Sufficient Cause Is Not a Matter of Sympathy, But Substance: Bombay High Court Rejects 645-Day Delay in Filing Review Petition

“Litigants Cannot Invoke Settlement Talks, Court Vacations and Family Functions as Grounds to Override Legislative Limitation”— In a ruling that firmly reiterates the boundaries of judicial discretion in condoning delay, the Bombay High Court dismissed an interim application seeking condonation of an extraordinary 645-day delay in filing a review petition. The Court ruled that vague, unsupported and post-facto justifications such as search for counsel, family weddings, court vacations, and late-stage settlement talks do not qualify as “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Justice Jitendra Jain held:

“The cause shown in the present application does not constitute ‘sufficient cause’, but is only an attempt which would constitute excuses — and that too without any supporting material.” [Para 13]

The Court went on to dismiss not only the application for condonation of delay but also the Review Petition (St.) No. 40325 of 2025, observing that once delay is not condoned, the review petition cannot survive.

Review Petition Filed 645 Days Late Without Tangible Explanation, Court Holds Delay Inexcusable

The matter pertained to a review petition filed nearly two years after the High Court had disposed of First Appeal No. 1106 of 2018 on 6 February 2024, arising out of a long-pending change report dispute under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950. The Applicants, while acknowledging the delay, sought condonation citing a combination of logistical difficulties, legal consultations, personal events, and efforts to amicably resolve the dispute.

Justice Jain rejected these justifications outright, holding:

“Reasons are vague, general and unsupported by material particulars — no explanation as to when counsel was identified or how vacations and personal events prevented timely filing.” [Paras 5–8]

“Cause Shown Must Cover Entire Period of Delay”—Settlement Talks Initiated After Limitation Cannot Justify Delay

A significant portion of the applicants’ argument was devoted to the claim that they were engaged in settlement discussions, which allegedly delayed the decision to file a review. However, the Court noted that the first settlement letter was dated 18 March 2025, well over one year after the original order and far beyond the 30-day limitation period under Article 124 of the Limitation Act.

“To say that the applicants were making an attempt to settle the dispute during the limitation period cannot be accepted… This attempt was not made within the limitation period provided under the Act, but almost after 1 year.” [Para 8]

The Court emphasized that under settled law, cause shown for condonation must span the entire period of delay, and subsequent acts cannot retroactively validate inaction during the actual limitation period.

Personal Disruptions, Vacations and Lack of Counsel Specifics Not “Sufficient Cause”

The Court sharply criticized the lack of specificity in the applicants’ explanation. While the applicants claimed that they had to find a “specialised counsel” and were delayed due to court vacations and a family wedding, the Court pointed out that no dates, names, or supporting documentation were provided.

“Even in support of paragraph 5, nothing has been annexed… Even in vacation, if urgency is shown, filing permission is granted. Therefore even this reason cannot be accepted.” [Para 7]

This observation reinforces the judiciary’s expectation that pleas for condonation must be accompanied by specific and verifiable particulars, and not generic, narrative excuses.

“Importance of Legal Issue Not a Substitute for Diligence”—Court Rejects Plea Based on Complexity of Review

The applicants further argued that the issue involved important legal questions, including the appellate powers under Section 70 of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, and whether the Appellate Court was justified in deciding the matter instead of remanding it under Order XLI Rule 23A CPC.

However, the Court held that the legal complexity of the case only made it more imperative for the applicants to act promptly:

“If, according to the applicants, the impugned order raises important question of law, then all the more reasons for the applicants to have acted speedily, than to wait for 645 days. Therefore, this submission is self-contradictory.” [Para 10]

In doing so, the Court firmly drew a line between legal merit of the review and procedural compliance with limitation laws.

“Limitation Period is a Legislative Mandate, Not a Flexible Suggestion”—30 Days Cannot Be Diluted by Recourse to Section 5

In a candid response to the applicants’ grievance that 30 days is “too short a time” to file a review petition, Justice Jain held that the period is prescribed by Article 124 of the Limitation Act, and courts cannot dilute such timelines merely based on convenience.

“When the legislature has provided certain time frame… it has factored the time which a litigant would take to consult and take a decision… The submission that the period of 30 days is too less cannot be accepted.” [Para 11]

The Court also noted that this argument was not even part of the written interim application, and was raised orally across the bar, thereby lacking procedural legitimacy.

Supreme Court Precedent Emphasises Need for Genuine Explanation

The applicants had relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, which adopted a liberal approach to condonation of delay.

However, the High Court clarified that the liberal approach is not a license to accept unverified or lazy excuses:

“Liberal approach does not mean accepting unsubstantiated excuses – Courts must distinguish between genuine cause and mere explanations to cover negligence.” [Para 12]

This reaffirms the principle that judicial generosity in delay matters is not unconditional, and is always anchored to good faith, promptitude, and factual backing.

Delay Dismissed, Review Petition Does Not Survive

Dismissing the interim application, the High Court concluded:

“In view of above, the interim application is dismissed. Consequently, the review petition does not survive and is disposed of.” [Para 14]

This judgment not only reinforces the sanctity of statutory limitation but also sends a clear message against tactical litigation practices, where parties wake up to challenge adverse orders long after the statutory clock has stopped ticking.

Date of Decision: 02 February 2026