Section 62 IBC | Limitation Period For Appeal To Supreme Court Commences From Date Of Receipt Of Order, Not Date Of Application: Supreme Court

"If the limitation clock remained suspended until physical collection at the litigant’s leisure, the limitation period would then become fluctuating and indefinite." Supreme Court, in a judgment dated October 14, 2026, held that the limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) cannot be kept in a state of suspension by a litigant by delaying the application for a certified copy.

 A bench of Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice N.V. Anjaria emphasized that the IBC is a self-contained, time-bound code, and the "time requisite" for obtaining a copy under Section 12 of the Limitation Act does not permit a party to remain idle before seeking such a copy.

Strict Timelines Under IBC

The court noted that the foundational architecture of the IBC is built upon speed and strict timelines to protect the value of corporate assets and ensure effective recovery for creditors. Because the statute includes a non-obstante clause in Section 61, the court ruled that general procedural provisions from other acts cannot be invoked to bypass the statutory outer limits prescribed by the IBC.

The Limitation Clock and Section 62 IBC

The appeal arose from a challenge to an NCLAT order, with the appellant seeking to exclude the period of inaction before they had applied for a certified copy of the judgment. The bench clarified that the 45-day limitation period, plus the 15-day grace period for condonation of delay, creates an absolute ceiling of 60 days that cannot be extended at the litigant's convenience.

Clarifying The Concept Of 'Time Requisite'

The court explained that while Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act allows for the exclusion of "time requisite" for obtaining a copy, this exclusion only applies once an application has been filed. Any period of inaction or delay in filing an application for a certified copy remains part of the initial statutory limitation period and cannot be excluded to extend the deadline.

Applying for a certified copy is not a mere procedural formality; it reflects the aggrieved party's due diligence.

Limitation Cannot Be Indefinite

The bench rejected the appellant's argument that the limitation period should be reckoned solely from the date of physical receipt of the order. If such a construction were adopted, the court observed, it would render the statutory limitation period "fluctuating and indefinite," effectively nullifying the legislative intent behind the IBC’s rigid timelines.

Court Reaffirms Binding Precedents

Drawing upon the ratio of V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Limited, the court held that because the IBC is a complete code, the requirements for filing an appeal must adhere strictly to the rules, including the requirement to proactively apply for certified copies. The appellant’s failure to file within the 60-day window, even after accounting for the time taken by the Registry to prepare the copy, rendered the appeal barred by limitation.

The right to appeal is permanently extinguished once the 60-day maximum window under the IBC closes.

The Supreme Court sustained the preliminary objection raised by the respondent and dismissed the civil appeal as barred by limitation. The bench concluded that the court lacked the jurisdiction to condone the delay in the present case, as the appeal was filed 76 days after the pronouncement of the impugned order, far exceeding the absolute 60-day limit.

Date of Decision: 14 October 2026