Rape Is An Offence Against Society And Not A Matter To Be Left For Compromise: Allahabad High Court Refuses To Quash Proceedings Under Section 376 IPC And U.P. Conversion Prevention Act Despite Settlement

Allahabad High Court dismissed a petition seeking the quashing of criminal proceedings arising from serious charges under Section 376 IPC (rape) and Section ¾(1) of the U.P. Conversion Prevention Act, 2020, despite a compromise between the parties. The court held that “rape is a non-compoundable offence and it is an offence against the society and is not a matter to be left for the parties to compromise and settle”. Justice Manju Rani Chauhan firmly reiterated that such offences have grave societal implications and cannot be extinguished by private settlements. 
 
The case originated from an FIR lodged on 7th June 2021, where the prosecutrix alleged that she was lured through Facebook by accused Rahul @ Mohd. Ayan, who detained her for six months, sexually assaulted her, and further subjected her to gang rape with the help of two co-accused, Taufik Ahmad (applicant) and Mohd. Riyaz. The accused were also charged under the U.P. Conversion Prevention Act, alleging an attempt to forcibly convert the victim. 
 
During the investigation, the victim, in her statements recorded under Sections 161 & 164 Cr.P.C., reiterated the allegations, naming Taufik Ahmad and others. A charge sheet was filed, and proceedings were initiated in Criminal Case No.1340 of 2021, before the trial court. 
 
Later, a compromise was allegedly reached between the parties, and the applicant approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the charge-sheet and proceedings based on the settlement. 
 
 The pivotal question before the court was: “Whether proceedings involving serious offences like rape and unlawful conversion can be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. merely because the parties have entered into a compromise?” 
 
The applicant relied on B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana [(2003) 4 SCC 675], emphasizing the power of the High Court to prevent abuse of process and secure ends of justice. The prosecution, however, strongly opposed the plea, highlighting that the offences were noncompoundable, heinous, and affected the larger societal interest. 
 
The court, after reviewing several binding precedents, observed: 
 The paramount consideration to the exercise of this power is to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. However, heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute” (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303]). 
 
 Justice Chauhan stressed: 
 “In a case of rape or attempt of rape, the conception of compromise under no circumstances can really be thought of. These are crimes against the body of a woman which is her own temple.” 
 
Referring to Shimbhu v. State of Haryana [(2014) 13 SCC 318], the Court held: 
 
“Since the Court cannot always be assured that the consent given by the victim in compromising the case is a genuine consent, there is every chance that she might have been pressurized by the convicts or the trauma undergone by her all the years might have compelled her to opt for a compromise.” 
 
 The court exhaustively discussed the principles governing Section 482 Cr.P.C. and observed: 
 
“There can be no hard and fast line constricting the power of the Court to do substantial justice. However, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended.” 
 
 The Court clarified that offences under Section 376 IPC and Section ¾(1) of the U.P. Conversion Prevention Act, 2020, cannot be classified as private disputes. The bench noted: 
 
“Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders.” 
 
Justice Chauhan strongly highlighted: 
 
“Let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.” 
 
 Moreover, on the issue of forced conversion, the Court referred to the law laid down in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1977) 1 SCC 677], asserting: 
 
“There is no fundamental right to convert another person to one’s own religion because that would impinge on the freedom of conscience guaranteed to all citizens.” 
 
 The Court also invoked the recent judgment in Daxaben v. State of Gujarat [2022 SCC OnLine SC 936] stating: 
 
“Heinous or serious crimes, which are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society, cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise between the offender and the victim.” 
 
 Further, the Court remarked: 
 “Conversion just for the purpose of marriage is unacceptable. From the U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2020, also such conversion just for the purpose of marriage is an offence.” 
 
In unequivocal terms, the Allahabad High Court dismissed the plea for quashing the proceedings, holding: 
 
“The alleged offences under Section 376 IPC and Section ¾(1) U.P. Conversion Prevention Act, 2020, are serious in nature and non-compoundable. Therefore, the instant proceedings cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties in exercise of powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C.” 
 
The judgment reinforces the principle that crimes against the dignity and bodily autonomy of women and offences affecting public policy cannot be compromised, even if the victim consents under pressure or for social reasons. 
 
Date of Decision: 27.03.2025