Section 92 CPC | Civil Court Cannot Pass Protective Interim Orders Before Grant Of Leave To Institute Suit: Supreme Court

"The grant of leave under Section 92 is an essential and mandatory pre-condition, in the absence of which there exists no pending proceeding in which interlocutory applications can be entertained." Supreme Court, in a significant ruling dated September 18, 2026, held that a Civil Court, while seized of a plaint under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) alongside an application seeking leave to institute the suit, lacks the jurisdiction to pass any protective or preservatory interim orders until such leave is formally granted.

A bench comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan observed that a suit under Section 92 remains "stillborn" until the threshold requirement of leave is met, and therefore, no interim relief can be entertained in the interregnum.

The litigation arose from a dispute concerning the People’s Education Trust, where the appellants moved a suit under Section 92 of the CPC. Pending the adjudication of the leave application, the Trial Court had appointed an ad hoc committee of trustees to manage the institution's affairs. The Karnataka High Court set aside this order, ruling that the court was denuded of jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders before the grant of leave, leading the appellants to approach the Supreme Court.

The core question before the Court was whether a Civil Court, seized of a plaint under Section 92 of the CPC along with a leave application, possesses the inherent or statutory power to pass protective interim orders during the pendency of the leave application. The Court was also tasked with determining if such an application qualifies as a "supplemental proceeding" under Section 94 or warrants the invocation of inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC.

Section 92 Acts As A Gatekeeper

The Court emphasized that Section 92 of the CPC constitutes a special provision that balances the protection of public trusts from mismanagement with the need to shield them from vexatious litigation. The amendment in 1976, which replaced the administrative consent of the Advocate-General with the "leave of the Court," shifted the burden of scrutiny to the judiciary. Consequently, the court acts as a gatekeeper, and the requirement of leave is a mandatory pre-condition for the institution of a suit.

Threshold Requirement For Jurisdiction

The bench clarified that an application for leave is a threshold proceeding and not a substantive one. Because the suit is not deemed instituted until leave is granted, there is no lis before the court that would permit the exercise of powers under Order XL Rule 1 regarding the appointment of a receiver. The court noted that "the concept of ‘supplemental proceedings’ cannot be invoked to circumvent the ‘gateway proceedings’ of leave under Section 92 of the Code."

Receiver Appointment As An Intrusive Measure

Addressing the argument that the appointment of a receiver is merely "preservatory," the Court held that such an act is inherently intrusive and dislodges the existing management of a trust. Allowing for such an appointment before leave is granted would prejudice the trust if leave were ultimately refused. The Court reasoned that a tribunal lacking jurisdiction to entertain the main suit cannot assume jurisdiction merely by characterizing the relief sought as protective.

Inherent Powers Cannot Override Special Provisions

The Court further rejected the invocation of Section 151 of the CPC, reiterating the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant. The general inherent powers of a court cannot override the specific statutory safeguards and procedures prescribed by Section 92. The bench stated that "inherent powers and principles of statutory interpretation can be invoked only where jurisdiction already exists," and a court cannot use Section 151 to bypass the mandatory leave requirement.

"The appointment of a receiver in respect of a public trust cannot be regarded as merely preservatory. Such appointment is intrusive in nature and has the effect of dislodging the management of the trust, thereby defeating the very purpose of the requirement of leave."

Ex Parte Leave In Urgent Circumstances

While maintaining a strict stance on the jurisdiction to grant interim orders, the Court provided a nuanced clarification regarding urgent cases. Where facts disclose a compelling urgency, the Court held that the issuance of notice to the proposed defendants prior to the grant of leave is not strictly indispensable. The bench emphasized that courts must exercise "utmost care, caution and circumspection" when granting leave ex parte, ensuring that reasons for such urgency are recorded in writing.

In its final determination, the Court held that a Civil Court is not empowered to pass protective or preservatory interim orders pending the disposal of a Section 92 leave application. However, for compelling reasons where urgent relief is necessary, notice prior to the grant of leave may be dispensed with. The appeals filed by the appellants were dismissed, confirming the legal position that the mandatory "threshold requirement" of leave must be fulfilled before the court gains the authority to entertain interlocutory applications.

Date of Decision: 18 September 2026