Presumption Under Section 113-B Evidence Act Not Attracted Without Proof Of Cruelty Soon Before Death: Bombay High Court Affirms Acquittal

"Unnatural Death Alone Does Not Make Out A Case Under Section 304-B IPC In Absence Of Evidence Linking Cruelty To Dowry Demand", In a judgment of considerable relevance to dowry death prosecutions, the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench), dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of five accused in a case involving the unnatural death of a young woman within one year of her marriage. The Court held that the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, could not be invoked in absence of cogent evidence showing that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death in connection with a demand for dowry.

The Division Bench comprising Justice Y. G. Khobragade and Justice Sandipkumar C. More in The State of Maharashtra v. Nandkumar Maruti Chavan & Others, Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2003, upheld the trial court’s reasoning that although the deceased died an unnatural death by consuming poison, there was no consistent or credible evidence of dowry demand or cruelty proximate to her death. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the acquittal dated 10.01.2003 was affirmed.

“Soon Before Death” Is A Relative Term – But Must Be Proved With Proximity To Dowry Demand

The Bench reaffirmed the principle that a presumption of dowry death under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act read with Section 304-B IPC arises only when three conditions are satisfied:

1. The woman died an unnatural death within seven years of marriage,
2. She was subjected to cruelty or harassment,
3. The cruelty was in connection with a demand for dowry, and
4. The cruelty occurred soon before her death.

Referring to the Supreme Court’s decisions in State of M.P. v. Jogendra, (2022) 5 SCC 401 and Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207, the Court reiterated:

“There must be a nexus between the demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand, and the date of death. The test of proximity will have to be applied.”

In the present case, the Court noted that while the deceased Savita died of Indosulfan poisoning within a year of marriage, the prosecution failed to prove a live and proximate link between any alleged dowry demand and her death.

Prosecution Version Based On Interested Witnesses, Marred By Contradictions And Improvements

The High Court was particularly critical of the manner in which the prosecution’s case was built upon the testimonies of only interested witnesses—primarily the father (PW-1), mother (PW-4), and brother (PW-3) of the deceased—while failing to examine any independent witness to corroborate the claims of dowry demand or harassment.

Significantly, the FIR did not disclose any prior settlement of dowry amounting to ₹1,50,000, nor did it refer to the alleged partial payment of ₹1,00,000 and balance ₹50,000. However, this story was introduced later during oral depositions. The Court held:

“In evidence, PW-1 and PW-4 improved the story and narrated the facts other than the FIR. The version/story narrated by PW-1 and PW-3 not been corroborated by the FIR.”

Further, even the claim that ₹50,000 was demanded for securing a government job for the accused husband (A1) was not established as a demand in connection with marriage—which is essential to attract the definition of dowry under the Dowry Prohibition Act.

No Charge Under Section 302 IPC – No Evidence That Poison Was Administered By Accused

The Court found that the prosecution failed to explain how the poison reached the deceased, or whether it was suicide, accident, or administration by a third party. Importantly, no charge was framed under Section 302 IPC, and the prosecution never alleged that the accused administered poison.

While the medical and chemical evidence confirmed death due to organochloro insecticide (Indosulfan) poisoning, and the spot panchanama recorded seizure of the poison tin, the Bench clarified:

“Evidence of the prosecution does not reveal that the accused persons administered said poisonous substance to the deceased.”

Hence, the case was adjudicated strictly within the legal framework of Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC, which required proof of cruelty linked to dowry—not mere unnatural death.

Trial Court’s Findings Based On Plausible View – No Grounds For Appellate Interference

Reiterating the limited scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Bench held that unless the trial court’s findings are perverse, unreasonable, or based on complete misreading of evidence, the High Court cannot substitute its own view merely because another interpretation is possible.

“The learned trial court disbelieved the evidence of prosecution witnesses and acquitted the accused… which appears to be just and proper. The prosecution has not made out substantial ground to interfere with the said findings.”

The Court held that the benefit of doubt was rightly extended to the accused in this case, and the acquittal warranted no interference.

Presumption Cannot Substitute Proof – Unnatural Death Must Be Tied To Dowry Cruelty

This judgment highlights the delicate balance between protecting women from dowry-related violence and ensuring that criminal convictions are not based on presumptions alone, without evidentiary foundation. It underscores that Section 113-B of the Evidence Act does not create an automatic presumption of guilt, but rather shifts the burden only after foundational facts are established by the prosecution.

The Court ultimately held:

“Prosecution failed to prove that deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment ‘soon before her death’ in connection with demand for dowry. Mere unnatural death insufficient to attract Section 304-B IPC.”

Date of Decision: 21 January 2026