Presence, Participation, and Purpose—Not the Knife—Makes You Guilty: Supreme Court Affirms Murder Conviction Under Section 149 IPC

In a compelling reaffirmation of the law on vicarious criminal liability, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of three men who were part of an armed unlawful assembly that executed a targeted killing, even though they did not individually inflict fatal blows. The Court held that “mere presence with knowledge and facilitation of a coordinated assault is enough to incur liability under Section 149 IPC”, dismissing the notion that only the hand that wields the weapon is culpable in murder.

Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi rejected criminal appeals filed by accused nos. 3, 4 and 6, affirming their conviction under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court found that the accused had actively participated in a premeditated group assault, and that their roles in transporting assailants, disabling escape routes, and inflicting injury were critical to the fatal outcome.

“Section 149 IPC Does Not Require That Each Member Holds a Weapon or Strikes a Blow—The Law Demands Common Object, Not Common Action”

Setting the tone for its ruling, the Court held that an unlawful assembly becomes culpable not by the number of strikes, but by the singularity of their design. “Once participation and sharing of the common object are proved, every member becomes vicariously liable for offences committed in prosecution of that object,” the Court observed while citing the settled doctrine from Masalti v. State of U.P.

The Court emphasized that what matters under Section 149 is conscious and knowing participation in the execution of an unlawful plan. “The appellants were not passive spectators but active participants and facilitators in a deliberate and planned assault,” the Bench concluded.

This principle, the Court explained, is not a matter of prosecutorial convenience, but the bedrock of accountability in collective crimes, where group coordination often masks individual guilt.

Trial Court’s Acquittal Was ‘Manifestly Unreasonable’—High Court's Conviction Restored

The trial court had acquitted accused nos. 3, 4, and 6, holding that there was no clear evidence of their direct participation in the murder. However, the Bombay High Court, in a detailed reappraisal of evidence, reversed their acquittal and found them guilty under the doctrine of constructive liability, observing that their presence and facilitation were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of common object under Section 149.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants argued that the High Court had overstepped its jurisdiction, that the prosecution had failed to prove any specific overt act, and that there were contradictions in witness statements. The defence also argued that there were fewer than five proven assailants, a necessary threshold for unlawful assembly.

Rejecting all contentions, the Court reiterated its view from Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka that an appellate court may reverse an acquittal when the trial court’s view is demonstrably flawed or unsustainable. The Bench held that the trial court had failed to appreciate the significance of consistent and credible eyewitness accounts, as well as medical evidence, and that its reasoning was not reasonably supportable by the record.

“Dragging Victims From a Jeep, Preventing Escape, and Assisting Attack—This Is Not Innocuous Presence”

The facts of the case spoke volumes about premeditation and common intent. On 27 April 1999, the deceased Ankush Gholap and his relatives were returning from the police station, having earlier lodged a complaint against one of the accused. At Navi Ali, they were ambushed by six men on two motorcycles, some armed with sattur and knives, who dragged the victims from the jeep and launched a coordinated attack.

Injured eyewitnesses PW-1, PW-7, and PW-9 provided consistent depositions stating that Haribhau (accused no. 3) and Rajendra (accused no. 4) forcibly stopped the vehicle, removed the keys, delivered the first blows, and held the deceased while others stabbed him. Subhash Pawar (accused no. 6) was identified as one of the assailants who inflicted serious injuries on PW-7 during the same sequence.

“There was no confusion, no delay, and no hesitation in the identification or sequence of events as narrated by the witnesses,” the Court noted. It held that their testimonies were “natural, coherent and mutually corroborative,” and “leave no room for doubt that the accused acted with complete knowledge of and participation in the fatal outcome.”

Medical Evidence Seals the Chain of Circumstantial and Direct Proof

What made the evidence airtight was the corroboration from three medical professionals. The post-mortem by PW-16 Dr. Praveen Chaudhary revealed that the deceased had multiple deep incised wounds on vital organs like the heart, liver and brain. The Court observed: “The autopsy proved death by haemorrhagic shock, and the nature of wounds matched precisely with the weapons recovered.”

Further, injured witnesses PW-7 and PW-9 were medically examined by PW-19 and PW-21, who described the injuries as grievous and potentially fatal, again confirming the use of sharp-edged weapons like those used in the assault.

“The harmony between the medical and ocular evidence leaves no scope for doubt,” the Court said. It held that the time, method, and ferocity of the injuries reinforced the narrative of a “planned, synchronised, and purpose-driven attack.”

“To Say That the Accused Were Merely Present Is To Deny the Obvious—They Were Executioners in a Theatre of Death”

One of the key arguments raised by the appellants was that they were merely present or at most transported the actual assailants, and that no knives or bloodstains were recovered from them. The Supreme Court dismantled this contention with surgical clarity.

“The law under Section 149 IPC does not require every member of the unlawful assembly to wield a weapon,” the Court held. “It only requires that they knew the common object and acted in furtherance of it.” The appellants’ acts—removing the jeep’s keys, disabling escape, holding the victim, and striking blows—were integral to the deadly outcome.

Citing Lalji v. State of U.P. and Masalti v. State of U.P., the Court reiterated that once the unlawful object is established, and participation in the assembly is proven, individual distinctions in the degree of violence become legally irrelevant.

Appeals Dismissed—Conviction and Life Sentences Upheld

Concluding its 48-paragraph judgment, the Court declared that the High Court’s reversal of acquittal was legally valid, and that the appellants were rightly convicted for murder and grievous assault under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC.

The Court said:

“The ocular testimonies of PW-1, PW-7 and PW-9, being natural, cogent and corroborated by medical evidence, clearly establish the active participation of the appellants in a concerted and premeditated attack.”

It found that the trial court had failed in its duty to correctly evaluate material evidence, while the High Court “has given cogent and well-reasoned findings based on a proper appraisal of the record.”

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that there was no merit in the appeals and affirmed the life sentences awarded to the appellants.

Date of Decision: 29 October 2025