Section 22 Specific Relief Act Overrides Order VI Rule 17 CPC: Rajasthan High Court Allows Amendment Seeking Refund Of Earnest Money Post-Trial

"The non-obstante clause attached to Section 22(1) of the 1963 Act grants it an overriding effect, thereby excluding the operation of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908." Rajasthan High Court, in a significant ruling, held that the mandate under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, permits a plaintiff to amend the plaint to include a claim for the refund of earnest money at any stage of the proceedings, notwithstanding the restrictions imposed by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

A bench of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjeet Purohit observed that the specific statutory provision of the 1963 Act overrides the general procedural requirements of the CPC regarding the "due diligence" test.

Statutory Primacy of Section 22

The petitioner challenged a trial court order that permitted the respondent-plaintiff to amend the plaint to include an alternative prayer for the recovery of advance money in a pending suit for specific performance. The amendment application was filed after the commencement of the plaintiff's evidence. The petitioner argued that the trial court erred in allowing this, citing the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, which bars amendments post-commencement of trial unless the party proves that they could not have raised the matter earlier despite due diligence.

Court Explains Interaction Between Special and General Law

The High Court clarified that the Specific Relief Act is a special enactment, whereas the CPC is a general procedural law. Applying the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant, the court held that Section 22 of the 1963 Act, which contains a non-obstante clause, occupies a superior position to the procedural mandates of the CPC. The court emphasized that the legislature, by using the word "shall" in the proviso to Section 22(2), made it mandatory for courts to allow such amendments to ensure the adjudication of all controversies between parties.

"The non-obstante clause contained in Section 22 of the Act of 1963 ensures that the requirement of establishing due diligence under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC would not, by itself, operate as a bar to an amendment seeking incorporation of a relief falling within the ambit of Section 22."

Avoiding Multiplicity of Litigation

The court further observed that the foundational facts—namely the payment of the advance amount and the defendant’s failure to refund it—were already present in the original pleadings. Consequently, the amendment did not introduce a new cause of action but merely sought an alternative, consequential relief. The court reasoned that rejecting such an amendment on hyper-technical grounds would defeat the primary objective of Order VI Rule 17 CPC, which is to determine the real questions in controversy and prevent a multiplicity of litigation.

Liberal Construction of Procedural Law

The bench also drew support from the decision in K.R. Suresh v. R. Poornima & Ors., reiterating that the expression "at any stage of the proceedings" in Section 22 is wide enough to include the appellate stage. The court endorsed the view that procedural law must serve the cause of justice and that the "due diligence" test under Order VI Rule 17 CPC cannot be applied with rigid, mechanical rigour when the proposed amendment pertains to alternative reliefs already supported by existing averments.

"A plain, grammatical interpretation and strict application of the proviso defeats the very object of the main provision which aims at avoiding multiplicity of litigation."

Addressing the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution, the court held that the power of superintendence is to be exercised sparingly. Finding that the trial court had acted within its jurisdiction and that the impugned order suffered from no patent perversity or flagrant abuse of law, the High Court refused to interfere. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the trial court’s decision to allow the amendment.

Date of Decision: 30 September 2026