Sessions Court Had No Jurisdiction to Reverse Acquittal in Bailable Offences: Karnataka High Court

“When Law Clearly Bars Jurisdiction, Any Conviction Rendered Thereunder Is a Legal Nullity” —  In a striking judgment that reiterates the primacy of jurisdiction in criminal adjudication, the High Court of Karnataka set aside the conviction of the appellant under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, holding that the Sessions Court had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against acquittal in bailable offences.

Delivering the verdict, Justice G. Basavaraja observed, “When a Sessions Court assumes jurisdiction contrary to the express mandate of law, it not only violates statutory procedure but also strikes at the core of Article 21 of the Constitution. Any continuation of such proceedings is a direct abuse of the process of law.”

The Court declared the Sessions Court’s conviction judgment dated 23rd February 2013 as a nullity, reinstating the acquittal granted by the Magistrate in 2009, and reaffirmed the principle that procedural safeguards under criminal law are not mere technicalities but foundational to the right to personal liberty.

“State Filed Appeal Before the Wrong Forum — Sessions Court Had No Power to Reverse Acquittal in Bailable Offences”

The High Court began by examining the scope of Section 378(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as amended by the CrPC (Amendment) Act, 2005, and held that in cases where acquittal is passed by a Magistrate in respect of bailable offences, “the appeal can lie only before the High Court and not before a Sessions Court.”

The Court noted that all offences in the case — Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A IPC — are bailable in nature, and held: “The judgment of conviction passed by the Sessions Court is patently without jurisdiction and hence a legal nullity. Jurisdiction is not a matter of convenience or discretion — it is a matter of constitutional fidelity. Once the law denies jurisdiction, no Court can confer it upon itself indirectly.”

Justice Basavaraja further observed that even inherent powers of the court cannot cure a jurisdictional defect, and added, “The continuation of proceedings before a forum lacking jurisdiction would not only violate legal procedure but would also be antithetical to the right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21.”

“Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur Has No Place in Criminal Trials” — No Evidence of Negligence or Rashness Found

In addition to the jurisdictional defect, the High Court also held that the first appellate court had erred in reversing the well-reasoned acquittal, despite the absence of any cogent evidence proving rash or negligent driving.

The trial court had acquitted the accused after finding that the prosecution failed to prove who was driving the bus, and whether it was driven rashly or negligently at the time of the accident which resulted in the death of one passenger and injuries to others.

Justice Basavaraja noted, “Mere occurrence of an accident, even if fatal, is not sufficient to convict under Section 304-A IPC. The prosecution must discharge its burden of proving rashness or negligence beyond reasonable doubt. That burden was never discharged.”

Critically analyzing the evidence, the Court found that none of the key witnesses could identify the accused as the driver, and several were either interested witnesses or not examined properly.

“PW2, the driver of the car and the most crucial witness, was never offered for cross-examination — this omission goes to the root of the matter,” the Court said.

It added, “PW4, claimed as an eyewitness, admitted that he reached the scene only after the accident had occurred. PW3 could not even identify the accused. The prosecution's story collapses under the weight of its own inconsistencies.”

“First Appellate Court Ignored Settled Principles of Appellate Interference” — Trial Court’s View Was Plausible and Reasonable

The High Court strongly criticized the approach of the Sessions Court in reversing the acquittal, terming its findings “unsupported by either legal reasoning or evidentiary appreciation.”

Citing the Supreme Court's rulings in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581, and Babu Sahebgouda Rudragouda v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149, the Court reiterated: “The presumption of innocence only strengthens after an acquittal. A reversal is permitted only where the trial court’s view is manifestly perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or where no two views are reasonably possible. That threshold has not been crossed in this case.”

On the contrary, the Court noted that the trial court had carefully weighed the evidence, identified the lacunae in the prosecution’s case, and rightly extended the benefit of doubt.

“Sessions Court’s Overreach Violates Rule of Law” — Acquittal Restored, Conviction Set Aside, Fine to be Refunded

Holding that jurisdictional error alone was enough to vitiate the entire appellate conviction, the High Court allowed the appeal and passed the following operative directions: “The judgment of conviction and sentence passed on 23.02.2013 by the II Additional District & Sessions Judge, Mangalore, is hereby set aside. The judgment of acquittal dated 07.03.2009 passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) and JMFC, Bantwal, is restored and confirmed.”

It directed that any fine deposited by the accused be refunded, and also recorded appreciation for the Amicus Curiae, Sri Sabappa B. Malegul, awarding him a fee of Rs.10,000 for his assistance in the matter.

In closing, Justice Basavaraja remarked: “State, being the parens patriae, is expected to act diligently and responsibly while invoking appellate remedies. Law does not condone procedural indifference — especially when it comes to depriving a citizen of his liberty.”

Date of Decision: 14 January 2026