Judges Cannot Enact Their Own Protocols During Bail Hearings: Supreme Court Sets Aside Sweeping Age Determination Directions In POCSO

“The Constitutional Power Cannot Overshadow the Statutory Power to Enlarge Its Scope Beyond the Statute” – In a judgment with deep implications for bail jurisprudence and judicial discipline, the Supreme Court on 9 January 2026 set aside directions issued by the Allahabad High Court mandating compulsory medical age determination of victims in POCSO cases, holding that such directions issued during bail proceedings were not only unauthorised but inconsistent with the statutory scheme.

Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice K. Vinod Chandran made it clear that High Courts cannot function as “super legislatures” under the guise of bail adjudication.

“The jurisdiction exercised under Section 439 CrPC is statutory and narrow,” the Court observed, adding emphatically, “The bail court is not a trial court. It is not a forum for final fact-finding on disputed issues such as age.”

“Judges Cannot Enact Their Own Protocols During Bail Hearings” – Supreme Court Disapproves Blanket Direction for Medical Age Tests

At the heart of the case was a 2024 bail order passed by a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, which not only granted bail in a POCSO case but also issued a general direction that in all such cases, medical examination of the victim for age determination must be carried out under Section 164-A CrPC read with Section 27 of the POCSO Act, even when school or municipal records were available.

The Supreme Court decisively rejected this judicial formulation, observing:

“The High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC, acted coram non judice in issuing directions compelling the State to conduct medical age tests as a matter of course. Such directions, though perhaps well-intentioned, travel beyond the four corners of the law.”

The Court reminded that Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 provides the governing standard for age determination, where documentary evidence—such as school certificates or birth records—must be given priority, and medical opinion can only be sought in absence of those documents.

“A medical determination of age is not to be resorted to routinely, nor can it override documentary proof. The High Court erred in placing medical opinion above primary statutory evidence.”

“You Cannot Hold a Mini-Trial at the Stage of Bail” – Supreme Court Warns Against Premature Evaluation of Evidence

In a forceful exposition of bail law, the Bench cautioned that bail proceedings are not meant to adjudicate disputed facts or to give findings that may prejudice the trial. The High Court had, in its bail judgment, cast aspersions on the genuineness of the victim’s age records and implied that medical evidence was more reliable.

The Supreme Court termed this approach legally unsustainable, remarking:

“The formation of a prima facie view at the stage of bail must not degenerate into an evidentiary adjudication. Courts must refrain from converting bail hearings into surrogates for trial.”

Referring to the precedent in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan and Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, the Court reiterated that the role of a bail court is limited to assessing whether, on a broad prima facie basis, the case warrants custody or liberty—not to test the veracity of documentary evidence or examine the truth of allegations.

“Statutory Restraints Cannot Be Breached in the Name of Constitutional Status” – Supreme Court Separates Judicial Power from Judicial Overreach

Responding to the High Court’s justification that its status as a constitutional court under Articles 226/227 empowered it to issue directions “in public interest,” the Supreme Court issued a crucial clarification on separation of statutory and constitutional domains.

“The powers of a constitutional court and those arising under a statute like CrPC are distinct. A constitutional court cannot exercise statutory jurisdiction by bypassing the constraints that the statute imposes.”

The Court underscored that constitutional authority is not a license to circumvent legislative scheme or create protocols that bind investigation or trial, especially under a sensitive statute like POCSO.

“When acting under Section 439 CrPC, the High Court must remain within the statutory contours of that provision. It cannot extend its reach on the pretext of being a constitutional court.”

“POCSO Must Not Be Used as a Tool of Vengeance” – Supreme Court Flags Need for Romeo-Juliet Clause and False Allegation Safeguards

In a deeply reflective post-script, the Court went beyond the immediate legal question to address the emerging misuse of the POCSO Act, particularly in cases involving consensual adolescent relationships. The Bench took judicial notice of instances where young men are implicated under POCSO at the instance of parents disapproving of romantic ties, with fabricated claims about the victim’s age.

Quoting from its earlier rulings in Satish alias Chand v. State of U.P. and Sahil v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court observed:

“Ignoring the consensual nature of adolescent relationships can lead to irreversible consequences such as wrongful incarceration. The law must protect, not persecute.”

The Court suggested that the Union Government may consider legislative reforms, including a ‘Romeo-Juliet clause’ for close-in-age relationships, and mechanisms to address deliberate falsification of age in POCSO complaints.

“The solemn purpose of POCSO must not be diluted. But neither should it become a weapon for vindictive prosecutions based on manipulated records.”

High Court’s Directions Quashed, Conviction Not Disturbed, Judicial Discipline Reaffirmed

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, quashing the general directions issued by the High Court in the bail order, and in its previous judgments in Aman @ Vansh and Monish, to the extent they mandated age determination through medical testing as a standard rule.

It clarified that the bail granted in the specific case was not being disturbed, but the legal overreach within that bail order stood annulled. The ruling would operate prospectively, without affecting bail orders already granted on the basis of now-overruled directions.

In closing, the Court directed that a copy of the judgment be sent to the Registrar General of the Allahabad High Court and to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, for appropriate action and dissemination.

Date of Decision: 09 January 2026