Strong and Cogent Evidence Must Exist at the Threshold to Deny Bail Under Section 319 CrPC: Supreme Court

“The test is more than a prima facie case, but short of proof beyond reasonable doubt” —  In a significant pronouncement on January 7, 2026, the Supreme Court of India, delivered clarity on the evidentiary threshold required to deny bail to accused persons added mid-trial under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court ruled that “strong and cogent evidence” — not mere possibility of involvement — is required to justify custodial detention at this stage.

The bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan ordered the release on bail of one of the summoned accused, while refusing to interfere with the anticipatory bail already granted to the two others, setting a precedent on how courts should assess such bail claims.

“The court must be satisfied that there is strong and cogent evidence of the person’s complicity at the threshold”

The case stems from a 2018 murder case registered at the Daily Market Police Station, Jharkhand, where nine individuals were originally named in the FIR. However, only three were chargesheeted, and the remaining six were dropped by the police. The complainant, relying on eyewitness depositions recorded in 2020 and 2021, sought to reintroduce the dropped individuals under Section 319 CrPC.

The trial court, after examining the witness statements, allowed the application partially—summoning three of the six previously dropped accused, including the appellant Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu. This summoning order was never challenged and thus attained finality. Imran was arrested pursuant to a non-bailable warrant, while the other two—Md Shamsher and Md Arshad—secured anticipatory bail from the High Court.

The State later moved the Supreme Court challenging the anticipatory bail granted to these two individuals, while Imran approached the apex court seeking regular bail after remaining in custody.

While hearing both appeals together, the Supreme Court laid down the legal test applicable in such circumstances. The Court observed:

“When a person is added as an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and that person is ultimately arrested and prays for bail, the relevant consideration at the end of the court while considering his plea for bail should be the strong and cogent evidence than mere probability of his complicity.”

The Court went further to specify that the standard is higher than that applied at the stage of framing charges:

“The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted would lead to conviction.”

This articulation is crucial, as it distinguishes the threshold of suspicion needed to summon an accused from the level of evidence necessary to deny them bail. The Court emphasized that, “In other words, the court must be satisfied that there is strong and cogent evidence of the person’s complicity at the threshold i.e., much higher than that required for framing charges against the original accused.”

The Court took note of the fact that the co-accused, Md Shamsher and Md Arshad, had been consistently appearing before the trial court and found no reason to interfere with their anticipatory bail. “They have been appearing before the trial court on all dates,” recorded the bench, dismissing the State’s appeal against their bail.

In Md Imran's case, the Court found no justification to keep him incarcerated when the evidence at this stage did not satisfy the heightened test. It directed that “Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu shall be released on bail subject to terms and conditions that the trial court may deem fit to impose.”

“Bail Cannot Be Denied Merely Because the Person Was Later Summoned Under Section 319”: Supreme Court Restores Bail Jurisprudence to Equilibrium

In a strong message reiterating procedural safeguards, the Court clarified that the mere fact of being summoned under Section 319 CrPC does not automatically disqualify a person from being granted bail. There must exist persuasive, substantial material — more than what is needed for original accused — to justify continued detention.

The judgment further stated:

“We make it clear that all the three accused shall regularly appear before the trial court and cooperate in expeditious disposal of the trial,” while also noting that, “the observations in this order are only for the purpose of deciding the bail application… the trial court will not be influenced by the observations in this order.”

This measured tone strikes a balance between individual liberty and prosecutorial fairness, allowing the trial to proceed on merits without prejudice, while not letting procedural technicalities override the principle of liberty.

A Step Towards Rationalising the Use of Section 319

This judgment is not just a routine bail order — it is a reiteration of a principled standard under a seldom-litigated provision. Section 319 CrPC allows courts to summon new accused at any stage of trial based on emerging evidence. While this power is crucial for preventing miscarriage of justice, its misuse can result in prolonged incarceration of individuals against whom no charges were originally laid.

By laying down the elevated standard of “strong and cogent evidence,” the Supreme Court has insulated the provision from potential misuse and aligned the bail jurisprudence with constitutional mandates of fairness and liberty.

Date of Decision: January 7, 2026