Mere Agreement To Sell Or Suit For Specific Performance Confers No Title Under Section 54 TP Act, Cannot Bar Eviction Decree Against Permissive Occupant: Gujarat High Court

"A mere filing of a suit for specific performance would not ipso facto entitle the defendant to claim that no decree for eviction can be passed against him especially when the appellant No.1 failed to secure any injunction in her suit." Gujarat High Court has ruled that an agreement to sell or the mere pendency of a specific performance suit confers no right, title, or interest under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and cannot restrain a lawful successor from obtaining an eviction decree against a permissive occupant.

Justice Maulik J. Shelat held on October 21, 2026, that permissive possession must yield to title, and legal representatives duly served under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) who consciously choose not to contest trial proceedings cannot belatedly allege violation of natural justice or seek remand in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

The dispute arose after the demise of the original leaseholder, Manjulaben, who had inducted her brother-in-law into permissive possession of the suit property situated in Gandhidham, Kachchh. Following her death, her legal heirs filed Regular Civil Suit No. 196 of 2014 for vacant possession and mesne profits after the defendant refused to vacate, claiming rights under an alleged transfer request application dated December 22, 2006. During the trial, the defendant passed away, and despite being served with notices under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC and subsequent summons after amendment of the plaint, his legal heirs failed to appear or lead evidence, leading to a decree of eviction which was concurrently affirmed in appeal.

The legal issues raised were whether the pendency of a suit for specific performance instituted by the occupant's wife barred the grant of an eviction decree, whether the trial court committed a jurisdictional error by not framing an issue on alleged forgery, and whether a remand was warranted on grounds of procedural irregularity or non-framing of specific issues.

Justice Shelat underscored that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act makes it abundantly clear that an agreement to sell immovable property does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. The Court noted that in the absence of a registered transfer instrument, the defendants possessed no legal title.

Agreement to sell creates no proprietary right and specific performance suit without interim protection cannot halt eviction

Highlighting the legal effect of an unadjudicated agreement, the Court observed:

"It is a well-settled position of law that the mere execution of an agreement to sell by the original owner of an immovable property does not confer any right, title, or interest in favour of the holder of the agreement to sell (See: - Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882). Rather, filing of the suit for specific performance by the original wife – appellant No.1 herein against the plaintiff would itself shows that there is no direct right, title, or interest of the defendant in the suit property."

The bench reiterated that filing a civil suit for specific performance cannot act as an automatic shield against an eviction decree, particularly where the claimant failed to secure any temporary injunction. The occupant could not establish any independent right or common interest with the plaintiffs to defend possession.

Pleadings are no substitute for proof and non-framing of unraised issues causes no prejudice

Turning to the contention regarding non-framing of specific issues regarding alleged forgery, the High Court observed that the original defendant never raised such a grievance during his lifetime and that general issues encompassing the reliefs had been formulated. Reaffirming that pleadings cannot substitute evidence, the Court pointed out:

"It is a well-settled position of law that pleadings are no substitute for proof. In absence of any material evidence on record which proved the case of the defendant, the contention advanced on behalf of the defendant that on the strength of the agreement to sell in favour of appellant No. 1 herein, the Trial Court ought not to have decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, cannot be accepted."

The Court added that because the decree was founded on the strength of the plaintiffs' leasehold title rather than on any adjudication of forgery, the absence of an issue on fraud was immaterial to the validity of the judgment.

Permissive occupants are legally bound to surrender possession to lawful title-holders

Applying the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on licensee and permissive possession, the bench held that the plaintiff proved title as the legal successor-in-interest of the deceased leaseholder. The court stressed:

"The possession of the suit property was given to the defendant as a family member, i.e., the brother-in-law of Manjulaben; hence, the possession of the defendant was permissive in nature. Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to file a suit for eviction and recover possession of the suit property from the defendant as he refused to return possession."

Addressing the grievance regarding lack of opportunity, the Court verified the trial court records and noted that notices were duly served on the appellants twice—initially under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC and again post-amendment. Having consciously abstained from participating in the suit, the legal heirs could not be permitted to cry foul or demand a retrial.

Concurrent factual findings cannot be disturbed under Section 100 CPC absent gross perversity

Relying on established apex court rulings, the Court reiterated that Section 100 CPC does not permit reappreciation of evidence merely because another factual view is plausible. In the absence of any perversity or contravention of statutory provisions, concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below remain unassailable.

The High Court dismissed the Second Appeal in limine, affirming the concurrent eviction decree directing the appellants to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the respondents. The decree was modified solely to set aside the award of mesne profits of Rs. 10,000 per month, pursuant to the respondents' unconditional undertaking before the Court forgoing the execution of the monetary claim.

Date of Decision: October 21, 2026