Rejection Of Nomination Paper Can Only Be Challenged Through Election Petition; Article 329(b) Bars Writ Jurisdiction: Supreme Court

"Scheme of the election law in this country as well as in England is that no significance should be attached to anything which does not affect the 'election'; and if any irregularities are committed while it is in progress... they should be brought up before a Special Tribunal by means of an election petition and not be made the subject of a dispute before any court while the election is in progress," Supreme Court, in a significant ruling, held that the rejection of a nomination paper by a Returning Officer cannot be challenged through a writ petition under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution.

A bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar observed that Article 329(b) creates an express constitutional bar against judicial interference in electoral matters once the process has commenced, stipulating that such disputes can only be resolved via an election petition.

The petitioner, Meenakshi Natarajan, a candidate for the Rajya Sabha biennial elections from Madhya Pradesh, challenged an order passed by the Returning Officer on June 9, 2026. Her nomination was rejected on the grounds that she suppressed material information by failing to disclose a pending criminal case in her Form-26 affidavit. While the petitioner argued that disclosure was not mandatory under Section 33A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as charges had not yet been framed, the Election Commission and the State opposed the petition on the grounds of maintainability.

The primary question before the court was whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is maintainable against the rejection of a nomination paper in view of the bar contained in Article 329(b). The court also examined whether the right to contest an election is a fundamental right and if the term "election" includes the intermediate stage of nomination scrutiny.

The Constitutional Bar Under Article 329(b)

The Court began its analysis by reproducing Article 329 of the Constitution, noting that it begins with a non-obstante clause, "notwithstanding anything in this Constitution." The bench emphasized that this phrasing is intended to exclude the extraordinary jurisdiction of both the High Courts and the Supreme Court during the progress of an election.

Article 329(b) Operates As An Absolute Bar To Writ Jurisdiction During Elections

The bench observed that the provision explicitly states that no election to either House of Parliament shall be called in question except by an election petition. By using such language, the framers of the Constitution intended to ensure that the election process is not stalled or protracted by intermediate litigation, thereby maintaining the sanctity and time-bound nature of democratic selection.

"The word 'election' has been used in Part XV of the Constitution in the wide sense, that is to say, to connote the entire procedure to be gone through to return a candidate to the legislature."

The Broad Definition Of 'Election'

The Court relied heavily on the landmark precedent of N.P. Ponnuswami vs. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, to define the scope of the word "election." It noted that "election" has both a narrow and a wide meaning. In the narrow sense, it refers to the final selection or the poll result; however, in the wide sense, it encompasses the entire process from the issuance of the notification to the final declaration of the result.

The Term 'Election' Encompasses Every Stage From Nomination To Result

The bench noted that the rejection of a nomination paper is a step in the "election" process. If the grounds for calling an election into question could be raised at an earlier stage and rectified by courts, the provision for a Special Tribunal and an election petition would be rendered meaningless. The court held that the Constitution did not contemplate a dual-track attack on election proceedings.

"Any other meaning ascribed to the words used in the article would lead to anomalies, which the Constitution could not have contemplated."

Statutory Nature Of The Right To Contest

Regarding the maintainability of an Article 32 petition, the Court reiterated that the right to vote or stand as a candidate is not a civil right or a fundamental right. Instead, it is a "creature of statute" or a special law. Consequently, this right must be subject to the specific limitations and remedies imposed by the statute that created it.

Right To Contest Is A Statutory Right, Not A Fundamental Right Invokable Under Article 32

The bench observed that since no fundamental right was at stake, the petitioner could not directly approach the Supreme Court under Article 32. It further noted that the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is a self-contained enactment, and Section 100 of the Act specifically provides that the "improper rejection of a nomination paper" is a ground for declaring an election void through an election petition.

Rejection Of The 'Glaring Illegality' Argument

Senior Counsel for the petitioner, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, had argued that in cases of "glaring and manifest" illegality, the Court must intervene to curb injustice. However, the bench rejected this submission, stating that accepting such an argument would require the Court to read principles into Article 329 that do not exist.

Courts Cannot Carve Out Exceptions To The Express Constitutional Bar In Article 329(b)

The bench held that allowing certain "glaring" cases to be heard while relegating others to election petitions would create a direct conflict with established law. It emphasized that even if a rejection is allegedly improper, the only legal remedy is to wait until the election concludes and then file a petition before the appropriate tribunal or High Court as prescribed by law.

"If this Court accepts such argument to find out such glaring cases... this Court would be reading some principle which is not provided for under Article 329 of the Constitution of India."

The Supreme Court concluded that it was not inclined to entertain the petition given the express bar under Article 329(b). While dismissing the writ petition, the Court clarified that its observations regarding the rejection of the nomination were only for the purpose of deciding maintainability and would not prejudice any future election petition filed by the petitioner. The court affirmed that the election process must proceed without judicial interdiction.

Date of Decision: June 12, 2026