Statement of Co-Accused May Be a Clue—But Not a Ground to Quash FIR at Threshold Stage: Gujarat High Court Declines Interference Under Section 482 CrPC

Admissibility Is for Trial, Not FIR Stage—Investigation Cannot Be Thwarted Merely Because Evidence is Yet to Emerge - Gujarat High Court dismissed a petition seeking quashing of an FIR under the Prohibition Act, reiterating that an FIR cannot be quashed solely because the accused is named on the basis of a co-accused’s statement, especially when investigation is in its nascent stage and no charge sheet has yet been filed.
Justice J.C. Doshi, while refusing to invoke inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, observed: “At first blush, the argument regarding inadmissibility of co-accused's statement appears attractive, but admissibility is a matter for trial. At the FIR stage, the statement can be a clue for investigation.”
“Only a Co-Accused’s Statement—No Recovery, No Presence at the Scene”: Petitioner Argues False Implication
The case stemmed from FIR No. 10/2018, registered at Jodiya Police Station, where a raid led to seizure of liquor worth over ₹49 lakhs from a truck. The cleaner of the truck was arrested, and during interrogation, he disclosed Vasim Sumra’s name, who was neither present at the spot nor found with any contraband.
Counsel for the petitioner argued that: “The applicant is a labourer who was falsely implicated solely on the strength of a co-accused’s custodial statement. There is no independent material to justify his prosecution.”
Reliance was placed on several precedents where courts have quashed proceedings post-charge sheet when no other evidence surfaced except inadmissible co-accused confessions.
“Quashing Petition Filed at FIR Stage—Investigation Yet to Progress”
Rejecting the petition, the Court distinguished between situations before and after charge sheet, and emphasized that the present petition was premature, stating: “The issue of admissibility arises at the stage of trial—not at the stage of registration of FIR or commencement of investigation. Quashing FIR now would amount to stalling a lawful investigation.”
Relying on Mohd. Malek Mondal v. Pranjal Bardalai [(2005) 10 SCC 608], the Court reiterated: “The confessional statement of co-accused, though inadmissible at trial, can serve as a clue for investigation. It is open to the Investigating Officer to probe further, and if no material is found, drop the prosecution.”
“High Court Cannot Preempt Investigation—No Per Se Bar on FIR Based on Co-Accused Statement”
In reaffirming the restraint courts must exercise at the FIR stage, the Bench noted: “Each case rests on its own facts. Even if FIRs against similarly placed co-accused have been quashed, there can be no parity without evaluating the specific role and material in each instance.”
The Court drew guidance from the principle laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], cautioning that: “The power to quash must be used sparingly and only in the rarest of rare cases where continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process or miscarriage of justice.”
“Petitioner Free to Approach Again After Investigation—Right to Challenge Charge Sheet Reserved”
While dismissing the petition, the Court ensured that the petitioner’s rights were preserved, holding: “If ultimately, no material is found against the petitioner, and if charge sheet is filed based solely on co-accused’s statement, the petitioner is at liberty to challenge it through appropriate legal proceedings.”
This ruling reinforces the judicial principle that quashing of criminal proceedings at the pre-investigation stage is to be granted sparingly, and that a statement of co-accused, even if inadmissible at trial, can lawfully trigger investigation.
The Court made it clear: “Courts cannot step into the shoes of investigators at the FIR stage. Admissibility and evidentiary weight must await trial—not bar investigation at inception.”

Date of Decision: 10 March 2025