty, such a man cannot be permitted to evade criminal responsibility on the plea that no valid marriage existed in law." Supreme Court, in a landmark ruling dated August 3, 2026, held that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code applies to live-in relationships that qualify as relationships in the nature of marriage, provided the intent to marry is established.

A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh observed that excluding partners in such domestic arrangements from the penal provision would create an unconstitutional classification failing the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. The bench noted that cruelty does not check at the door whether a house belongs to a legally wedded couple or partners in a live-in arrangement.

The appeals arose from a judgment of the High Court of Karnataka which had rejected the appellant's petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to quash criminal proceedings. The appellant and respondent no. 2 had been embroiled in matrimonial disputes after entering into a relationship, leading to criminal complaints alleging offences under Section 498A IPC and other provisions. The accused contended that a valid marriage is a sine qua non for prosecuting a person under Section 498A, while the complainant maintained that the relationship possessed all the trappings of a marital union.

The primary question before the court was whether Section 498A IPC can be given a construction so as to include a man in a live-in relationship. The court was also called upon to determine whether the protections under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 suffice to address such grievances or if penal consequences under criminal law are warranted.

Purposive Interpretation Of Penal Statutes

The court examined the canons of statutory interpretation, noting that while penal statutes require strict construction, strict interpretation does not encompass literalism that defeats legislative intent. Referencing Constitution Bench rulings such as Commissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co. and Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, the bench observed that penal statutes must be fairly construed according to the true intent and real purpose of the legislature without leaving loopholes for offenders to escape.

"Strict Interpretation" Does Not Mean Literalism

The judges emphasized that penal provisions must not be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. Quoting Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Wiltberger, the bench reiterated that penal laws are not to be interpreted in a manner that narrows words to the exclusion of cases clearly comprehended by the legislative design.

Mischief Rule And Social Context Adjudication

Invoking the Heydon's case rule of purposive construction, the court stressed that the interpretation which remedies the gap and advances the remedy must be adopted. The bench observed that in a welfare state, legislations intended to combat social evils must be interpreted realistically to ensure the benefit reaches those vulnerable sections for whom institutional safeguards are designed.

Object, Import And Misuse Of Section 498A IPC

The court traced the historical evolution of Section 498A, introduced by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983, to combat the menace of dowry deaths and cruelty to women. While acknowledging catena of judgments highlighting the rampant misuse of the provision to harass families, the bench reiterated the principle from Janshruti v. Union di India that the mere possibility of occasional misuse does not render a constitutionally sound objective provision infirm or trivial.

Live-In Relationships And Relationships In The Nature Of Marriage

Analyzing the concept of live-in relationships alongside precedents such as D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, the court clarified that not all live-in relationships amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage. The bench delineated key indicators including duration, shared household, pooling of resources, domestic arrangements, sexual relationship, socialization, and the common intention of the parties.

Civil Remedies Under DV Act Do Not Suffice

Addressing the submission that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 adequately covers live-in partners, the court held that the DV Act is predominantly a civil legislation. The bench emphasized that civil remedies and monetary relief are fundamentally different in impact and deterrence compared to penal punishment backed by the force of criminal law, rendering the argument that the DV Act suffices legally flawed.

Constitutional Challenge Under Articles 14 And 21

The court elevated the dispute to a constitutional question under Articles 14, 15, and 21, scrutinizing whether differentiating between a married woman and a woman in a live-in relationship regarding protection against cruelty stands on firm ground. Relying on landmarks such as K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India and Joseph Shine v. Union of India, the bench held that the right to choose a partner is an intrinsic part of individual autonomy and spatial-associational privacy.

Classification Without Intelligible Differentia

The bench ruled that the distinction between a married woman and a woman in a live-in relationship in the nature of marriage, for the purposes of Section 498A protection, bears no rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic violence. Consequently, the court held that excluding live-in partners from Section 498A is offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Safeguards Against Arbitrary Arrest

To address concerns regarding potential misuse, the court restricted the extended scope to live-in relationships where an intention to marry is clearly established, requiring a higher standard of proof. Furthermore, the bench mandated the strict application of procedural safeguards and arrest protocols laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, ensuring no automatic arrests are made without preliminary inquiries and adherence to Section 41 CrPC parameters.

Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court held that the allegations in the FIR regarding suppression of a prior marriage, harassment for dowry, and physical injury prima facie constituted a cognizable offence. Concluding that the trial court must be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law, the apex court dismissed the appeals and refused to quash the criminal proceedings.

Date of Decision: 03 August 2026