Merely Because There Are Multiple Dying Declarations, The First One Doesn’t Lose Value If Found Truthful: Supreme Court Upholds Conviction in Kerosene Burn Murder Case

Delivering a strong verdict on the evidentiary value of dying declarations, the Supreme Court held that minor discrepancies in multiple dying declarations cannot dilute the truthfulness of the first declaration, especially when it is made voluntarily before a neutral medical officer and is corroborated by medical and forensic evidence. The Court affirmed the conviction of Jemaben, the accused who burnt her niece-in-law alive by pouring kerosene, rejecting the defence theory of accidental fire.

Justice Rajesh Bindal and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi dismissed the appeal against the Gujarat High Court’s decision, which had reversed the trial court’s acquittal and convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC for murder. The Court observed that the first dying declaration made to the medical officer was credible, clear, and voluntarily made, and the trial court had erred in ignoring its evidentiary weight merely due to minor inconsistencies in other statements.

“Merely because there are minor discrepancies in the version given by the prosecution witness with regard to the dying declaration and the manner of occurrence of the incident, the first dying declaration given by the deceased before the independent witness cannot be ignored,” the Court held.

“Kerosene on the Body, Kerosene on the Floor, and 100% Burns—This Was No Accident”

The case concerns a horrifying incident from the night of 29–30 November 2004, when Leelaben, a young woman, was set ablaze in her hut while sleeping beside her 4-year-old son. According to the prosecution, the appellant Jemaben—her aunt-in-law—poured kerosene and lit her on fire after the deceased refused to accompany a man named Mania Dabhawala, allegedly at the appellant’s insistence.

Although the trial court acquitted the appellant, citing minor contradictions in three dying declarations, the High Court reversed the acquittal, relying heavily on the first declaration made by the deceased to Dr. Shivrambhai Patel (PW-3), which specifically named the appellant and described the motive.

The Supreme Court affirmed this approach:

“The first dying declaration is supported by the independent documentary evidence, and therefore, the High Court has rightly placed reliance upon the decision rendered by this Court in Nallam Veera Stayanandam v. Public Prosecutor, (2004) 10 SCC 769,” the Bench observed.

The dying declaration was further corroborated by the medical certificate, the Yadi (written communication) sent by the doctor to the police, and the presence of a kerosene-smelling empty container at the scene.

“Only One View Possible—Trial Court Failed to Appreciate Corroborative Medical and Forensic Evidence”

The Court stressed that the trial court had taken a legally unsustainable view by discarding the dying declaration in favour of the defence's claim of an accidental fire, which was contradicted by both medical and circumstantial evidence.

“From the whole body and the clothes of the deceased, the smell of kerosene was found… the 4-year-old son sleeping beside her suffered only 10–12% burns. Thus, the theory of accidental fire… cannot be believed,” the Court reasoned.

It pointed out that the victim had sustained 100% burns, and the pattern of injury was deliberate, targeted, and not consistent with a mere domestic accident. The fact that the child had limited burns further indicated that only the mother was attacked intentionally, which destroyed the theory of spontaneous combustion.

Moreover, PW-3, the doctor, testified that the victim was fully conscious and coherent, and confirmed that she explicitly named Jemaben as the perpetrator. The Medical Certificate (Exhibit 20), the post-mortem report (Exhibit 25), and the forensic panchnama (Exhibit 12) showing kerosene smell on the site, clothing, and body, all pointed in the same direction.

“The deceased was in a position to speak and gave a consistent and specific account of the incident. This Court finds no reason to disregard such credible and corroborated evidence,” the Bench held.

“Dying Declaration Made to a Doctor Is Admissible and Trustworthy Even Without a Magistrate’s Presence”

Rejecting the contention that the dying declaration was unreliable because it was not recorded by a Magistrate, the Court clarified:

“Even though the dying declaration has not been recorded by the Executive Magistrate, it is clear from the medical certificate issued by PW-3 that the statement was made when the deceased was conscious and fit to speak.”

This ruling is consistent with the Supreme Court’s established jurisprudence that a dying declaration recorded by a doctor is admissible so long as it is shown to be voluntary and made in a fit mental state.

The Court also stressed that each dying declaration must be independently evaluated, and contradictions in subsequent versions do not vitiate the evidentiary value of a clearly truthful first account.

Truth in the Flames—Conviction Affirmed, Appeal Dismissed

Finding no error in the High Court’s reliance on the first dying declaration and medical evidence, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Jemaben for murder under Section 302 IPC, sentencing her to life imprisonment and ₹10,000 fine, dismissing the appeal in its entirety.

The Court concluded:

“On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, only one view was possible… the High Court has rightly set aside the trial court’s order… No interference is required in the judgment.”

This ruling underscores a clear legal principle: where a dying declaration is made voluntarily to an independent medical officer, is medically certified, and is corroborated by physical and forensic evidence, the courts are bound to give it due weight—even if other versions introduce minor contradictions.

Date of Decision: 29 October 2025