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by kapil
28 October 2026 6:13 AM
"Any direction that requires the offender to undergo imprisonment for life twice over would be anomalous and irrational for it will disregard the fact that humans like all other living beings have but one life to live." Reiterating that a convict cannot be directed to serve two life sentences consecutively because "humans like all other living beings have but one life to live", the Supreme Court on October 27, 2026, held that multiple sentences of life imprisonment awarded in a single trial cannot be directed to run consecutively under Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).
A bench comprising Justice K. V. Viswanathan and Justice Arun Palli ruled that where multiple life terms are awarded for distinct offences in a single trial, such sentences must be superimposed over each other so that any remission granted in one does not automatically extend to the other.
The appellant stood trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, Thane, for the alleged rape and murder of a 12-year-old girl in April 2010. By a judgment dated September 27, 2013, the trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302 and Section 376 read with Section 342 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), awarding life imprisonment on both counts with a specific direction that the substantive sentences shall run consecutively, one after the other. The Bombay High Court affirmed the conviction and the consecutive sentencing on June 10, 2016, and subsequently dismissed a writ petition seeking concurrent sentences on January 13, 2025, prompting the appellant to approach the Supreme Court.
The primary question before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court and the High Court were justified in law in imposing consecutive life sentences upon a convict in a single trial for offences under Section 302 and Section 376 read with Section 342 IPC. The bench was also called upon to examine the operational framework governing the concurrent running and superimposition of multiple life terms under Section 31 of the CrPC.
Writ Remedy Issue Left Open As Criminal Appeal Entertained On Merits
At the outset, the bench addressed the procedural posture of the proceedings, noting that the appellant had approached the court through two separate channels: one challenging the writ court's refusal to review a coordinate bench order, and the other directly assailing the High Court's 2016 appellate judgment on the imposition of consecutive sentences. The bench condoned the delay in the substantive appeal and granted leave, rendering the challenge against the writ court order infructuous. The court noted that it was not required to determine whether a writ court could order concurrent sentences, as the substantive sentencing order was directly before it for adjudication.
Life Sentence Means Remainder Of Natural Life; Consecutive Terms A Legal Impossibility
Addressing the substantive sentencing question, the bench observed that the issue of awarding consecutive life terms to a convict tried in a single trial is no longer res integra, having been authoritatively settled by a Constitution Bench in Muthuramalingam and Others v. State Represented by Inspector of Police (2016) 8 SCC 313. The court reiterated that imprisonment for life implies incarceration for the remainder of the natural life of the offender, unless validly commuted or remitted by the competent authority.
"The legal position is, thus, fairly well settled that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless of course the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the competent authority."
Section 31 CrPC Must Be Harmonised With Section 427(2) CrPC
Examining the statutory scheme, the bench highlighted the crucial interplay between Section 31(1) and Section 427(2) of the CrPC. The court recalled that Parliament, while framing Section 427(2) CrPC, was conscious of the anomaly that would arise if a prisoner is directed to undergo life imprisonment twice over for separate trials, and therefore enacted that subsequent life sentences must run concurrently with previous life sentences. Drawing upon Ranjit Singh v. Union of India, O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala, and Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa, the bench observed that the same rational principle governs Section 31 CrPC.
The bench stressed that Section 31(1) CrPC permits consecutive running of sentences only if such sentences do not happen to be life sentences. Interpreting the provision otherwise would lead to an impossibility because a prisoner cannot serve two consecutive life sentences. Therefore, sentences awarded for several offences committed by a prisoner shall run consecutively unless the court directs otherwise, except where such sentences include imprisonment for life, which can and must run concurrently.
"So interpreted Section 31(1) CrPC must mean that sentences awarded by the Court for several offences committed by the prisoner shall run consecutively (unless the Court directs otherwise) except where such sentences include imprisonment for life which can and must run concurrently."
Kamalanantha Doctrine Disapproved Regarding Consecutive Life Sentences
The bench also drew attention to the Constitution Bench's disapproval of the contrary line of reasoning in State of Maharashtra v. Kamalanantha. While a trial court has unhindered power to award multiple sentences of life imprisonment for multiple heinous offences punishable under law, it cannot direct those life terms to run consecutively. The bench emphasized that awarding multiple sentences of life imprisonment so that they are superimposed over one another is legally distinct from directing them to run consecutively.
Doctrine Of Superimposition Governs Multiple Life Sentences
Elaborating on the doctrine of superimposition established in Muthuramalingam, the bench explained that while multiple life sentences cannot run consecutively, they do not merge completely into a single entity. Instead, multiple life sentences get superimposed over each other. This operational distinction ensures that the prisoner does not receive a blanket windfall if one conviction is altered or remitted.
The court clarified that superimposition ensures that if the convict is granted the benefit of remission or commutation qua one offence by the competent executive authority, that benefit will not ipso facto extend to the other life sentence. The prisoner must continue to serve the remainder of the unremitted life sentence awarded for the separate offence.
"We hold that while multiple sentences for imprisonment for life can be awarded for multiple murders or other offences punishable with imprisonment for life, the life sentences so awarded cannot be directed to run consecutively. Such sentences would, however, be super imposed over each other so that any remission or commutation granted by the competent authority in one does not ipso facto result in remission of the sentence awarded to the prisoner for the other."
Trial Court And High Court Sentences Modified
Applying these settled principles to the case at hand, the bench partly allowed the criminal appeal arising from the conviction proceedings. The court set aside the directions of both the Additional Sessions Judge, Thane, and the Bombay High Court to the extent they mandated the life sentences under Section 302 and Section 376 read with Section 342 IPC to run consecutively. The substantive life sentences were directed to run concurrently by operation of law, subject to being superimposed over each other.
Partly allowing the substantive appeal, the Supreme Court modified the sentences imposed on the appellant, setting aside the direction for consecutive life terms and substituting it with superimposed life sentences. The judgment reaffirms the vital procedural safeguard that while trial courts may award multiple life terms in a single trial, such terms cannot run consecutively, ensuring consistency with the constitutional and statutory reality that human life is singular.
Date of Decision: 27 October 2026