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by sayum
01 May 2026 8:18 AM
"Requirement of sanction is a condition precedent only for taking cognizance and not for the registration of an FIR or for the conduct of investigation. Any interpretation that makes the registration of an FIR contingent upon prior sanction would invert this statutory scheme and render the provisions relating to investigation unworkable", Supreme Court, in a significant ruling dated April 29, 2026, held that a Magistrate directing the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) and investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC does not require prior sanction from the government.
A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta observed that the bar under Sections 196 and 197 CrPC operates exclusively at the stage of "taking cognizance" and not at the anterior, pre-cognizance stage of investigation. The Court clarified that an order for investigation is intended to set the criminal law in motion, whereas cognizance is a subsequent judicial step.
The ruling arose from a batch of petitions, including a criminal appeal challenging a Delhi High Court judgment. The High Court had earlier refused to direct the registration of an FIR against certain public functionaries for alleged hate speech, holding that a Magistrate cannot exercise power under Section 156(3) CrPC without prior sanction under Section 196 CrPC. The appellants contended that such a requirement at the threshold of an investigation would lead to institutional inertia and shield offenders from the primary investigative process.
The primary question before the court was whether the existence of prior sanction is a precondition for a Magistrate to direct the registration of an FIR and the commencement of an investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC. The court was also called upon to determine whether the act of directing an investigation amounts to "taking cognizance" of an offence within the meaning of Section 190 CrPC.
Distinction Between Investigation And Cognizance
The Court emphasized that the criminal process is sequential and the requirement of sanction is specific to the stage where a Court takes formal notice of an offence to initiate judicial proceedings. It noted that information of a cognizable offence must first be received, an FIR registered, and an investigation conducted before a report is submitted under Section 173 CrPC. It is only at this final stage that the question of taking cognizance arises.
"The scheme of CrPC does not contemplate any embargo on the direction for registration of an FIR or the conduct of investigation at the pre-cognizance stage. To hold otherwise would amount to introducing a restriction not envisaged by the legislature."
Magistrate’s Power Under Section 156(3) Is Pre-Cognizance
The Bench clarified that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3), they do so before taking cognizance of the offence. Citing the settled position in Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan, the Court noted that a Magistrate is not required to examine the complainant on oath while directing an investigation because the judicial mind is not yet being applied to initiate a trial. The order is simply a tool to ensure the police perform their statutory duty of investigating a cognizable offence.
"An order directing investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC does not amount to 'taking cognizance' within the meaning of Section 190 of CrPC."
Rejection Of The Delhi High Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court found the Delhi High Court's view—that the expression "taking cognizance" should be widened to include Section 156(3) orders—to be legally unsustainable. It observed that defining "taking cognizance" as the mere application of judicial mind for any purpose is too broad. Instead, it must be the application of mind for the specific purpose of proceeding with the case under Chapter XV of the CrPC.
"Where the Magistrate applies his mind for a different purpose, such as ordering investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC or issuing a search warrant in aid of investigation, it would not amount to taking cognizance of the offence."
Sanction Cannot Be A Shield Against Investigation
The Court warned that requiring sanction at the registration stage would place citizens in a position of vulnerability. While the requirement of sanction under Sections 196 and 197 serves as a safeguard against frivolous prosecution at the trial stage, it cannot be permitted to operate as a shield to prevent the very initiation of the investigative process where a cognizable offence is disclosed. The Bench reiterated that the law does not admit any distinction based on the status or identity of the accused at the stage of registering an FIR.
"The requirement of sanction operates at the stage of taking cognizance and does not extend to the pre-cognizance stage of registration of FIR or investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC."
Application To The New Criminal Laws (BNSS)
The Bench noted that these principles apply equally to the corresponding provisions under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. Specifically, Section 156(3) CrPC corresponds to Section 175(3) BNSS, and the bar on cognizance without sanction in Section 196/197 CrPC remains reflected in Sections 217 and 218 of the BNSS. The Court held that the transition to the new code does not alter the fundamental distinction between the investigative and cognizance-taking stages.
"The requirement of prior sanction under Sections 196 and 197 of CrPC (corresponding Sections 217 and 218 of BNSS) operates at the stage of taking cognizance and does not extend to the pre-cognizance stage."
The Supreme Court partly allowed the criminal appeal, setting aside the Delhi High Court's ruling to the limited extent that it required prior sanction for a Section 156(3) direction. However, on the facts of the specific case, the Court affirmed the final dismissal, finding that the speeches in question did not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence. The Registry was directed to transmit the judgment to all High Courts to ensure the law regarding pre-cognizance investigations is implemented effectively.
Date of Decision: 29 April 2026