Placard Punishment “He Will Never Misbehave With Any Girl” -  Unjustified: Allahabad High Court Strikes Down

“Such a direction is not only humiliating but would cast a permanent scar on the character of the appellant” –  Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court comprising Chief Justice Arun Bhansali and Justice Kshitij Shailendra delivered a significant ruling. The court examined the legality of a series of conditions imposed by a learned Single Judge while setting aside the rustication of a university student, focusing especially on one stigmatic condition that required the student to carry a placard at the university gate confessing to misconduct.

The Division Bench partly allowed the appeal, striking down what it termed a “humiliating” and disproportionate punishment that had no place in constitutional remedies under Article 226. The judgment reaffirms that judicial discretion must align with principles of fairness, proportionality, and human dignity.

“Discretion Under Article 226 Cannot Be Used to Degrade or Shame”: Bench Denounces Stigmatic Condition on Student

The dispute arose when Harsh Awana, a student rusticated by the respondent university for alleged misconduct, approached the High Court. The Single Judge, by an order dated October 29, 2025, quashed the rustication but imposed a series of stringent conditions to regulate his continuation in the university. Among these was Direction No. (II), requiring the appellant to carry a placard reading “he will never misbehave with any girl” and stand at the university gate every morning for thirty minutes over thirty days.

The Division Bench found this particular condition to be egregiously punitive and without legal justification. The Court observed:

“Direction of such nature… is not only humiliating but would cast a permanent scar on the character of the appellant, which, in the circumstances of the case, is not called for.”

The Court clarified that while a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 has wide powers to mould relief, such discretion must be exercised in a manner that is "reasonable, proportionate, and non-stigmatic." It noted that the Single Judge’s intent to blend leniency with accountability could not extend to degrading the student or imposing socially shaming punishments.

The appellant Harsh Awana had been rusticated by his university following allegations of misconduct. He filed a writ petition (Writ-C No. 36011 of 2025) under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the disciplinary action. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ and quashed the rustication but, while granting relief, imposed five conditions—each with specific compliance mechanisms.

These conditions ranged from compulsory attendance and apology to active police surveillance at the university gate. However, it was Condition No. (II) that triggered serious constitutional concerns due to its stigmatic and public-shaming nature.

Aggrieved by this part of the order, Awana approached the Division Bench in appeal, albeit with a delay of 57 days. The delay was condoned after the appellant showed sufficient cause supported by affidavit.

The core legal issue before the Division Bench was whether a constitutional court could impose conditions in the nature of public humiliation as a pre-condition for allowing a student to continue education, particularly in the absence of proven criminal guilt.

The Court noted that while Directions No. (I), (III), (IV), and (V) were corrective in nature and tailored to ensure academic discipline and public order, Direction No. (II) violated constitutional safeguards:

“We are firmly of the opinion that nature of direction no. (II)… is not justified under any circumstances.”

The court reasoned that compelling a student to perform a public act of self-humiliation amounted to an extrajudicial punishment with no statutory or judicial basis, and one that could leave a permanent stigma on the individual’s character. It underscored that judicial discretion must operate within the bounds of human dignity, and Article 226, while wide in scope, does not authorize “public shaming” as a remedy or deterrent.

The Court drew a clear line between reformative justice and punitive humiliation, holding that such “placard punishments” echo outdated notions of justice and cannot stand in modern constitutional jurisprudence.

The Division Bench allowed the appeal partly, setting aside Direction No. (II) of the learned Single Judge. All other directions—including maintaining 95% attendance, submitting a written apology, and police surveillance—were upheld as reasonable.

Crucially, the Court protected the appellant’s rights by clarifying that if rustication had again been imposed solely due to non-compliance with the now-quashed Condition No. (II), the same must be set aside:

“If on account of the default clause in direction no. (II), the appellant has again been rusticated, he shall be given one opportunity to do the needful in terms of the direction no. (III) if not already done. On compliance/if already complied with, the rustication shall stand set aside.”

Thus, the court ensured that the appellant’s educational prospects are not derailed by a punitive order that has been judicially quashed. It also sent a clear message to constitutional courts to exercise discretion with sensitivity and in alignment with constitutional values.

Date of Decision: February 4, 2026