Irretrievable Breakdown Is Cruelty in Itself When the Marriage Has Become a Legal Fiction: Calcutta High Court Grants Divorce

“A Dead Marriage Cannot Be Revived on Technicalities,”  In a significant matrimonial ruling on January 8, 2026, the Calcutta High Court setting aside the Family Court’s dismissal of a woman’s divorce plea and holding that both mental cruelty and desertion had been clearly established under Section 27(1)(d) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The Division Bench comprising Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya declared in no uncertain terms that, “The marriage between the parties is long dead and it would be a travesty to sustain the same merely on technicalities.”

The Court also recognised the irretrievable breakdown of marriage as not only a ground for concern but as an integral component of cruelty, thus paving the way for a decree of divorce even in the absence of express recognition of such a ground in statutory text. “Irretrievable breakdown of marriage, although not a standalone ground for divorce, is nonetheless an integral component of the ground of ‘cruelty’ under Indian Matrimonial Law,” the Court held.

“Evasive Denials Are No Defence Against Specific Allegations of Cruelty” – Court Applies Doctrine of Non-Traverse

The wife, a government medical officer, had approached the Family Court seeking dissolution of her marriage on grounds of mental cruelty and desertion. Her allegations included public humiliation, threats to her life, abuse at her workplace, and financial exploitation. She also pleaded that the husband had no emotional attachment to their child and had fabricated his status as a businessman.

The Trial Court dismissed the petition, questioning the evidence and framing an issue of adultery, despite no such ground being raised in the plaint. The High Court castigated this approach as being “entirely misconceived and beyond the pleadings.”

The Division Bench held that the wife’s allegations were not only substantiated but stood admitted in law, owing to the husband’s evasive and general denials in his written statement. The Court observed, “The denial of the specific and categorical allegations regarding abuse by the husband at the wife's workplace, spreading of rumours about her chastity, and threats to kill her and their child... are, at the most, evasive. Hence, the allegations are established in any event by the doctrine of non-traverse.”

“No Infrastructure for Video Evidence Cannot Be an Excuse to Deny Fair Trial”: Trial Court’s One-Line Rejection of Video Testimony Criticised

The wife had also filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC seeking to lead additional evidence through video conferencing of her colleagues to prove the allegations of cruelty and public humiliation. This was rejected by the Trial Court in a single-line order stating lack of video-conferencing infrastructure.

The High Court came down heavily on this procedural unfairness, remarking, “The learned Trial Judge, having himself refused to permit oral evidence through video conferencing on the flimsy ground of lack of infrastructure, could not have drawn adverse inference against the appellant on the self-same ground.”

The Court acknowledged the practical realities faced by professional witnesses, especially in government service, and stated that video testimony is not just convenient but essential in such contexts. It found the Trial Court’s refusal to allow the wife to adduce best evidence as a breach of procedural justice.

“Stray Visits Cannot Be Equated With Conjugal Cohabitation”: Court Finds Desertion Since 2015 Proven

The Bench firmly held that the wife had succeeded in proving desertion. The parties had been living separately since 2015, and the husband had failed to produce any material evidence showing any meaningful resumption of conjugal life. His claims of a reunion in a Kurseong hotel in 2020 were rejected for want of proof. The Court noted that not a single receipt or corroborative evidence had been furnished by the husband.

“In matrimonial law, mere stray visits do not amount to cohabitation,” observed the Court. “The best case made out by the respondent is that he occasionally visited the wife during the relevant period, which the wife portrays to be stray visits merely for the purpose of extracting money from her. Be that as it may, fact remains that such stray visits cannot tantamount to living a conjugal life worth the name between the parties.”

“A Marriage That Exists Only in Law and Not in Life Is Mental Cruelty to Both Parties” – Court Applies Rakesh Raman Doctrine

In a decisive application of precedent, the Court held that the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, (2023) 17 SCC 433, is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution and squarely applicable to cases under the Special Marriage Act.

The Court observed that the ground of cruelty under Section 27(1)(d) of the Special Marriage Act is in pari materia with Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Citing the Supreme Court, the Bench quoted: “A marriage which has broken down irretrievably... spells cruelty to both the parties... It is therefore a ground for dissolution of marriage.”

Refusing the respondent’s argument that Rakesh Raman was distinguishable or overruled by Rinku Baheti v. Sandesh Sharda, (2024) 12 SCR 1355, the Court held that the latter judgment was delivered in a different context under Article 142 and did not dilute the binding nature of Rakesh Raman. “The law as it stands now is that irretrievable breakdown is a valid ground of divorce, as a component of cruelty,” the Court held.

“This Marriage Has Spent Its Shelf-Life Long Ago”: High Court Declares It Beyond Repair

In a striking observation, the Court held that the marriage had become a legal fiction. “A dead marriage cannot be revived merely by refusing a divorce decree... which would only result in further agony in the personal lives of both parties,” the Court observed.

The Trial Court’s own recognition that the marriage was “an unfortunate mismatch” and that the wife was “not happy residing with the respondent” was cited by the High Court to expose the internal contradictions in the lower court’s decision to reject divorce.

Noting the long separation, lack of trust, and complete emotional disengagement, the Court said, “The marriage between the parties has obviously reached a cul de sac and has spent its shelf-life long back.”

Divorce Granted; Father Granted Visitation Rights; No Costs Imposed

Concluding that both cruelty and desertion were proven and the marriage had broken down irretrievably, the High Court set aside the Family Court’s decree and dissolved the marriage. While doing so, it balanced the interests of the minor child by granting visitation rights to the father.

“The respondent/husband shall be entitled to visit the minor son of the parties once a month, on the first Sunday of each month, for a period of two hours... in any public place within a radius of 2 km from the then residence of the appellant,” the Court ordered.

The Court did not impose any costs and directed a formal decree of divorce to be drawn accordingly.

Date of Decision: 8 January 2026