Presumption Under Section 112 Is Not A Procedural Form But A Substantive Safeguard Against Casual Illegitimization: Supreme Court Quashes DNA Test Order In Criminal Case

“Scientific procedures, however advanced, cannot be employed as instruments of speculation... The presumption under Section 112 is a bulwark against casual illegitimization of children”, ruled the Supreme Court while setting aside a direction of the Madras High Court that had compelled the appellant to undergo a DNA test in a criminal matter arising out of allegations of cheating and harassment.

In a significant judgment reinforcing the constitutional right to privacy and legal presumption of legitimacy, a bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi allowed the appeal and quashed the order directing DNA profiling of the appellant, observing that “the paternity of the child is, at best, a collateral issue and not central to the criminal charges under Sections 417 and 420 IPC or the Tamil Nadu Women Harassment Act.”

 “Mere Allegations of Simultaneous Access Do Not Rebut Presumption of Legitimacy”

On 10 November 2025, the Supreme Court of India delivered a critical judgment in R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha & Ors., allowing the appeal against the Madras High Court’s directive for a DNA test to ascertain the paternity of a child allegedly fathered by the appellant during the subsistence of the respondent’s marriage with one Abdul Latheef. The judgment revisits and reinforces the statutory presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the constitutional right to privacy under Article 21, and narrows the permissible scope of intrusive scientific procedures like DNA testing within criminal investigations.

The Court held that unless non-access between the married couple is proven by strong and unambiguous evidence, DNA testing cannot be ordered to challenge the legitimacy of a child. “Mere assertion of extramarital relations or simultaneous access does not suffice,” said the bench, reiterating that the law “frowns upon illegitimacy and protects the dignity of children born within wedlock.”

DNA Testing Sought In Criminal Proceedings Alleging Harassment and Cheating

The case arose out of an FIR registered by Respondent No.1, Kamar Nisha, against the appellant R. Rajendran, a doctor, alleging offences under Sections 417 and 420 IPC and Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Women Harassment Act. She claimed that the appellant, instead of referring her to his wife for gynecological treatment, engaged in an extramarital affair, which led to the birth of a child on 08.03.2007.

After a series of writ petitions and appeals, the High Court directed the appellant to undergo a DNA test along with the respondent and her child to “unearth the truth” for the pending investigation. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court addressed several layered legal questions, including:

• Whether a DNA test can be ordered in criminal proceedings for offences not intrinsically linked to paternity;
• Whether the presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act can be displaced without a plea or proof of non-access;
• Whether forcing an individual to undergo DNA testing violates their right to privacy under Article 21.

The bench ruled decisively against the High Court’s approach, emphasizing that DNA testing in such cases must satisfy a triple threshold of legality, legitimate state aim, and proportionality. It concluded that in this case, “there exists no legitimate investigative aim justifying the intrusive nature of a DNA test”.

Section 112 Evidence Act: A Substantive Safeguard, Not a Mere Rule of Procedure

Citing the statutory language and judicial precedents including Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram and Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, the Court clarified that Section 112 of the Evidence Act creates “conclusive proof” of legitimacy when a child is born during the continuance of a valid marriage unless non-access is shown. The Court elaborated:

“Allegations of multiple or simultaneous access by third parties do not negate the access between the spouses... The focus remains on the child’s birth, while the time of conception is relevant only to determine whether access between the spouses existed.”

It noted that respondent No.1 neither pleaded nor proved non-access, nor demonstrated any incapacity on the part of Abdul Latheef to father a child. Instead, official records, including the birth and school certificates, consistently listed Abdul Latheef as the father.

“Right To Privacy Cannot Be Waived By One Party To Override Others’ Autonomy”

Rebutting the argument that the respondent's willingness to undergo DNA testing should justify the order, the Court underscored that privacy is not a waivable right for third parties. Noting that the child had attained majority, it stated:

“Respondent No.1’s willingness to waive her own privacy does not extend to waiving the privacy of others. The appellant and the now-major child possess independent and equally inviolable rights to privacy and dignity.”

The Court reaffirmed that forced DNA testing infringes upon bodily autonomy and privacy under Article 21, and any such intrusion must pass the constitutional muster laid down in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. In this case, no compelling public interest, nor a proportional need, was established.

“Criminal Allegations Do Not Warrant Determination Of Paternity”: Court Calls It A Collateral Issue

The bench decisively rejected the respondent’s argument that paternity was necessary to establish the offence. Relying on Inayath Ali v. State of Telangana, the Court observed:

“The paternity of the child is a collateral issue to the criminal charges... The child is neither a party to the proceedings nor is her status relevant to the proof of cheating or harassment.”

It concluded that introducing DNA testing to resolve an issue tangential to the actual criminal offence amounts to “scientific speculation divorced from legal necessity.”

Adverse Inference Under Section 114 Cannot Arise Without First Displacing Section 112 Presumption

Respondent No.1 had also urged the Court to draw an adverse inference under Section 114(g) and (h) of the Evidence Act against the appellant for refusing to undergo the DNA test.

The Court firmly rejected this:

“Without first displacing the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Section 112, no occasion arises to invoke Section 114... A litigant cannot jump to the inner fence of adverse inference without first crossing the outer fence of justifying the DNA test.”

This reasoning aligns with the Court’s approach in Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, reinforcing that adverse inference cannot be a substitute for satisfying legal thresholds.

Court Cautions Against Routine Use of DNA Testing; Recognizes Emotional and Ethical Implications

The Court did not stop at statutory and constitutional analysis but also addressed the ethical and psychological ramifications of DNA testing, especially where the child’s autonomy is in question. It highlighted:

“The act of extracting and analysing one’s genetic material intrudes into the innermost sphere of personal identity... It can have lasting emotional and social ramifications not only for children but also for adults.”

The bench criticized the High Court’s mechanical application of Sections 53 and 53A CrPC, clarifying that these provisions are confined to cases where medical examination directly relates to the commission of the alleged offence, which was not the case here.

Appeal Allowed, DNA Test Direction Set Aside

In conclusion, the Supreme Court found the High Court’s direction to be constitutionally infirm, legally unsustainable, and ethically problematic. The judgment ends with a stern reminder:

“Scientific procedures, however advanced, cannot be employed as instruments of speculation. They must be anchored in demonstrable relevance to the charge and justified by compelling investigative need.”

The appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the direction for DNA testing was quashed.

Date of Decision: 10 November 2025