RFCTLARR Act, 2013 | Section 5 Limitation Act Applies to Section 74 Appeals; High Court Can Condone Delay Beyond Statutory Period: Supreme Court

“The 2013 Act is a special law... but does not bar any assistance from the other enactments to give effect to its avowed object... Any interpretation to the contrary would result in a situation as if both Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act and Section 103 of the 2013 Act have vanished.”— In a seminal ruling, the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, has set aside a string of High Court judgments to hold that the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act).

In a massive relief to both landowners and the State instrumentalities, the Court ruled that the High Court has the power to condone delay in filing appeals under Section 74 of the 2013 Act by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, even beyond the prescribed period of 60 days plus the discretionary 60 days (total 120 days).

The Controversy: Is the 2013 Act a Complete Code?

The core legal knot before the Apex Court was the interpretation of Section 74 of the 2013 Act. The provision prescribes a limitation period of 60 days to file an appeal before the High Court against an award by the Land Acquisition Authority. A proviso allows the High Court to entertain an appeal within a further period of 60 days if sufficient cause is shown.

Various High Courts had interpreted this to mean that the 2013 Act is a self-contained code which impliedly excludes the Limitation Act. Consequently, any appeal filed beyond the maximum 120-day window was dismissed as time-barred, leaving the State (in roughly 530 appeals) and landowners without a remedy.

“The 2013 Act takes into consideration various social factors and extends its benefits to affected persons... Courts must make a conscious endeavour to give effect to its avowed objectives.”

The Verdict: Section 29(2) Limitation Act Saves the Day

The Supreme Court rejected the rigid interpretation adopted by the High Courts. The Bench relied heavily on Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which mandates that unless a special law "expressly excludes" the provisions of the Limitation Act, sections 4 to 24 (including the power to condone delay under Section 5) shall apply.

The Court observed that Section 74 of the 2013 Act contains no such express exclusion. Furthermore, the Court pointed to Section 103 of the 2013 Act, which explicitly states that the provisions of the Act shall be "in addition to and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being in force."

Harmonious Construction

Justice Sundresh, writing for the Bench, held that reading Section 74 in isolation to bar the Limitation Act would render Section 103 of the 2013 Act and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act "redundant and otiose." The Court clarified that the proviso to Section 74 (allowing an extra 60 days) does not act as an exclusion of Section 5 but merely brings a delayed filing within the ambit of the main provision.

“We cannot introduce words that are not available in Section 74 through an imaginary interpretation in holding the existence of an express exclusion.”

Judicial vs. Executive Functions

The Court drew a sharp distinction between the Collector and the Land Acquisition Authority.
The Collector: Acts in an administrative/quasi-judicial capacity. Therefore, the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings before the Collector (such as seeking a reference under Section 64).
The Authority & High Court: The Authority (Section 51) exercises the powers of a Civil Court, and the High Court exercises appellate jurisdiction. Thus, judicial proceedings attract the

Transitional Provisions: No Retrospective R&R Under Section 24(1)(a)
Rehabilitation & Resettlement Provisions Not Applicable to 1894 Act Transitions
The Court settled a crucial incidental issue regarding Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. This section covers cases where proceedings were initiated under the old 1894 Act, but no award was passed before the 2013 Act commenced. The Court held that while the determination of compensation must be done under the 2013 Act, the Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) entitlements (Chapters V and VI) do not apply. The Bench reasoned that R&R is a new right created by the 2013 Act and cannot be extended retrospectively to acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 regime unless the statute explicitly says so.

Reference to Authority: No Condonation of Delay for Section 64
Collector Cannot Condone Delay Beyond Statutory One Year for References
While the Court allowed condonation of delay for appeals to the High Court (Section 74), it strictly barred it for references to the Authority under Section 64. Under Section 64, a landowner must seek a reference within 6 weeks (or 6 months depending on notice). The Collector can extend this only by one year. The Court held that since the Collector is a statutory authority and not a Court, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to extend this period further. Once the one-year extension expires, the right to seek a reference is extinguished.

State Accountability: "Official Connivance" in Delays
SC Slams "Abject Carelessness" of Officials in Filing Appeals
The judgment noted with concern that over 530 appeals were filed with massive delays, hinting at "official connivance" and "collusion" between acquiring bodies and claimants to let awards attain finality by default. The Court observed that such negligence erodes public confidence in the legal system. The Bench directed State Governments to fix responsibility on erring officials and create a monitoring system to ensure appeals are filed on time, refusing to accept "interdepartmental correspondence" as a valid excuse for delay in future cases.

Nature of the Award: Decree vs. Executive Order
Authority’s Award is a Decree; Collector’s Award is an Offer
The Court clarified the legal nature of awards under the Act. An award passed by the Collector (Section 23) is merely an offer/tender of compensation and not a decree. However, an award passed by the Land Acquisition Authority (Section 69) is deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court. This distinction is vital because the proceedings before the Authority are "original proceedings" (akin to a suit), whereas proceedings before the High Court are appellate, allowing for the application of the Limitation Act to the latter.

Date of Decision: February 09, 2026