Limitation Act | Quasi-Judicial Bodies Cannot Invoke Section 5 Principles Without Express Statutory Grant: Supreme Court

“The power to extend time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be resorted to by statutory authorities, quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless expressly indicated... such a legal fiction must not be extended beyond the purpose for which the fiction was created.” — In a seminal ruling, the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, has allowed the appeal in The Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, holding that the Company Law Board (CLB) had no jurisdiction to condone a delay of 249 days in filing an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Companies Act, 2013.

The Transitional Legal Vacuum

The judgment addresses a complex transitional legal issue arising from the phased implementation of the Companies Act, 2013. The respondent had filed an appeal under Section 58(3) of the 2013 Act before the CLB during the specific window between 12.09.2013 and 01.06.2016—a period when the substantive provisions of the new Act were in force, but the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) had not yet been constituted.

The core controversy was whether the CLB, functioning as a transitional adjudicatory body, possessed the power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, despite the absence of an express provision akin to Section 433 of the 2013 Act (which later explicitly applied the Limitation Act to NCLT proceedings).

“The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963... would only apply to suits, applications or appeals... which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless specifically empowered in that regard.”

The ‘Court’ vs. ‘Tribunal’ Dichotomy

Justice Pardiwala, authoring the judgment, undertook an exhaustive review of precedents including M.P. Steel Corporation and Parson Tools. The Court reiterated the "thumb rule" that the Limitation Act applies strictly to Civil Courts. While the CLB was deemed a "court" for limited purposes under Section 10E(4C) of the erstwhile Companies Act, 1956, the Bench held that this legal fiction could not be stretched to confer the discretionary power to condone delay under Section 5.

The Court clarified that mere "inherent powers" saved under Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations could not override the mandatory statutory timelines prescribed by Section 58(3) of the 2013 Act.

Section 5 (Extension) vs. Section 14 (Exclusion)

In a significant contribution to the jurisprudence on limitation, the Court drew a sharp distinction between the principles underlying Section 5 (Extension of prescribed period) and Section 14 (Exclusion of time spent in bona fide litigation).

The Court distinguished its earlier ruling in M.P. Steel, which had allowed the application of Section 14 principles to tribunals to advance substantial justice. The Bench elucidated that Section 14 is mandatory and restorative—it "reverses the clock" and expunges the time spent in a wrong forum, restoring the litigant's right to file as if the abortive proceeding never happened.

“Under Section 5, it is the limitation period itself which is being discretionarily extended; whereas, under Section 14, the clock is reversed and the litigant’s position is restored to some specific date which is within the prescribed period of limitation.”

Conversely, Section 5 is discretionary. It does not erase the delay but excuses it. The Court held that while Section 14 principles might apply to tribunals to prevent injustice, the discretionary power of Section 5 cannot be claimed as a matter of right or applied by analogy to quasi-judicial bodies absent express legislative intent.

No Retrospective Application of Section 433

The respondent argued that Section 433 of the Companies Act, 2013, which applies the Limitation Act to the NCLT, should be applied retrospectively to the CLB. The Supreme Court rejected this, noting that Section 433 came into force only on 01.06.2016.

The Court observed that the remedy (the right to appeal) had already become time-barred under the erstwhile regime before the 2013 Act provisions fully kicked in. Citing Thirumalai Chemicals, the Court held that a new law of limitation cannot revive a "dead remedy" or extinguish a vested right of the opposite party. Since the CLB had no power to condone delay at the relevant time, the subsequent empowerment of the NCLT could not cure the fatal delay.

The Supreme Court set aside the Calcutta High Court's judgment which had affirmed the CLB's condonation of delay. The Court ruled that the appeal filed by the respondent before the CLB was barred by limitation, and the CLB acted without jurisdiction in condoning the delay of 249 days.

Date of Decision: 7th January, 2026