POCSO | Absence of Child's Name in Birth Certificate Not Fatal: Kerala High Court

“Sterling Testimony of Victim Sufficient — Statutory Presumption Under Section 29 POCSO Stands Invoked” – In a significant ruling affirming the importance of victim testimony and clarifying the evidentiary framework in child sexual abuse cases, the Kerala High Court dismissed an appeal by a convict accused of repeated rape of a minor, holding that both the conviction and sentence of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment were legally sound and based on unimpeachable evidence.

The Court, presided over by Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas, upheld the conviction of Suresh K., who was found guilty by the Special Court for Atrocities against Women and Children, Kasaragod under Sections 376(2)(i) and 376(2)(n) IPC, and Section 6 read with Section 5(l) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO). The charges pertained to repeated penetrative sexual assault committed between September 2015 and February 2016 on a 13-year-old girl.

“Once Foundational Facts Are Proved, Presumption of Guilt Under Section 29 POCSO Applies”

Addressing the central challenge by the accused to the credibility of the victim’s testimony, the Court observed:

“When the evidence of the victim is unwavering and of a sterling quality, the foundational facts get established. Once the foundational facts are proved, Section 29 of the POCSO Act sets in and creates a statutory presumption of guilt.”

The Court noted that the victim had clearly and cogently narrated the sequence of assaults, which began in the victim’s old house and continued in her new residence. The accused allegedly entered the minor’s room at night, gagged her mouth, promised marriage, and repeatedly raped her, sometimes by removing the iron rod of the window.

The deposition of the victim (PW6) was found to be consistent, credible, and free from embellishment, and was corroborated by medical evidence showing a torn hymen and signs consistent with sexual assault. The victim’s mother (PW9) also supported the prosecution case and confirmed that her daughter had confided in her.

“There are no reasons to disbelieve the prosecution witnesses. No significant inconsistency has also been brought out through their cross-examination,” the Court stated.

Accused’s Objection on Victim’s Age Dismissed: “Totality of Evidence Sufficient to Prove Minor Status”

The appellant had sought acquittal by raising doubts over the victim’s age, contending that the birth certificate (Ext.P2) did not contain the victim’s name and hence could belong to her sibling. The defence stressed that since the child’s name was recorded as “not entered”, the certificate was insufficient to establish that the victim was below 16 years, a fact which enhances the gravity of the offence under POCSO.

However, the Court took judicial notice of the common practice in India where birth certificates often omit the name of the child. Referring to Murugan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 6 SCC 111, the Court reiterated:

“It is a matter of common knowledge that the birth certificate issued by the Municipality generally does not contain the name of the child, for the reason that it is recorded on the basis of information furnished either by the hospital or by the parents immediately after birth.”

Importantly, the victim’s unchallenged oral testimony identified her own date of birth as 18.08.2002, which matched the date in the certificate. The Court also highlighted that:

• The defence did not cross-examine the victim on her age.

• The accused did not dispute her age in his statement under Section 313 CrPC.

• The mother’s identity, mentioned in the certificate, was not disputed.

On the standard of proof, the Court applied Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, which defines a fact to be "proved" when a prudent person would act upon its presumed existence. Accordingly, the Court held:

“Considering the certificate produced as Ext.P2 and the unchallenged evidence of the victim, it is highly probable that the date of birth of the victim is the same as that recorded in Ext.P2.”

JJ Act and POCSO Age Determination: Not the Only Way — Evidence Act Still Applies

In a noteworthy clarification, the Court held that methods prescribed under the Juvenile Justice Acts (JJ Act 2000 and JJ Act 2015) for determining age are not the exclusive mechanisms in POCSO cases. While referring to Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana and Yuvaprakash P. v. State, the Court cautioned against rigid application of juvenile jurisprudence, stating: “The words in a judgment ought not to be interpreted as that in a statute. The JJ Act modes can be one of the methods, not the only method.”

The Court held that evidence admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, including oral testimony and secondary proof, can also be used to establish age.

Citing the Division Bench in Biju v. State of Kerala, [2024 (2) KLT 130], it reaffirmed: “There is nothing under the POCSO Act that indicates that the unchallenged oral testimony of the mother of the victim cannot be taken as proof of the date of birth of the victim.”

Plea for Leniency Rejected: “Young Age of Accused Not a Mitigating Factor”

Rejecting the plea for a lenient sentence due to the accused's age (20 years) at the time of the offence, the Court said: “Sexual offences targeting young victims whose innocence of childhood are exploited must be dealt with a stern hand. The nature of offence is grave, involving repeated sexual assault on a minor. Minimum statutory punishment is justified.”

The 10-year sentence of rigorous imprisonment imposed by the trial court under Section 376(2)(i) and 376(2)(n) IPC, read with Section 5(l) and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, was upheld. The fine of ₹15,000, and victim compensation ordered by the trial court, were also affirmed.

This judgment reinforces the principle that the victim’s testimony—if credible, consistent and corroborated—is sufficient to convict in sexual offence cases, even when technical deficiencies exist in documentary evidence such as birth certificates. The Court’s nuanced reading of statutory presumptions, judicial precedents, and evidentiary standards makes it a significant precedent under Section 29 of the POCSO Act and for determining age of minor victims in child sexual abuse trials.

Date of Decision: 10 December 2025