Section 52 TPA | Pendente Lite Transferees Have No Independent Right to Resist Execution of Decree: Supreme Court

“The doctrine of lis pendens does not annul the conveyance of such transferee pendente lite but makes it subservient to the rights of the parties and dependent upon the final decision of the suit. That being the position, no valid title vested with the obstructionists.”— In a seminal ruling, the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, has dismissed the appeals of subsequent purchasers, holding that transferees pendente lite cannot obstruct the execution of a specific performance decree merely because they were not impleaded in the sale deed executed by the Court Commissioner.

The Factual Matrix: A Three-Decade Struggle for Fruits of the Decree

The case represents a classic example of the "difficulties of a litigant" beginning after obtaining a decree. The Respondent No. 1 (Decree Holder) entered into an agreement for sale in 1973 and filed a suit for specific performance in 1986, registering a lis pendens notice immediately. During the pendency of the suit, the original owner (Judgment Debtor) transferred the property to third parties in 1987. The suit was decreed in 1990, and a sale deed was executed by the Court Commissioner in favor of the Decree Holder in 1993.

The Appellants, who purchased the property in 1995-1996 from the 1987 transferees, resisted the execution of the decree in 2019. They argued that they were independent owners in possession and that the Decree Holder had failed to acquire valid title because the subsequent purchasers were not joined in the sale deed executed by the Court Commissioner.

“It appears that decree passed in 1990 is not permitted to be executed for last 30 years even though sale deed pursuant to the decree for specific performance was executed in favour of respondent No. 1 decree holder on 25.03.1993.”

Sanctity of Lis Pendens: Section 52 Transfer of Property Act

The Supreme Court undertook a comprehensive analysis of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which encapsulates the doctrine of lis pendens. The Bench reiterated that the doctrine rests on the principle of equity and public policy—pendente lite nihil innovetur (pending the suit nothing should be changed).

The Court held that the moment a suit is instituted, the property becomes subject to the final outcome of the litigation. Any transfer made during this period is not void ab initio but is subservient to the decree. The Court rejected the Appellants' contention that they should have been impleaded in the execution proceedings or the conveyance deed to pass valid title. The Bench clarified that a transferee pendente lite steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor and is bound by the decree just as much as the original party.

“A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. In fact, title of the obstructionists stood extinguished under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.”

Execution Proceedings and Order XXI CPC

The judgment provides a deep dive into the scheme of Order XXI Rules 97 to 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The Court observed that the Executing Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate all questions regarding right, title, and interest arising between the parties, including obstructionists, without the need for a separate suit.

Referring to precedents like Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust and Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, the Court held that a transferee pendente lite has no independent right to resist execution. Once the Executing Court determines that the obstructionist is a transferee pendente lite, the resistance must fail, and the decree must be enforced. The Court affirmed the Executing Court's order directing the removal of the obstruction, noting that the Appellants' title was extinguished by the operation of Section 52 TPA upon the execution of the sale deed in favor of the Decree Holder.

“The court cannot shirk its responsibility by skirting the relevant issues arising in the case.”

Distinguishing Lala Durga Prasad

The Appellants relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Lala Durga Prasad v. Lala Deep Chand (1953) to argue that subsequent purchasers must join the conveyance. The Bench distinguished this precedent, clarifying that Lala Durga Prasad involved a transfer made prior to the institution of the suit, where the subsequent purchaser was a necessary party. In the present case, the transfers were pendente lite (during the suit), squarely attracting Section 52 TPA, rendering the Lala Durga Prasad ratio inapplicable.

Invocation of Article 142: Ending the Litigation Cycle

Expressing anguish over the fact that the Decree Holder had been denied the fruits of his success for over 30 years, the Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Court directed the Appellants to hand over actual physical possession by February 15, 2026, and issued a blanket injunction prohibiting any court from entertaining further petitions or applications from the Appellants or the Judgment Debtor regarding this property.

Date of Decision: January 12, 2026