FIR Registration | Prospective Accused Has Locus Standi To Appeal Against Single Judge's Direction: Supreme Court

"If the appellants are not permitted to assail such finding in the appellate proceedings, the same shall come in their way, if an independent proceeding is initiated, assailing the First Information Report as per law." Supreme Court, in an important ruling dated October 21, 2026, held that prospective accused persons have the locus standi to prefer an appeal against a Single Judge's judicial direction mandating the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) and commencement of investigation against them.

A bench comprising Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana set aside an order of the Kerala High Court Division Bench which had refused leave to appeal to the appellants on the ground that prospective accused persons have no right of pre-registration hearing. The bench observed that where the registration of an FIR is propelled by a judicial finding that the material discloses a cognizable offence, denying the right of appeal severely prejudices the affected parties.

The appeals arose out of a writ petition filed before the Kerala High Court seeking registration of an FIR on the basis of information shared by the Enforcement Directorate under Section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The Single Judge quashed the State Government's decision to conduct a preliminary enquiry through a Special Investigation Team and specifically directed the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau to immediately register an FIR for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, conduct an investigation, and submit a final report. Aggrieved by this direction, the appellants, who were not impleaded as parties before the Single Judge, sought leave to appeal before the Division Bench, which came to be dismissed.

The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether prospective accused persons possess the locus standi to seek leave to appeal against a Single Judge's judicial order directing the mandatory registration of an FIR, investigation, and submission of a final report against them. The court was also called upon to consider whether the bar on a pre-registration hearing of an accused applies equally when the FIR is directed to be registered through a binding judicial determination.

Judicial Directions For FIR Differ From Suo Motu State Action

The Supreme Court rejected the contention that prospective accused persons are completely stripped of their right to maintain an appeal against judicial mandates for registration of FIRs. The bench pointed out a vital distinction between executive statutory action on one hand and judicial directions on the other, noting that this was not an instance where the police registered a crime on their own under Section 66(2) of the PMLA.

The bench observed that the initiation of the criminal process flowed entirely from a binding judicial fiat of the High Court. While issuing such directions, the Single Judge made substantive judicial determinations on the record, holding that the material forwarded by the Enforcement Directorate prima facie disclosed the commission of cognizable offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Prejudice Caused If Judicial Findings Remain Unchallenged In Appeal

Emphasizing the procedural jeopardy faced by prospective accused persons, the bench explained that if such individuals are prevented from questioning the Single Judge's order in intra-court appeal, the judicial findings rendered against them would operate as an impediment in subsequent challenges. Such substantive findings would inevitably prejudice any independent statutory or constitutional remedies invoked later to assail the FIR.

The court noted that when a judicial forum records a positive finding on the existence of a cognizable offence, it binds subordinate authorities and complicates future quashing proceedings. Therefore, shutting out an appeal against the genesis of such a finding impairs substantial rights of the prospective accused.

"If the appellants are not permitted to assail such finding in the appellate proceedings, the same shall come in their way, if an independent proceeding is initiated, assailing the First Information Report as per law."

BNSS Envisages Expansive Role For Public Servants Prior To FIR

The bench highlighted that the procedural framework governing judicial intervention for FIR registration has undergone an important statutory change under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). Contrasting the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with the BNSS, the bench pointed out that Section 156(3) CrPC contained no requirement of heard participation, whereas Section 175(4) of the BNSS specifically incorporates safeguards for public servants.

Under Section 175(4) BNSS, a Magistrate receiving a complaint against a public servant arising in the course of the discharge of official duties must receive a report on facts from a superior officer and consider the assertions made by the public servant regarding the incident before ordering an investigation. The court noted that while this provision may not strictly govern the factual merits of every controversy, it underscores Parliament's intent to recognise an expansive jurisdiction regarding the participation of potential accused prior to the registration of an FIR.

"We have referred to Section 175(4) of the BNSS not in reference to the merits of the case before us, but to elucidate the expansive jurisdiction envisaged in the new law with regard to participation of a potential accused prior to registration of FIR."

Single Judge Exceeded Routine Directions By Ordering Final Report

The Supreme Court took note of the sweeping nature of the directions issued by the learned Single Judge. The court highlighted that the Single Judge did not merely stop at directing the registration of an FIR as contemplated under the precedent laid down in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, but went further to direct the commencement of investigation and the peremptory filing of a final report.

The bench observed that directing an active investigation through to the stage of a final report inevitably engages distinct statutory protections available under special enactments. In particular, the mandatory statutory requirement of obtaining prior approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 requires consideration before such investigative steps can be ordered.

Division Bench Wrongly Denied Leave To Appeal; Appeals Restored

Holding that the appellants unequivocally possessed the requisite locus standi to prefer an appeal against the Single Judge's judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that the Division Bench fell into serious error by summarily turning down their applications seeking leave to appeal. Consequently, the Apex Court set aside the Division Bench's order and restored the appeals to file for adjudication on merits.

The bench clarified that it had not expressed any view on the substantive merits of the allegations or on the validity of any subsequent Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) registered in connection with the impugned FIRs. To safeguard the rights of the appellants and enable them to seek appropriate interim relief before the restored Division Bench, the Supreme Court directed that the investigation arising out of the impugned FIRs shall remain stayed for a period of ten days.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals to the extent of recognizing the appellants' locus standi and restoring their intra-court appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court. By clarifying that an accused has the right to challenge judicial orders directing FIR registration, the ruling provides vital appellate recourse to individuals directly impacted by pre-cognizance judicial mandates.

Date of Decision: October 21, 2026

Case Title: Pinarayi Vijayan v. K M Shajahan & Ors. | Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 [Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.20437/2026]

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice V. Mohana

Counsel: For Petitioners/Appellants: Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Mr. N. Hariharan, Sr. Adv., with Mr. Gilbert George Correya, Mr. Mayank Jain, Mr. Ameen K. Hassan, Mr. Madhur Jain, Mr. Arpit Goel, Mr. Kartik Yadav, Mr. Shoumik Chowdary, Mr. Deepak Jain, Mr. Devanshu Yadav, Mr. Anshul Rai, Mr. Ojaswa Pathak, Ms. Mallika Ranjan, Ms. Bhabna Das, Mr. Shrey Nautiyal, Ms. Sagarika Singh, Mr. Vishnu Kanth Mundada, Mr. Arpit Kumar Mishra, Mr. Kartikeye Dang, Mr. Aadarsh Joshi, Ms. Aditi Mishra, Ms. Muskan Anand, Advs., and Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, Mr. Sahil Sharma, Mr. Krishna Dev Jagarlamudi, M/s Dharmaprabhas Law Associates, Advocates-on-Record.

For Respondents: Mr. Ramesh Babu, Sr. Adv., Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Sr. Adv., Mr. Koshy John, Adv., Mr. M.S. Vishnu Sankar, Mr. Aljo K. Joseph, Mr. Ajay M., Mr. Sashwat Mishra, Ms. Meenakshi, Mr. Annam Venkatesh, Mr. Hitarth Raja, Mr. Madhav Singhal, Advs., and M/s Lawfic, Mr. Amrish Kumar, Advocates-on-Record.