Power Of Review Is Not Inherent; Executive Directions Cannot Confer Jurisdiction: Supreme Court Strikes Down Four-Decade Review as Unconstitutional

“Executive Can’t Rewrite History of Vesting” , On 06 February 2026, the Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark ruling on land reforms, finality of vesting and limits of executive power. A Bench comprising Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh and Justice M.M. Sundresh held that a Revenue Officer under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 has no statutory power to review a concluded vesting order, even if such review is directed by the State Government.

Allowing the appeal filed by the State, the Court set aside the Calcutta High Court’s judgment dated 17.05.2012, restored the Tribunal’s order dated 31.03.2010, quashed the review order dated 07.05.2008, and held that the vesting order dated 07.10.1971 continues to operate in accordance with law.

The judgment assumes immense significance as the Court firmly declared that executive authorities cannot reopen concluded quasi-judicial determinations decades later on grounds of policy, settlement or economic expediency, warning that such an approach would strike at the rule of law, finality of adjudication and separation of powers, which forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

“Once vesting attains finality, the intermediary stands divested forever”

Background of the Case

The dispute arose from the claim of Jai Hind Private Limited, a company incorporated in 1946, to retain large tracts of agricultural land in Bharatpur-II Block, Murshidabad, under Section 6(1)(j) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. The company asserted that it was “exclusively engaged in agricultural farming” as on 01.01.1952, and therefore entitled to retain its land despite vesting.

After issuance of notice and full adjudication, the Revenue Officer by order dated 07.10.1971 rejected the claim, holding that the company failed to prove exclusive engagement in farming. Consequently, more than 205 acres of land stood vested in the State.

The company challenged this determination before the Calcutta High Court. However, its writ petition was dismissed in 1975, the restoration application was rejected in 1987, and the appeal was dismissed in 2002, resulting in the 1971 vesting order attaining finality. The Supreme Court noted that after this stage, the respondent-company “ceased to have any right, title or interest over the vested land.”

“Review after four decades is anathema to the rule of law”

Executive-Directed Review and the 2008 Order

Decades later, while proceedings under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 were pending on a separate issue of ceiling, the company approached the State Government seeking an “amicable settlement”, projecting an eco-friendly agro-based industry and employment generation. Acting on this proposal, the Principal Secretary issued a Government Order dated 26.02.2008, directing the B.L. & L.R.O. to review the 1971 vesting order.

Pursuant thereto, the Revenue Officer on 07.05.2008 reviewed and reversed the 1971 order, permitting the company to retain 211.21 acres. The Tribunal later quashed this review for lack of jurisdiction, but the High Court restored it, prompting the State’s appeal.

The Supreme Court found this entire exercise legally impermissible, observing that the review was initiated nearly forty years after the vesting order had attained finality, without any legally sustainable justification.

“Review is a core judicial function, not an executive privilege”

Power of Review and Statutory Limits

The Court emphatically reiterated the settled principle that power of review is not inherent and must be specifically conferred by statute. Referring to Patel Narshi Thakershi and Kalabharati Advertising, the Bench held:

“The power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication.”

Rejecting the respondent’s reliance on Section 57A of the WBEA Act, which invests certain authorities with powers of a Civil Court, the Court clarified:

“The omnibus conferment of ‘all powers of a Civil Court’ cannot be read to include the substantive power of review in the absence of an explicit legislative mandate.”

The Court further relied on the proviso to Section 57B(3), which expressly bars reopening of matters already decided, holding that the 1971 vesting order squarely fell within this statutory prohibition.

“Executive cannot sit in judgment over its own decisions”

Separation of Powers and Basic Structure

In a constitutionally significant analysis, the Court linked the issue to the doctrine of separation of powers, citing Kesavananda Bharati, Minerva Mills and tribunal jurisprudence. The Bench cautioned:

“Allowing executive authorities exercising quasi-judicial power to review their own concluded orders would permit the executive to sit in judgment over itself, erode finality, and strike at the rule of law.”

Quoting Montesquieu, the Court reminded that liberty perishes when executive and judicial powers are fused, and held that ministerial approval or executive instructions cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists.

“Review is not an appeal in disguise”

Why the 2008 Review Failed Even on Merits

Even assuming review jurisdiction existed, the Court held that the 2008 review failed on every known parameter of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The documents relied upon by the company were either available earlier but not produced or were generated decades later, leading the Court to observe:

“A party cannot justify a review by producing old documents lying in its own custody; review cannot be used to cure negligence.”

On economic benefits and employment generation, the Court was categorical:

“A concluded determination cannot be reopened on the basis of subsequent policy preferences or economic expediency.”

“Exclusive farming must be proved, not presumed”

Section 6(1)(j) and Failure of the Company

On merits, the Court upheld the 1971 finding that the respondent failed to prove exclusive engagement in farming as on 01.01.1952. It held that mere inclusion of agriculture in the Memorandum of Association, payment of agricultural tax or ownership of land is insufficient, stating:

“The mere presence of agricultural objectives in a company’s Memorandum does not establish exclusive engagement in farming.”

The Court found the 1971 vesting order legally sound and unimpeachable.

“No estoppel against statute; void orders can be challenged anytime”

Rejecting the plea of promissory estoppel, the Court held:

“There can be no estoppel against statute. An action taken without jurisdiction cannot be validated by consent, settlement or executive assurance.”

The Tribunal was justified in quashing the review even without a specific prayer, as an order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity, challengeable at any stage.

The Supreme Court’s judgment stands as a strong reaffirmation of land reform finality, statutory discipline and constitutional boundaries. By restoring the 1971 vesting order, the Court sent an unequivocal message that executive benevolence cannot undo what the law has conclusively settled, and that review powers cannot be smuggled into executive hands under the guise of civil court powers.

Date of Decision: 06 February 2026