No Legal Shortcut to Compassionate Appointment — Presumption of Civil Death Arises Only After Seven Years of Disappearance: Supreme Court

“In cases of civil death, the death will be presumed to be after the expiry of seven years from the date the person went missing unless a specific date of death is proved by cogent evidence” – Supreme Court of India delivered a significant ruling , clarifying the legal presumption of civil death under Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and its implications on compassionate appointment claims. The Court set aside the High Court’s direction to appoint the son of a missing municipal employee on compassionate grounds by treating the date of disappearance as the date of death, holding that such a presumption is legally untenable without concrete proof.

“The decree of civil death only recognizes the presumption of death after seven years of disappearance—without fixing any precise date or time of death”

In a judgment authored by Justice Pankaj Mithal, sitting with Justice Prasanna B. Varale, the Apex Court reversed the High Court’s order dated July 18, 2024, which had directed the Nagpur Municipal Corporation to issue a compassionate appointment order to respondent No.2, Shubham, by treating his father’s disappearance date (01.09.2012) as his death. The Supreme Court held that such treatment contradicts established legal principles under Section 108 of the Evidence Act and judicial precedents including LIC v. Anuradha [(2004) 10 SCC 131].

The dispute arose from the disappearance of Gulab Mahagu Bawankule, a municipal employee, who went missing on 01.09.2012. His son, respondent No.2, later filed a civil suit and obtained a decree of civil death from the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur on 11.01.2022. Based on this, he sought compassionate appointment from the Corporation.

The Nagpur Municipal Corporation, however, resisted the claim, arguing that under the law, a person is presumed dead only after a continuous absence of seven years without being heard of, and therefore, the actual presumption of death would arise only on 01.09.2019. During the intervening period, Gulab was treated as in service and was retired from duty on 31.01.2015, with full retiral benefits of ₹6,49,000 and a monthly pension of ₹12,000 being provided to his family. The Corporation contended that accepting retirement benefits and pension clearly indicated acknowledgment of service continuity, negating any claim of premature death.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the date of disappearance (01.09.2012) can be deemed the date of death for purposes such as compassionate appointment, especially when the statutory presumption of death arises only after seven years under Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act.

The Court emphatically rejected the High Court’s approach, stating:

“In matters of civil death, the question of the date or time of the death must be determined on the basis of direct or circumstantial evidence, and not on mere assumption or presumption.”

Referring to the ruling in LIC v. Anuradha, the Court reiterated that:

“The decree of declaration of civil death only recognizes the fact that the person is presumed to be dead after expiry of seven years of disappearance, without fixing any precise date or time of death.”

The Bench further held that since respondent No.2 did not adduce any evidence proving the actual date or circumstances of death, and the civil court decree was silent on any specific date of death, the presumption under Section 108 would only arise on 01.09.2019—not earlier.

Moreover, the Court stressed that the respondent's acceptance of his father's retirement and pension benefits amounts to acknowledgment that his father remained in service until formal retirement and thus cannot now be used to claim a backdated compassionate appointment.

The Supreme Court faulted the High Court for not only misapplying the presumption of civil death but also for directing the municipal authority to issue a compassionate appointment order outright, without even considering whether the eligibility criteria were met. The Court observed:

“The High Court manifestly erred in directing the appellants to straight away grant compassionate appointment to respondent No.2, instead of directing them to consider his case… upon satisfaction of prescribed conditions.”

Acknowledging the factual peculiarities, however, the Court provided a limited window of opportunity to the respondent by leaving it open to the Corporation to consider his appointment “independent of claim for compassionate appointment”, possibly by granting age relaxation if otherwise permissible in law.

Thus, while compassionate appointment based on a mistaken assumption of death was rejected, the door remained slightly open for employment on other grounds.

The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the legal framework surrounding civil death presumptions, stressing that the seven-year rule is not a mere formality, but a substantive condition to avoid speculative claims over deaths of missing persons. Importantly, it underscores that compassionate appointment is not a vested right and must be granted strictly in accordance with law and established facts.

By reiterating the binding nature of Section 108 of the Evidence Act and the standards of proof required to assert a death for legal benefits, the ruling provides clarity to public authorities handling similar requests and restricts misuse of presumptive legal doctrines for premature benefit claims.

Date of Decision: October 29, 2025