Section 5 Limitation Act Inapplicable To Persona Designata; Quasi-Judicial Appellate Authority Cannot Condone Delay Absent Express Enabling Provision: Punjab & Haryana High Court

"Whatever latitude a persona designata may enjoy in regulating the conduct of proceedings before itself, that latitude operates within the jurisdiction conferred such authority and not beyond it. Freedom to devise procedure is not a licence to enlarge jurisdiction." Punjab and Haryana High Court, in an authoritative decision delivered on October 16, 2026, held that an administrative or quasi-judicial appellate authority constituted under an executive policy is a persona designata and cannot assume the power to condone delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the absence of an express enabling provision.

 A Division Bench comprising Justice Deepak Sibal and Justice Sunish Bindlish held that the right of appeal is not an inherent right but a creature of the instrument conferring it, ruling that "freedom to devise procedure is not a licence to enlarge jurisdiction" and the period within which an appeal may be preferred constitutes a mandatory condition of jurisdiction that cannot be relaxed at discretion.

The appellants, who were long-standing commercial tenants occupying municipal shops in Palika Bazar, Panipat, challenged the order of the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Panipat, which rejected their applications for conveyance of ownership under the Haryana Policy for Sale of Shops/Houses by Municipal Bodies dated June 1, 2021, on the ground that the building was structurally dilapidated and condemned for human habitation. The Director General, Urban Local Bodies, Haryana, subsequently dismissed their statutory appeals as time-barred due to an unexplained delay of 265 days beyond the one-month period prescribed by Clause 8(b) of the 2021 Policy. A learned Single Judge dismissed their writ petitions, holding that the appellate authority had no statutory competence to condone delay, prompting the present intra-court Letters Patent Appeals.

The primary legal issue before the Division Bench was whether an administrative appellate authority acting as a persona designata under an executive policy possesses the jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the prescribed period in the absence of an express statutory or policy provision. The Court was also called upon to determine whether the use of the word "may" in Clause 8(b) rendered the limitation period directory, and whether mere fulfillment of 20 years' occupation conferred an indefeasible right to conveyance of public property in a condemned building under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Appellate Authority Under Executive Policy Is Persona Designata, Not A Court

The High Court observed that the appellate forum constituted under Clause 8(b) of the 2021 Policy derives its authority solely from the policy itself and does not function as a court of law. Relying on settled precedents, the Court noted that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply exclusively to proceedings before regular civil courts and cannot be imported into proceedings before statutory or policy-created authorities without express legislative sanction.

The Bench reiterated the principles established in Sakuru v. Tanaji, Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, and International Asset Reconstruction Co. of India Ltd. v. Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Ltd., holding that in the absence of a specific provision incorporating Section 5 of the Limitation Act, no authority that is not a court can assume the power to extend limitation.

Freedom To Devise Procedure Cannot Enlarge Jurisdictional Boundaries

Addressing the appellant's contention that a persona designata enjoys inherent procedural flexibility, the Court drew a firm line between regulating existing proceedings and assuming jurisdiction not conferred by law. The Bench distinguished Manohar Lal v. Inderjit Singh alias Shakuntla Devi, emphasizing that procedural discretion only governs matters validly pending before a forum.

The Court clarified that the period within which an appeal must be preferred is an essential condition upon which the right of appeal is conferred, and relaxing that threshold would improperly grant unlimited discretion to the appellate authority to rewrite the governing instrument.

Use Of Word 'May' Governs Option To Appeal, Not Period Of Limitation

The Court rejected the submission that the phrase "may prefer an Appeal... within a period of one month" should be construed as directory on account of the word "may". The Bench explained that the word "may" merely indicates an aggrieved person's option to avail the legal remedy, whereas the temporal prescription of "within a period of one month" operates as a mandatory, unqualified condition precedent.

The Bench noted that the entire scheme of the 2021 Policy is structured on strict, time-bound windows for disposing of public property, and treating the limitation period as open-ended would defeat the very purpose of streamlined administrative resolution.

Order 8 Rule 1 CPC Jurisprudence Inapplicable To Administrative Limitation

The Bench distinguished the Supreme Court rulings in R.N. Jadi & Brothers v. Subhash Chandra, Zolba v. Keshao, and Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, which held the timeline under Order 8 Rule 1 CPC for filing written statements to be directory. The High Court clarified that those decisions applied to regular courts regulating steps in a suit already validly instituted within their plenary jurisdiction.

The Bench held that principles guiding procedural timelines in pending civil suits cannot be deployed to create a power of condonation for an administrative forum where the parent instrument has withheld it, noting that the maxim that procedure is the handmaid of justice cannot breathe jurisdiction into a forum lacking authority.

Liberal Construction Cannot Supply A Non-Existent Power

The Court dismissed reliance on beneficial legislation precedents such as Brahampal @ Sammay v. National Insurance Co. and Secretary, Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers v. Cipla Ltd., pointing out that Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 contains an express proviso enabling condonation of delay upon sufficient cause, which is conspicuously absent in Clause 8(b).

The Bench underlined that the 2021 Policy is not social welfare legislation but an executive framework for the commercial alienation of public municipal assets, where strict adherence to terms is paramount and courts cannot rewrite policy to supply missing powers.

Government's Power Of Relaxation Does Not Extend To Appellate Authority

The Court rejected the invocation of Clause 12 of the Policy, which permits relaxation of provisions, observing that such power is explicitly reserved for the State Government and can only be exercised generally or for a class or category of persons or properties.

The Bench observed that an individual appellate authority cannot usurp the Government's plenary relaxation powers to condone delay in an individual appeal, especially when no such relaxation had ever been sought from or granted by the Government.

Unsubstantiated Oral Assurances And Hardship Do Not Constitute Sufficient Cause

Even on the hypothetical assumption that the appellate authority possessed the power to condone delay, the Court held that the appellants failed to disclose any sufficient cause for the extensive delay of 265 days, noting that averments of business hardship and reliance on Article 21 cannot substitute an explanation for procedural default.

The Bench observed that vague assertions of oral assurances from municipal officials, raised for the first time in a writ petition, cannot explain an inordinate delay, and reiterated the Supreme Court's warning in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary that limitation cannot be excused as a matter of generosity.

"The object of the 2021 Policy is to regularise long and settled occupation of public property on fair terms. It is not to compel the transfer of units in a building which is unfit for occupation and is to be redeveloped."

Eligibility Under Policy Does Not Create Unconditional Right To Conveyance

Examining the merits under Clause 7(e) of the 2021 Policy, the Court held that satisfying the condition of 20 years' possession merely renders an occupant eligible to apply but confers no indefeasible legal right to purchase public property.

The Bench held that Clause 7(e) explicitly empowers the Competent Authority to decline an application for any valid reason recorded in the order, and the condemned, dilapidated condition of a municipal building slated for public redevelopment constitutes a highly germane and compelling reason to refuse transfer.

Article 21 Embraces Public Safety And Cannot Compel Conveyance Of Dilapidated Assets

The Court rejected the argument that denying ownership violated Article 21, affirming that the right to livelihood cannot compel the State to transfer title in a structurally unsound building that poses a grave hazard to life and limb.

The Bench observed that several appellants held multiple commercial units with substantial stock-in-trade exceeding tens of lakhs of rupees, undermining their plea of extreme poverty, while clarifying that dismissal of the appeals would not impede their existing tenant rights or prospective claims for re-allotment upon commercial redevelopment.

The High Court dismissed the Letters Patent Appeals and affirmed the Single Judge's judgment, establishing that quasi-judicial appellate authorities under executive schemes possess no jurisdiction to condone delay absent express statutory authorization. The ruling reinforces that prospective purchasers cannot compel the alienation of public property situated within unsafe structures earmarked for civic redevelopment.

Date of Decision: 16-10-2026