Supreme Court Quashes Termination Of Two Women Judges: Holds High Court's Action Punitive, Arbitrary And Stigmatic

While gender is not a rescue for poor performance, it is a critical consideration which must weigh for holistic decision-making at certain times and stages of a woman judicial officer - In a significant pronouncement Supreme Court in Sarita Choudhary & Aditi Kumar Sharma v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. set aside the termination orders of two women judicial officers, Sarita Choudhary and Aditi Kumar Sharma, holding that their termination was not a mere termination simpliciter due to unsatisfactory probation but amounted to a punitive and stigmatic dismissal without complying with the safeguards under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The Court emphasised that the termination was vitiated by arbitrariness, non-application of mind, and failure to give the petitioners an opportunity to defend against the alleged adverse material. The judgment is also notable for the Court's sensitive and progressive remarks on the unique challenges faced by women in judicial service, especially during motherhood, health crises, and the work-life balance.

The two petitioners, Sarita Choudhary and Aditi Kumar Sharma, were serving as Civil Judges (Junior Division) in Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service. Both had completed their probation and had served for multiple years with varying ACR gradings ranging from ‘Very Good’ to ‘Average’. On 23.05.2023, the State of Madhya Pradesh, acting on the recommendation of the Full Court of the High Court, issued termination orders under Rule 11(c) of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994, citing non-satisfactory completion of probation.

The petitioners challenged the termination, asserting that the orders were punitive, stigmatic, and had been passed without adherence to the principles of natural justice and Article 311 of the Constitution. The petitioners highlighted that their performance had improved over time and that adverse remarks, if any, were not communicated promptly, thus depriving them of an opportunity to improve.

Appearing for the petitioners, the Amicus Curiae and senior counsel argued that the termination orders were disguised punishment orders. They pointed out that the High Court took into account certain complaints and adverse remarks in ACRs without giving them an opportunity to be heard, rendering the termination punitive in nature. Relying on Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India and Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. S.N. Bose National Centre, it was contended that even when an order of termination appears facially innocent, the Court is empowered to lift the veil and examine if it is founded on allegations of misconduct.

On behalf of the High Court, it was submitted that probationers have no right to hold the post and may be discharged without an enquiry or hearing. It was contended that under Rule 11 of the Recruitment Rules, confirmation requires positive satisfaction by the High Court, and absence of such satisfaction is sufficient for termination. Counsel stressed that "a probationer has no indefeasible right to continue" and that "mere complaints, even if pending or closed, can still be taken into account in the overall assessment."

The High Court heavily relied on precedents including Ved Priya, Satya Narayan Jhavar, and Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad Sinha, to argue that probationers may be terminated on the ground of unsuitability without notice.

The Court laid down that while it is true that probationers have no vested right to be confirmed, the law equally mandates that if termination is based on allegations of misconduct or inefficiency having civil consequences, then an enquiry is essential. The Bench observed that "If a probationer is unsuitable for a job and has been terminated, then such a case is non-stigmatic as it is a termination simpliciter. However, if it is based on misconduct or adverse material resulting in a stigma, it becomes punitive."

Quoting Parshotam Lal Dhingra, the Court reiterated that "if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with."

In applying this test, the Court held that the administrative records showed that "the complaints, advisories, warnings and even pending inquiries were considered as part of the foundation for termination" and not merely as background material. The Court noted that "Even on perusal of the records of the petitioners submitted by the learned counsel for the High Court in a sealed cover, they do not persuade us to take a different view."

Case-Specific Findings on Sarita Choudhary

With regard to Sarita Choudhary, the Court observed that her ACRs had fluctuated between ‘Very Good’, ‘Good’ and ‘Average’, but never reflected incapacity or dishonesty. Despite a few complaints resulting only in warnings or advisories, no formal enquiry was ever initiated. The Court found that "although she may have received certain criticisms in her ACRs, she was simultaneously appreciated for her judicial integrity, punctuality, conduct in court and ability to dispose of old cases."

The Court remarked that "the assessment charts placed before the Full Court did not bring out positive aspects like her high unit value for old case disposals." The Bench further observed that the adverse remarks were communicated with significant delay, depriving her of an opportunity to correct and respond effectively.

Case-Specific Findings on Aditi Kumar Sharma

The Court took judicial notice of the fact that Aditi Kumar Sharma suffered not only from the professional challenges of handling a vacant court but also personal tragedies, including contracting Covid-19, hospitalization, miscarriage, and serious illness in the family. In this context, the Court remarked:

"It is not enough to find comfort solely in the growing number of female judicial officers if we are unable to secure for them a sensitive work environment and guidance."

The Court found that her downgrading in the ACR was solely due to disposal figures without considering the factual realities explained by her. The Bench noted that "her judicial performance, especially quality-wise, remained consistently appreciated even in her ACRs, with no adverse findings regarding integrity or conduct."

The Court found it unacceptable that the Administrative Committee relied on her unapproved and under-process ACR for the year 2022. "An unapproved and unprocessed ACR is akin to irrelevant material and could not have been placed for consideration before the Committee," the Court held.

The Test of Stigma

Applying the settled law from Samsher Singh, Dipti Prakash Banerjee, and Anoop Jaiswal, the Court concluded that the termination orders were not innocuous. "When termination is by way of punishment, the concept of stigma would arise. If a punishment casts a stigma on the competence of an employee, it can affect their future career."

The Court categorically found that "the surrounding circumstances show that the terminations were, inter alia, founded on the allegations of the complaints of misconduct and 'inefficiency' and were stigmatic in nature," and thus, punitive.

Supreme Court on Gender and Workplace Sensitivity

"While gender is not a rescue for poor performance, it is a critical consideration which must weigh for holistic decision-making at certain times and stages of a woman judicial officer."

The Court emphasized that pregnancy, miscarriage, health conditions, and socio-cultural realities cannot be ignored in judicial assessments. Referring to Babita Puniya and Nitisha v. Indian Army, the Bench condemned gender-insensitive practices in the judicial appointment and confirmation process, stating:

"It is important to secure for women judges a sensitive work environment and guidance."

The Court allowed the writ petitions and suo motu writ petition, quashing the termination orders dated 23.05.2023, the Full Court resolution dated 13.05.2023, and all related proceedings. The Court directed reinstatement of both officers within 15 days with continuity of service, but without back wages for the intervening period, while protecting their pensionary benefits.

The Court further directed that probation be declared effective from the date their juniors were confirmed and left it open for the High Court to deal with pending complaints, if any, in accordance with law.

The judgment is a landmark in reinforcing the constitutional protection under Article 311(2) for probationary judicial officers, clarifying the thin line between unsuitability-based termination and stigmatic dismissal. Importantly, it is a progressive step towards building a gender-sensitive judicial administration by reminding the courts and judicial institutions of their constitutional duty to factor in the lived realities of women officers.

The Court fittingly concluded by appreciating Senior Advocate Gaurav Agrawal for his assistance as Amicus Curiae.

Date of Decision: 28th February 2025