Police Can Register FIR for Threats to Witnesses Under Section 195A IPC Without Court’s Prior Complaint: Supreme Court Resolves Statutory Confusion

"The power of the police to act under Sections 154 and 156 CrPC in relation to Section 195A IPC cannot be doubted" – Supreme Court of India delivered a decisive ruling resolving conflicting High Court interpretations on the cognizability and procedural route for prosecuting offences under Section 195A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court held that Section 195A IPC is a cognizable offence, and therefore, the police is empowered to register an FIR and investigate such cases under Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, without requiring a prior complaint from the court under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC.

Rejecting the narrow interpretation adopted by the Kerala and Karnataka High Courts, the Court clarified that Section 195A IPC stands outside the procedural restrictions imposed by Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC, thereby ensuring immediate police action against threats to witnesses.

“Requiring a complaint from the court would only cripple and hamper the process”: SC defends legislative intent behind making Section 195A IPC cognizable

Case Background: Procedural Confusion and Conflicting High Court Interpretations

The judgment arose from two sets of appeals—one by the State of Kerala and the other by the CBI—challenging rulings of the Kerala and Karnataka High Courts, which had insisted that offences under Section 195A IPC (threatening a person to give false evidence) could only be prosecuted through a complaint made by the court under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC.

In Kerala, an FIR was registered against the accused Suni @ Sunil, for threatening a witness-turned-approver in a murder case. The Kerala High Court granted bail to the accused on the ground that the police could not have registered an FIR without a court complaint. In Karnataka, the CBI had brought to light witness intimidation in a high-profile murder investigation. However, the High Court set aside the Magistrate’s cognizance order and discharged the accused, citing lack of a proper complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC.

Section 195A IPC: A Standalone Cognizable Offence

The Court’s ruling turned on a meticulous interpretation of the legislative scheme and the textual positioning of Section 195A IPC. Justice Sanjay Kumar, writing for the Bench (also comprising Justice Alok Aradhe), observed:

“Section 195A IPC was conceptualized as an offence distinct and different from those under Sections 193 to 196 IPC. Those offences were all non-cognizable, but Section 195A IPC was classified as cognizable in the First Schedule to the CrPC.”

The judgment traced the legislative history of Section 195A IPC (inserted by Act 2 of 2006) and Section 195A CrPC (introduced by Act 5 of 2009), highlighting that parliament deliberately made Section 195A IPC cognizable, to allow for immediate intervention by the police in cases of witness intimidation.

“The threatened witness or other person could approach the police or file a complaint in relation to an offence under Section 195A IPC so that the process relating to cognizable offences could commence immediately.”

Section 195A CrPC Offers Optional Remedy, Not a Procedural Fetish

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that Section 195A CrPC, which permits a witness or any person to file a complaint for an offence under Section 195A IPC, implied exclusivity or excluded police action. The Court emphasized that the use of the word “may” in Section 195A CrPC conferred discretion, not compulsion:

“The word ‘may’ in Section 195A CrPC indicates that it is not compulsory for a threatened witness to only approach the Magistrate. The process of criminal law can be set in motion either by lodging an FIR with the police or by filing a complaint before the Magistrate.”

In doing so, the Court aligned its view with earlier rulings of the Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, and Calcutta High Courts which had permitted police action under Section 195A IPC, while overruling contrary views from the Gauhati, Kerala, and Karnataka High Courts.

No Casus Omissus – Courts Cannot Rewrite Statutes to Create Procedural Fetters

One of the key arguments by the respondents was that since Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC had not been amended to explicitly exclude Section 195A IPC, it implied inclusion. The Court dismissed this as an unjustified application of the doctrine of casus omissus, reiterating the principle of judicial restraint in statutory interpretation.

“It is not the function of the Court to add words or expressions merely to suit what the Court thinks is the intent of the legislature. Such an exercise would amount to judicial legislation.”

“There is ample material to infer legislative intent to treat Section 195A IPC independently… harmonious construction of the CrPC and IPC is necessary to give effect to that intent.”

Implications: FIRs Restored, Accused Directed to Surrender

The Court allowed all appeals and restored the validity of FIRs, cognizance orders, and pending prosecutions. Notably, the bail granted to Suni @ Sunil by the Kerala High Court was set aside, with the direction that he surrender before the trial court within two weeks, while allowing him the liberty to seek fresh bail on other grounds.

Similarly, in the Karnataka cases, the order of cognizance by the Judicial Magistrate and the dismissal of discharge application were restored.

A Victory for Witness Protection and Effective Policing

With this ruling, the Supreme Court has finally settled the ambiguity over procedural initiation of proceedings under Section 195A IPC. The Court upheld the legislative design to empower police officers to respond swiftly to threats against witnesses, a vital measure in preserving the integrity of judicial proceedings and ensuring public justice.

“Requiring the victim to approach the court to initiate prosecution under Section 195A IPC would only cripple and hamper the process… The power of the police to take action under Section 154 and 156 CrPC must remain untrammeled in cognizable offences.”

By harmonizing statutory provisions without engaging in judicial legislation, the Court has reaffirmed its commitment to witness protection, constitutional due process, and efficient criminal administration of justice.

Date of Decision: October 28, 2025