Sessions Court Cannot Direct Life Imprisonment Till Natural Life Without Remission: Supreme Court Reasserts Limits on Sentencing Powers of Subordinate Courts

“Sessions Court, a creature of the Code, cannot overstep the statutory mandate of Section 428 CrPC or restrict the constitutional powers of remission under Articles 72 and 161” — Supreme Court On December 18, 2025, the Supreme Court delivered a significant ruling in Kiran v. State of Karnataka, reaffirming that Sessions Courts cannot impose a life sentence stipulating incarceration for the rest of the convict’s natural life without any scope for remission. The Court held that such “special category sentences” are within the exclusive domain of Constitutional Courts—the High Courts and the Supreme Court.

The Bench comprising Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and K. Vinod Chandran partially allowed the appeal filed by Kiran, convicted under Section 302 IPC for setting ablaze a widow who resisted his sexual advances. While upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court modified the sentence, striking down the direction of the trial court that denied the benefit of remission and statutory set-off under Section 428 CrPC. The sentence now stands as life imprisonment simpliciter, with the convict eligible to seek remission or commutation as per applicable law.

“The power to impose life sentence without remission lies only with Constitutional Courts. Sessions Courts cannot infringe upon statutory and constitutional safeguards” — Court Distinguishes Between Trial and Constitutional Jurisdictions

The central legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether a Sessions Court, while convicting an accused under Section 302 IPC, could direct that the life sentence must continue till the end of the convict’s natural life and that no set-off under Section 428 CrPC would be allowed for the pre-conviction period of detention.

The Court was unequivocal in holding that such sentencing is impermissible under the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure. “The sentence of life imprisonment no doubt means the entire life, subject only to the remission and commutation provided under Cr.PC and also to Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India, which cannot be curtailed by a Sessions Court,” the Court observed. It categorically declared that “the power to impose punishment of imprisonment for life without remission was conferred only on the Constitutional Courts and not on the Sessions Courts.”

Referring to the landmark rulings in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka [(2008) 13 SCC 767] and Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan [(2016) 7 SCC 1], the Court reiterated that only the Supreme Court and High Courts can impose the “special category sentence” that curtails remission powers. This sentencing innovation was devised as a middle path between the death penalty and the often-understood 14-year term associated with life imprisonment due to remission policies.

“In appropriate cases, as a uniform policy, punishment of imprisonment for life beyond any remission can be awarded, substituting the death penalty—not only by the Supreme Court but also by the High Courts,” the Court said, emphasizing that this discretion does not extend to Sessions Courts.

“There is no escape from Section 428 CrPC. The statutory set-off for pre-conviction custody is mandatory and cannot be denied by the trial court” — Supreme Court on Procedural Safeguards

Another critical issue addressed in the judgment was the legality of the trial court’s direction denying the convict the benefit of set-off under Section 428 CrPC for the time he spent in custody during the investigation and trial.

The Supreme Court termed this direction “illegal” and clarified that Section 428 CrPC grants a mandatory statutory right to set-off the period of detention undergone before conviction against the sentence imposed. “There is no escape from it,” the Court ruled, deleting the Sessions Court’s directive and restoring the statutory entitlement.

The Court also distinguished the reference pending in The Superintendent of Prison v. Venkatesan @ Senu, 2025 INSC 541, stating that it dealt with a different context—namely, set-off in cases involving multiple offences and trials. “In the present case, no such question arises… the direction of the trial court is not to grant the set-off for the period of detention undergone by the accused in the course of the investigation and trial of the same case.”

Widow Set Ablaze for Resisting Sexual Advances—Dying Declaration Crucial

The case involved the brutal murder of a widow with five children, who was allegedly set on fire by the appellant, Kiran, on January 1, 2014, after she resisted his repeated sexual advances. Though several key prosecution witnesses—including the daughter and father of the deceased—turned hostile, the prosecution relied on two consistent and medically certified dying declarations, made to a Head Constable and later to a Magistrate.

The Court extensively reviewed the evidence despite the appeal being limited to sentencing. It found the conviction valid, observing: “The presence of the accused and his flight from the scene of occurrence is established.” The dying declarations were held to be reliable, voluntary, and corroborated by medical evidence, with no procedural infirmities. “In the totality of circumstances… we are convinced that the conviction was entered into properly,” the Court said.

Sessions Courts Must Abide by Statutory Boundaries

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiran v. State of Karnataka underscores a crucial limitation on the sentencing powers of trial courts. While acknowledging the heinous nature of the crime, the Court stressed that sentencing must align with statutory and constitutional frameworks. Sessions Courts, being creatures of the Code, cannot override provisions like Section 428 CrPC nor direct a life sentence to run till the convict’s death without possibility of remission—such powers rest only with the Supreme Court and High Courts.

The judgment not only protects the rights of convicts but also fortifies procedural safeguards embedded in criminal jurisprudence, ensuring uniformity and consistency in sentencing practices.

Date of Decision: December 18, 2025