-
by Admin
19 January 2026 6:56 AM
“Where Prospectus Reserves Power to Revise Fee Structure, Students Cannot Claim Fixed Fees for Entire Course” — Calcutta High Court in Gourab Kumar Sadhu & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. [WPA 13054 of 2024] upheld the validity and applicability of a Government Notification dated 16.10.2023, which revised the upper ceiling of tuition and development fees for self-financing engineering colleges in West Bengal, and dismissed the writ petitions filed by students admitted to the B.Tech batch 2023–2027 challenging the mid-course enhancement.
Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee observed that once the right to revise fees was reserved in the prospectus, students cannot resist such changes on grounds of hardship or contractual rigidity. The Court held that the enhancement was neither retrospective nor arbitrary, and found the implementation from the second semester (January 2024) to be prospective and legally sustainable.
“Fee Structure Is Not Indivisible; Can Be Recast Semester-Wise Within Statutory Limits”
The Court emphasized that the concept of "Fee Structure" under Regulation 7 of the AICTE Regulations, 1994 does not imply an unalterable block sum for four years, but is modular and semester-based. Justice Chatterjee held: “The fee structure has not been treated as indivisible either under the 1994 Regulations or under the notification dated 16.10.2023; rather, it has been divided according to the number of years or, as the case may be, the number of semesters of study for the course.”
Rejecting the analogy offered by petitioners’ counsel, who compared the fee structure to a completed “building” that cannot be altered mid-way, the Court ruled that payment per semester allows for prospective adjustments, particularly when notified by the State pursuant to regulatory powers.
Petitioners Admitted on One Fee Structure, Faced Hike Midway
The petitioners — students of Dr. B.C. Roy Engineering College, Durgapur, admitted for the 2023–2027 B.Tech batch — challenged the applicability (not the legality) of the State’s Notification dated 16.10.2023, which revised the fee ceiling for self-financing engineering colleges in the State. After having paid the first semester fees, the students were served with a revised demand including an enhanced tuition fee and a newly introduced “development fee” of ₹9,075 per semester, starting from the second semester (January 2024).
The petitioners contended that the fee enhancement violated Regulation 7(6) of the AICTE Regulations, and infringed the contractual assurance given at the time of admission. It was also claimed that educational loans were obtained based on the earlier fee structure, and any mid-course revision prejudiced the students’ financial planning.
Prospectus Was a Contractual Document Reserving Right to Revise Fees
Justice Chatterjee underscored that the prospectus provided clear notice that the fee structure was subject to change as per Government decisions. This condition, voluntarily accepted at the time of admission, formed part of the contract between student and institution. The Court held:
“Where the prospectus expressly reserves the right to revise the fee structure in accordance with decisions taken by the Government, the institution may, in appropriate cases, enforce a mid-session enhancement of fees even in respect of existing students.”
The Court went further to emphasize that invoking writ jurisdiction to escape the consequences of voluntarily accepted contractual conditions is impermissible:
“The writ jurisdiction cannot be allowed to be invoked to facilitate the avoidance of contractual obligations voluntarily undertaken.”
Government Had Power Under General Clauses Act to Supersede Earlier Fee Notifications
Invoking Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the Court held that the State Government was well within its statutory authority to revise or supersede previous fee-related notifications:
“The power to issue a notification includes the power to amend, vary, or rescind it. Therefore, it can safely be held that the State is empowered to rescind the earlier notification and issue a fresh notification in its place.”
The Court held that fee ceilings can be updated to account for inflation, enhanced salaries, and infrastructural upgrades, and the revised structure was framed within the bounds of the AICTE framework and the Fee Regulatory Committee’s recommendations.
Phrase “To Be Admitted” Does Not Bar Applicability to Current Students of 2023–2024 Academic Year
The petitioners argued that the Notification dated 16.10.2023 applied only to students “to be admitted”, and therefore could not cover those already admitted. The Court, however, clarified that: “The expression ‘to be admitted’ was used to qualify the category of students and not to indicate the time from which the notification would take effect.”
It further observed that academic year 2023–2024 had multiple semesters, and since the notification was implemented only from January 2024 (second semester), its application was prospective, not retrospective.
“The intention discernible from the notification is manifestly clear that it was intended to take effect from the date of its issuance and for the academic year 2023–2024.”
No Parity With Shanker Doon or Bindiya Khatri Precedents – Distinct Statutory Regimes
The petitioners relied heavily on Shanker Doon v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6737, and Bindiya Khatri v. State of Uttarakhand, to argue that mid-course fee enhancements are impermissible. The Court rejected these precedents as inapplicable:
In Shanker Doon, the Delhi High Court had restrained retrospective fee hikes for earlier academic years based on delayed notifications.
In Bindiya Khatri, a specific statutory prohibition (Section 4(14) of the Uttarakhand Act) barred fee revision for existing students.
“The propositions laid down in the aforesaid two decisions cannot be applied to the case at hand,” the Court clarified, noting the absence of any such statutory bar under the West Bengal regime.
Students Bound by Terms; No Arbitrariness Found
Summing up, the High Court ruled that petitioners had no legal right to demand continuation of the older fee structure, once the prospectus explicitly permitted revision, and the same was executed pursuant to Government notification and AICTE norms.
The Court concluded: “The contentions raised by the petitioners are devoid of merit and, accordingly, cannot be accepted.”
Accordingly, all writ petitions were dismissed, with the prayer for stay also rejected immediately after pronouncement.
Date of Decision: 15 January 2026