Use of Permitted Synthetic Colour in Dal Masur Still Constitutes Adulteration: Punjab & Haryana High Court Uphold Conviction

Use of synthetic food colour in Dal Masur is strictly prohibited... even if permitted for other food items –Punjab and Haryana High Court delivered a reasoned and reportable verdict concerning food safety regulations under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. While affirming the petitioner’s conviction for selling adulterated Dal Masur coloured with sunset yellow synthetic dye, the Court modified the sentence due to the inordinate delay of over two decades in final adjudication, observing that “right to speedy and expeditious trial is one of the most valuable and cherished rights guaranteed under the Constitution.”

The Court reduced the original sentence of three months’ rigorous imprisonment to the “period already undergone,” which was seven days, but enhanced the fine from ₹500 to ₹10,000, to be paid within four weeks. Failure to pay would revive the original sentence, the Court clarified.

Conviction Originated from Sale of Coloured Dal Masur in 1999

The prosecution arose out of a food safety inspection conducted on September 28, 1999, by Government Food Inspector Sham Lal Mahiwal. Aditya Kumar was found possessing 20 kg of Dal Masur at his shop for public sale. Upon sampling and analysis by the Public Analyst, it was found that the Dal Masur contained synthetic colour “sunset yellow,” which is not permitted for use in lentils.

The petitioner was convicted under Section 7 read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. His conviction by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar, was delivered on October 20, 2007, and later affirmed by the appellate court on January 7, 2010. He had been on bail since January 12, 2010, when the High Court admitted the revision petition.

Court Rejects Defence of Permissible Colouring: “Dal Masur not included under Rule 29”

The petitioner’s primary defence was that sunset yellow was a permitted synthetic colour under the PFA Rules. The Court, however, unequivocally rejected this contention by holding that “the addition of a colouring matter to any article of food except as specifically permitted by these rules, is prohibited.” Referring to Rule 29 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, the Court observed, “Dal Masur is not included therein and as such, use of synthetic food colour in Dal Masur is strictly prohibited.”

It further stated that, “even if the colour is permitted for other foods, its use in Dal Masur is strictly prohibited,” making it clear that the violation was not merely technical but substantial in nature, and the offence under Section 7/16(1)(a)(i) of the PFA Act was fully established.

No Procedural Violations under PFA Act and Rules: “Substantial compliance shown”

The petitioner also challenged the conviction on technical grounds, including alleged violations of Rules 17, 18, and 22 of the PFA Rules, and non-compliance with Section 13(2) of the Act. However, the Court found no merit in these contentions.

On the issue of non-service of the analyst’s report, the Court said, “Registered envelope containing the letter was never returned back, raising presumption that it was served upon the addressee i.e. the accused.” Moreover, the accused “never pleaded that he had not received the report” during his statement under Section 313 CrPC.

With regard to the challenge under Rule 22, the Court held that, “Rule 22 of the PFA Rules is to be treated as directory,” and clarified that “if the Public Analyst found the sample to be sufficient for analysis and had given his report, no prejudice could be caused to the accused.”

In relation to Rule 18, the Court noted that although the Food Inspector did not specifically depose about sending the seal specimen, the Public Analyst’s report contained a recital that “the seals affixed on the container and the outer cover of the sample tallied with the specimen impression separately sent by the Food Inspector,” and held that “such recital in the report of Public Analyst must be presumed to be correct.”

Sentence Modified in View of Article 21: “Sword of conviction kept on hanging for 26 years”

While refusing to extend the benefit of probation due to Section 20AA of the PFA Act, which prohibits probation unless the convict is below 18 years of age, the Court noted the extraordinary delay in the proceedings. “Offence in question was committed in September 1999... and this way, he is out on bail for the last more than 15 years,” it said.

The Court invoked constitutional jurisprudence, observing: “It cannot be disputed that right to speedy and expeditious trial is one of the most valuable and cherished right guaranteed under the Constitution.” Relying on Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar and Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court reiterated that “speedy trial is of the essence of criminal justice and delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice.”

It observed that “the sword of conviction kept on hanging on the head of the petitioner for the last 26 years,” and emphasized the psychological burden borne by the petitioner: “One cannot imagine the agony & trauma, which is faced by such a person, whose conviction has been recorded by the Court.”

Final Directions: Conviction Maintained, Sentence Reduced, Fine Enhanced

While affirming the legality of the conviction under the PFA Act, the Court held that “sending him behind bars at this stage to undergo the remainder of the sentence, will not be in the interest of justice.”

Accordingly, the sentence was modified: “The sentence of the petitioner is reduced to the period already undergone by him.” However, the fine was enhanced: “The sentence of fine as imposed upon the petitioner is increased from ₹500/- to ₹10,000/-, which is required to be deposited... within a period of 4 weeks.”

The Court made it clear that “in case the enhanced fine is not deposited... the present order reducing the sentence... shall automatically stand vacated and... petitioner will have to undergo the actual sentence of 3 months.”

The revision petition was thus disposed of with a balance between the rigour of law and the recognition of constitutional safeguards.

Date of Decision: April 3, 2025