Refusal by One House Cannot Stall Removal Proceedings: Supreme Court Upholds Speaker’s Power to Constitute Inquiry Committee Against High Court Judge

“First Proviso to Section 3(2) Applies Only When Motions Are Admitted in Both Houses, Not Merely Given”, In a landmark judgment pronounced on January 16, 2026, a bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma of the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutionality and legality of a three-member Inquiry Committee constituted by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, to investigate charges against a sitting High Court Judge. The Court rejected the argument that the failure of the Rajya Sabha to admit an identical motion filed on the same day rendered the Speaker’s action invalid.

The Court held: “The first proviso to Section 3(2) caters to only one situation: when notices of motion are given in both Houses on the same day and are admitted in both Houses. The mere giving of notices is not sufficient. If a motion is not admitted in one House, the other can proceed independently.”

This ruling settles a vital question concerning the constitutional procedure for removal of judges, and particularly, the interpretation of the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, a provision invoked for the first time in judicial history in this context.

"Vacancy in One House Cannot Paralyse Another" – Supreme Court Rejects Interpretation That Would Give Veto to One House Over Another

At the heart of the dispute was the petitioner-judge’s contention that since motions for his removal were given in both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha on the same day, the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act mandated that “no Committee shall be constituted unless the motion has been admitted in both Houses” and that, if one House (here, Rajya Sabha) refused to admit, then no action could be taken even by the other House.

Rejecting this submission, the Court held: “The proviso does not create a disabling effect in cases where only one House admits the motion. It is situational, not exhaustive. The Speaker’s power remains unaffected when the motion is not admitted in the other House.”

The judgment warns that such an interpretation as suggested by the petitioner would lead to absurd consequences:

“It would allow members of one House, by submitting a defective notice, to scuttle legitimate proceedings in the other House. Such an interpretation would frustrate, not promote, the object of the Inquiry Act.”

In effect, the Court reaffirmed the autonomy of each House in acting upon a motion for removal, and ruled that one House’s inaction or rejection cannot act as a constitutional veto over the other.

“Deputy Chairman Validly Exercised Powers of Chairman” – Supreme Court Upholds Refusal to Admit Motion in Rajya Sabha

The Court also addressed the competence of the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, who had acted as the Presiding Officer after the Chairman resigned, to refuse admission of the motion filed in the Upper House.

The petitioner argued that only the “Chairman” (Vice-President) could exercise such power, and that the Deputy Chairman was not empowered under the Act, which defines “Chairman” narrowly in Section 2(a).

Rejecting this contention, the Court held: “To read the statute in isolation of the Constitution would be grossly incorrect. Article 91 of the Constitution authorises the Deputy Chairman to perform all the duties of the Chairman in case of vacancy.”

The Court observed that constitutional provisions must prevail over statutory silence, invoking the doctrine of constitutional necessity. It ruled:

“A narrow interpretation of the word ‘Chairman’ overlooking Article 91 would be incoherent. The Deputy Chairman's action was entirely lawful.”

The Court further noted that hypothetical bias (such as the Deputy Chairman being a signatory to the motion) could not form the basis for invalidating his action, and that in such situations, recusal or the doctrine of necessity would apply.

“Even if Deputy Chairman’s Decision Were Illegal, Speaker’s Action Remains Valid” – Supreme Court Rejects Relief Based on Hypotheticals

Taking the argument further, the Court considered a hypothetical scenario where the Deputy Chairman’s refusal to admit the motion might have been invalid.

Yet, the Court held that even assuming illegality, the Speaker’s independent action based on admission of the Lok Sabha motion would still stand: “The first proviso springs into action only when there are admitted motions in both Houses. As on the date the Speaker acted, no motion had been admitted in the Rajya Sabha.”

The Court decisively ruled: “Even if the Rajya Sabha’s action was flawed, it cannot retrospectively invalidate the Speaker’s lawful exercise of power.”

“Writ Petition Without Challenging Deputy Chairman’s Order Is Not Maintainable”

Another critical procedural point addressed by the Court was that the petitioner had never challenged the order of the Deputy Chairman refusing admission of the Rajya Sabha motion, either in pleadings or through a prayer.

This, the Court held, was fatal to the writ petition under Article 32:

“Relief cannot be granted on hypothesis or assumptions. Courts cannot quash or ignore an order not put in issue.”

The Court cited Hindustan Petroleum v. Sunita Mehra and Amina Marwa Sabreen v. State of Kerala to reiterate that “unless the petitioner lays an order to challenge with proper pleadings and grounds, no relief can be granted against it.”

“Secretary General Cannot Play Adjudicatory Role” – Supreme Court Cautions Rajya Sabha Secretariat on Overreach

While declining to interfere in the outcome, the Court made strong academic observations on the role played by the Secretary General of the Rajya Sabha, who had scrutinized the motion and found it “not in order”, leading to its rejection.

Noting that the Secretary General examined factual allegations, errors in dates, legal citations, and completeness of documents, the Court said: “The Secretary General’s role was expected to remain confined to administrative scrutiny, not a quasi-adjudicatory function.”

It emphasized that: “Where statute is silent, constitutional provisions must fill the gap – but procedural discretion must remain with the Presiding Officer, not the Secretariat.”

The Court made it clear that such comments were “academic and not forming basis for relief”, but called for greater institutional restraint in the future.

“No Demonstrable Prejudice to Petitioner – Inquiry Is Not Final”

The petitioner had argued that the constitution of a non-joint Committee deprived him of additional safeguards and caused “reputational prejudice”.

The Court rejected this, observing: “The Committee’s report is not self-executory. The Judge retains full rights of defence, cross-examination, and the final decision rests with Parliament under Article 124(4).”

It held that the loss of a joint committee is not sufficient to show real prejudice warranting judicial interference, and that reputational damage alone, absent procedural illegality, does not justify the quashing of a statutory process.

Supreme Court Dismisses Writ, Upholds Speaker’s Power and Removal Process

In its final analysis, the Court unequivocally upheld the Speaker’s action under the Judges (Inquiry) Act and dismissed the petition: “No interference is called for. The present writ petition stands dismissed.”

The ruling reaffirms the independence of parliamentary procedures, the supremacy of constitutional functionaries, and provides critical clarity on the interplay of statutory and constitutional provisions in judicial accountability.

Date of Decision: January 16, 2026