Mere Abusive Language or Threat, Without Sexual Colour, Does Not Attract Section 354A IPC: Delhi High Court

“Abuse, Suspicion or Quarrel Is Not Sexual Crime…..Penal Provisions on Sexual Offences Cannot Be Invoked on Assumptions or Emotions”, Delhi High Court, through Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha, delivered a significant acquittal judgment setting aside a conviction under Sections 354A and 354D IPC and Section 12 of the POCSO Act.

The Court held that mere allegations of abusive conduct, quarrel or intimidation—without proof of sexual intent or statutory ingredients—cannot sustain convictions for sexual harassment, stalking or offences under the POCSO Act. The judgment underscores the constitutional necessity of strict proof, especially in criminal prosecutions involving serious sexual offence charges.

“Mere Abusive Language or Threat, Without Sexual Colour, Does Not Attract Section 354A IPC”

The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court in 2017 for allegedly stalking and sexually harassing the prosecutrix for several months, culminating in an incident on 14.02.2014, when he allegedly abused and threatened her near her residence. The prosecution claimed that the victim was 17 years old, thereby attracting the PoCSO Act.

The trial court sentenced the accused to rigorous imprisonment up to two years, relying primarily on the statements of the victim and her family members. Aggrieved, the accused approached the High Court under Section 374 Cr.P.C.

“Sexual Harassment Has Statutory Boundaries, Not Elastic Meanings”

While examining Section 354A IPC, Justice Sudha reproduced the statutory language and held that the prosecution evidence did not disclose any act falling under clauses (i) to (iv), namely physical sexual advances, demand for sexual favours, showing pornography, or making sexually coloured remarks.

The Court categorically observed that “mere use of abusive language, quarrel or intimidation, however improper, does not amount to sexual harassment unless it is accompanied by sexual overtures or sexually coloured intent.” On facts, neither the First Information Statement nor the testimony before Court disclosed any such conduct.

“PoCSO Act Demands Proof of Minority and Sexual Intent—Both Were Missing”

A crucial limb of the prosecution rested on the PoCSO Act, which required proof that the victim was a child and that the accused acted with sexual intent. The High Court found the prosecution case fatally deficient on both counts.

The victim and her father were unable to state her date of birth. The school records relied upon were found to be based solely on parental disclosure, without verification through a birth certificate or independent proof. The school principal candidly admitted that no official document was produced at the time of admission.

The Court held that “minority was not proved beyond reasonable doubt”, adding that even otherwise, sexual intent—an essential ingredient under Sections 11 and 12 of the PoCSO Act—was completely absent.

“Inconsistent Testimonies Cannot Sustain a Conviction for Stalking”

Turning to Section 354D IPC, the Court scrutinised the testimonies of the victim (PW2), her sister (PW3), and her father (PW4). The evidence revealed material contradictions on critical aspects, including the presence of the father at the scene, the sequence of events, and the nature of the alleged conduct.

Notably, the victim’s father did not support the prosecution case and resiled from his earlier statement, prompting the prosecution to seek permission under Section 154 of the Evidence Act. While reiterating settled law that such permission does not automatically render a witness unreliable, the Court held that even after such examination, no material emerged to support the charge of stalking.

The Court also took note of the admitted monetary dispute between the families, which cast a shadow on the prosecution narrative.

“Section 154 Evidence Act Is a Tool to Discover Truth, Not a Cure for Weak Evidence”

Relying on Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration and Tamil Maran K.P. v. State, the Court clarified that allowing leading questions under Section 154 does not amount to declaring a witness hostile, nor does it substitute the need for substantive proof.

Justice Sudha emphasised that criminal conviction cannot rest on wavering testimonies, suspicion or moral indignation, particularly when statutory ingredients remain unproven.

“Some Incident May Have Occurred, But Not the Offences Charged”

In a balanced observation, the Court noted that “some incident or quarrel may have occurred” and that abusive language or threats might have been exchanged. However, the accused was not charged with criminal intimidation, and the Court refused to stretch penal provisions to fit facts.

It was held that “in the absence of proof of essential ingredients of the charged offences, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt.”

Allowing the appeal, the Delhi High Court set aside the conviction and sentence under Sections 354A, 354D IPC and Section 12 PoCSO Act, and acquitted the appellant under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C. The bail bonds were cancelled, and the appellant was set at liberty.

The judgment is a clear reaffirmation of criminal jurisprudence principles: serious allegations demand serious proof, and sexual offence laws, howsoever vital, cannot be applied on conjecture, inconsistent evidence or emotional appeal.

Date of Decision: 06 February 2026