Special Appeal Against Order Refusing To Initiate Contempt Proceedings Not Maintainable If Merits Of Original Case Not Decided: Allahabad High Court

"An appeal is a creation of statute and once the legislature in its wisdom has chosen not to provide for any remedy of appeal against an order passed, whereby the contempt court has declined to initiate contempt proceeding, then appeal cannot be construed to be maintainable," Allahabad High Court, in a significant ruling dated April 29, 2026, held that a Special Appeal (intra-court appeal) under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, is not maintainable against an order of a Single Judge declining to initiate contempt proceedings, provided the court does not delve into the merits of the original dispute.

A bench comprising Hon’ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J. and Hon’ble Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, J. observed that the right to appeal is a statutory creation, and the Contempt of Courts Act only provides for an appeal when a punishment is imposed.

The appellant, Saurav Raj, filed a contempt application against his wife, Sonakshi Verma, a serving judicial officer in Bihar, alleging she filed a false Affidavit of Assets and Liabilities in maintenance proceedings under the DV Act. The appellant contended that despite being a regular salaried officer, she stated her income as "N/A" to mislead the court. A Single Judge disposed of the contempt application, directing the appellant to pursue a perjury application under Section 340 CrPC (now Section 379 BNSS) already pending before the trial court, observing that multiple proceedings on the same issue should be discouraged.

The primary question before the court was whether a Special Appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the High Court Rules, 1952, is maintainable against an order of a Contempt Court declining to initiate proceedings. The court was also called upon to determine if the guidelines in Rajnesh v. Neha mandate the simultaneous initiation of both contempt and perjury proceedings for filing false affidavits.

Special Appeal Not Maintainable Against Refusal To Initiate Contempt

The court began by clarifying the statutory limitations of appeals in contempt matters. It noted that Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, provides for an appeal only against an order or decision where the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunni Lal Nanda (2006), the bench reiterated that an order declining to initiate proceedings or dropping them is generally not appealable.

"Special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 is maintainable only if the learned Single Judge has overstepped its jurisdiction and jumped into deciding on merits of the earlier order."

Distinction Between Procedural Orders And Deciding On Merits

The bench emphasized that for a Special Appeal to be maintainable in a contempt context, the Single Judge must have "overstepped" jurisdiction by adjudicating the substantive issues of the original litigation. The term "merit" in this context refers to core legal and factual questions being contested in the original case. The bench found that the Single Judge’s observation regarding "multiplicity of proceedings" was merely a procedural reason to decline jurisdiction and did not touch upon the underlying matrimonial dispute.

"The focus of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, not to resolve the underlying dispute."

Interpretation Of Guidelines In Rajnesh v. Neha

The appellant argued that the Supreme Court's mandate in Rajnesh v. Neha requires courts to initiate both Section 340 CrPC proceedings and contempt of court for false affidavits. The High Court rejected this interpretation, stating that while both jurisdictions can be invoked simultaneously, it does not mean courts are bound to initiate action under both. The bench noted that the word "and" in the Supreme Court's observation must be read disjunctively as "or" to effectuate the true judicial intent.

"The above principles only allow a person to invoke both the jurisdictions simultaneously but that does not mean that the courts are bound to initiate action under both the provisions."

No Remedy Against Refusal To Exercise Discretion

The court held that if the Contempt Court, in its wisdom, decides not to entertain a petition to avoid parallel proceedings in a lower court, such an order does not confer a right of appeal. Relying on the maxim quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum (what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly), the bench stated that since the Contempt of Courts Act is a self-contained code with limited appeal rights, one cannot use the High Court Rules to create a remedy where none exists.

"If there is no provision of appeal in the statute, one cannot take aid of any other provisions as such of the Rules."

The High Court concluded that the Single Judge had neither entered into the merits of the dispute nor decided any question affecting the valuable rights of the parties. Consequently, the Special Appeal was found to be incompetent. The court dismissed the appeal without going into the factual allegations of perjury against the respondent judicial officer.

Date of Decision: April 29, 2026