Payment of Stamp Duty and Preparation of Draft Sale Deed Reinforce, Not Negate, Readiness and Willingness: Punjab & Haryana High Court Decrees Specific Performance

“Mere Delay Within Limitation Cannot Defeat Equitable Relief Absent Waiver, Abandonment or Prejudice” – In a landmark judgment vindicating the rights of purchasers in specific performance suits, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has set aside concurrent findings of the courts below and decreed the suit in favour of a buyer who had paid more than half the sale consideration and demonstrated consistent readiness and willingness.

Justice Pankaj Jain held that the lower courts had erred both in law and on facts, and had perversely ignored overwhelming material evidence. The second appeal was allowed, and the suit for specific performance decreed, directing execution of the sale deed upon payment of balance consideration within three months.

The case revolved around the specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 16.10.2008, wherein the plaintiff-appellant Renu Sharma had entered into a contract with the defendant-vendor for purchase of 6 kanal 12 marlas of land at Sohna, Haryana, for ₹1.01 crore. A total of ₹50.70 lakhs had been paid prior to the agreed sale execution date.

Courts Below Ignored Readiness & Willingness Demonstrated by Plaintiff

The trial court and first appellate court had both denied the discretionary relief of specific performance, largely on the grounds of delay and the plaintiff’s insistence in a prior legal notice that land be delivered in a partitioned, fenced shape.

However, Justice Pankaj Jain firmly disagreed with that assessment:

“The fact that the plaintiff paid for deficient stamp duty not only shows that she was willing to get the sale deed executed, but also evinces her financial capacity,” the Court observed at Para 31.

Criticising the lower courts’ interpretation, the High Court noted that the draft sale deed was prepared on stamp paper purchased by the plaintiff strictly in terms of the original agreement to sell — not as per the earlier legal notice.

“Draft sale deed is on record as Ex.P26… even the doubt expressed by the Court of First Instance with respect to drafting of the sale deed on 06.01.2009 stands dispelled in the light of legal notice dated 10.01.2009 Ex.P31,” the Court held.

The plaintiff had appeared before the Sub-Registrar, Sohna on both 15.12.2008 and again on 06.01.2009 — the latter date being fixed mutually after 15.12.2008 passed without execution. She made good the deficiency in stamp duty on 06.01.2009 and possessed bank drafts worth ₹51 lakhs.

Delay Within Limitation Cannot Deny Relief Absent Conduct Showing Waiver or Abandonment

One of the key arguments advanced by the respondents — and accepted by the lower courts — was the supposed delay in filing the suit. While the plaintiff filed an injunction suit in 2008, the suit for specific performance was instituted only on 23.12.2010.

But Justice Jain rejected this line of reasoning as contrary to settled law:

“Though delayed filing of the suit is one of the considerations while decreeing the suit for specific performance, it cannot be the sole criteria,” the Court clarified at Para 36, citing Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao, P. Daivasigamani v. S. Sambandan, and other precedents.

The Court reiterated that while equitable considerations do play a role under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, mere delay within the statutory limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act is not, in and of itself, a valid ground to reject relief.

“In India mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of limitation,” the Court quoted with approval from Mademsetty Satyanarayana.

Conduct of Plaintiff Not Blemished – Findings of Lower Courts Deemed Perverse

The High Court also addressed the lower courts' aspersions on the plaintiff’s conduct — particularly the observation that she had misled the trial court and was not bonafide. The appellate court had even referenced an earlier High Court observation in a writ petition where costs were imposed.

But Justice Jain called such reasoning unsustainable:

“Dismissal of the writ petition by High Court imposing cost of ₹50,000 does not affect her rights in the present suit… The Writ Court decried the conduct of plaintiff in filing writ petition, it has no bearing on the present suit.”

Further, the trial court’s finding that the suit was not maintainable due to prior injunction proceedings or non-challenge to the alleged cancellation notice, was decisively rejected:

“There being no power vested with defendant No.1 to cancel the agreement to sell, the cancellation pleaded in legal notice is inconsequential,” the Court ruled.

Subsequent Purchaser Not Bona Fide – Notice of Prior Agreement Established

A significant part of the Court’s judgment was dedicated to addressing the rights of the second defendant, who had purchased the same land via sale deed dated 28.10.2010 and claimed to be a bona fide purchaser under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act.

However, the Court noted the overwhelming evidence showing knowledge of the prior agreement, including an affidavit dated 28.01.2010 filed by the purchaser himself, and an admission made by the authorised representative during cross-examination.

“The Courts below ignored the overwhelming evidence in form of affidavit and admission made by the authorised representative of defendant No.2 and returned perverse finding regarding defendant No.2 being bonafide purchaser,” the judgment stated at Para 40.

Accordingly, the High Court held that the purchaser was not entitled to protection under Section 19(b).

High Court Grants Decree of Specific Performance, Overturns Alternate Relief

Reversing the findings on Issue Nos. 1 to 4 framed by the trial court, Justice Jain held:

“Suit filed by the plaintiff is decreed. It is ordered that the plaintiff is entitled for decree of specific performance of agreement to sell dated 16.10.2008 qua land measuring 6 kanal 12 marlas… on payment of balance sale consideration within a period of 03 months from the date of passing of the decree.”

The Court also dismissed the alternate relief of refund of advance payment which had been granted by the lower courts, thereby granting full specific relief sought.

Date of Decision: 28 January 2026