Suit for Cancellation of Sale Deed Barred Under Consolidation Act; Restitution of Possession Ordered: Allahabad High Court

When rights of tenure holders are determined and recognized by consolidation authorities, the jurisdiction of civil courts is excluded by the very scheme of the Consolidation Act - Allahabad High Court, while allowing the second appeal in Prem Kumar & Others v. Subhash Chand & Others, overturned concurrent judgments of the trial court and the first appellate court that had decreed the cancellation of a sale deed. The Court held that the suit was barred under Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, as the property was subject to consolidation proceedings during the execution of the sale deed. Justice Kshitij Shailendra also directed restitution of possession to the appellants and imposed damages of Rs. 10,00,000/- on the respondents for unauthorized possession of the land for 17 years.

The High Court observed that the disputed sale deed, executed in 1968, was during the ongoing consolidation operations initiated in 1966, and the appellants’ rights as transferees had already been adjudicated under Section 12 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Court stated:

“The jurisdiction to decide disputes of rights and title during consolidation operations lies exclusively with the authorities under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Once rights are adjudicated and recorded, civil courts cannot directly or indirectly nullify such orders.”

Relying on precedents, including Narendra Singh v. Jai Bhagwan (2006) 100 RD 69, the Court emphasized that the bar under Section 49 applies not only to disputes that arise during consolidation operations but also to matters that could or ought to have been raised before the consolidation authorities.

The plaintiffs had claimed that the disputed land was part of a Joint Hindu Family (HUF) property and was improperly sold by a power of attorney holder. However, the High Court rejected this claim, finding no evidence to support the existence of an HUF or a joint family fund. Justice Shailendra underscored:

“There is no presumption of a property being joint family property merely because a Joint Hindu Family exists. The burden lies on the plaintiffs to prove the existence of a joint nucleus or joint family funds used for the acquisition of the property.”

The Court noted several deficiencies in the plaintiffs' case:

The sale deed of 1953, through which the property was initially acquired, did not indicate that it was purchased from HUF funds.

The plaintiffs failed to plead or prove the formation of a joint family fund or its contribution to the acquisition of the property.

Claims that compensation for property left in Pakistan during Partition was used as joint family funds were not supported by evidence or statutory framework under the Displaced Persons Acts of 1950 and 1954.

The Court concluded:

“Findings of the lower courts regarding the existence of HUF and joint nucleus are legally perverse and unsustainable. The property was acquired individually, not as part of a joint family arrangement.”

The appellants were dispossessed of the property in 2007 during the pendency of the appeal, despite interim orders of status quo. Criticizing the actions of administrative officials and the respondents, Justice Shailendra observed:

“The administrative machinery, by adopting coercive measures, committed abuse of their position, flouted the Court’s interim orders, and made a mockery of the established procedure of law.”

The Court allowed the appellants' application under Section 144 CPC for restitution of possession and ordered:

Restitution of possession of the disputed property to the appellants within two months.

Payment of damages of Rs. 10,00,000/- by the respondents for unauthorized possession of over 17 years.

The Court remarked: “Section 144 CPC incorporates only a part of the general law of restitution. The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every court and must be exercised whenever the justice of the case demands.”

Addressing arguments regarding the applicability of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, the High Court clarified that the suit, being a simplicitor action under Section 31 for cancellation of the sale deed, was not affected by Section 34. The Court noted:

“The plaintiffs did not seek declaratory relief, and rejection of an amendment to include a prayer for possession did not render the suit barred under Section 34.”

Setting aside the judgments of the lower courts, the High Court dismissed the original suit for cancellation of the sale deed, holding that it was barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Court directed:

“The executing court shall ensure hassle-free delivery of possession to the appellants and recover damages from the respondents as if it were a money decree.”

Date of Decision: December 11, 2024