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by sayum
19 June 2026 7:16 AM
"Mere execution of two wills on the same day that are couched in identical language would not by itself establish the existence of a mutual will or a binding agreement restricting revocation or alienation," Delhi High Court, in a significant judgment, has clarified that the mere fact of spouses executing identical wills on the same day does not automatically constitute "mutual wills" that create binding, irrevocable obligations.
A bench of Justice Amit Bansal observed that for a will to qualify as a mutual will, there must exist a clear and definite agreement between the executants that the arrangement would remain irrevocable after the death of one of them.
The dispute involved siblings and the estate of their late parents, who jointly owned a property in Pitampura, Delhi. In 2006, both parents executed identical Wills bequeathing their shares to the surviving spouse, and thereafter to their legal heirs in specific proportions. After the mother’s death in 2007, the father executed gift deeds transferring the property to one son (Respondent No. 1) and made a subsequent Will in 2010, which was challenged by the other son (the original plaintiff) as being in derogation of the alleged "mutual wills" of 2006.
The primary question before the Court was whether the two Wills dated April 20, 2006, constituted mutual wills that restricted the surviving father's right to alienate the property. The Court was also called upon to determine if the father had acquired only a limited life interest or absolute ownership of the property following the demise of his wife.
Agreement Against Revocation Is Essential For Mutual Wills
The Court emphasized that the hallmark of a mutual will is a definite agreement between the executants that the will would not be revoked or that no disposition contrary thereto would be made after the death of one party. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dilharshankar C. Bhacheh v. Controller of Estate Duty, the Court noted that such an agreement is enforced in equity through a constructive trust.
The bench observed that the mere fact of execution of a joint or identical will is not sufficient to establish such an agreement for the survivor to be bound. The Court stated that "the term 'mutual wills' is used to describe joint or separate wills made as the result of an agreement between the parties to create irrevocable interests in favour of ascertainable beneficiaries."
Similarity In Testamentary Language Does Not Imply Mutuality
Justice Amit Bansal noted that similarity in the terms of purported mutual wills is insufficient to establish a binding agreement. Citing Krishna Kumar Birla v. Rajendra Singh Lodha, the Court held that while an agreement can be discerned from the tenor of the will by necessary implication, the language must clearly restrict the survivor’s power of disposition.
"Exclusive Rights" And "Control" Indicate Absolute Ownership
The Court meticulously analyzed the language of the 2006 Wills, which stated that the surviving spouse "shall enjoy the same in his/her own exclusive rights, interest and control" and "shall be able to dispose off the same to meet his/her necessities." The bench held that these words confer absolute ownership rather than a mere life interest.
"The words 'to meet his/her necessities' does not go to the extent of creating life interest. The intention of the testatrix was clear that even if the property survives and remains after the death of her husband, only in that eventuality her property would go to the heirs in the manner specified."
Distinction Between Mutual Wills And Identical Wills
The Court distinguished the present case from the Single Bench judgment in Vickram Bahl v. Siddhartha Bahl. In that case, the will provided that rights would "rest with the survivor" without conferring unrestricted power of disposition. However, in the current case, the Wills unequivocally conferred complete dominion upon the surviving spouse.
No Restriction On Alienation Discernible From The Wills
The bench further observed that the stipulation regarding the property devolving upon the legal heirs only "if the property subsists" after the demise of the survivor reinforces the intention to allow alienation. The Court remarked that if the parents intended to impose restrictions, they could have explicitly used the terms "life estate" or language restricting the right to dispose of the property.
"If it was the intention of the executants to impose restrictions on the surviving spouse to dispose of the suit property, they could have used the words 'life estate' or specifically put in proper language, restricting the right of the surviving executant."
In view of the findings that the father became the absolute owner of the property and was competent to execute the subsequent gift deeds and the 2010 Will, the High Court found no infirmity in the Trial Court's judgment dismissing the partition suit.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the 2006 Wills were merely identical and not mutual wills. However, it recorded that Respondent No. 1 shall be bound by his statement to honour the monetary bequests made to the other siblings in the father's subsequent Will dated August 6, 2010.
Date of Decision: 29th May 2026