Fatal To Prosecution: Gujarat High Court Affirms Acquittal In 2002 Riot Murder Case Over Unexplained 12-Day FIR Delay And Contradictory Eyewitness Testimony

"The FIR was lodged after a delay of 11 to 12 days [and] there was no explanation on record for such delay," observed the Gujarat High Court while dismissing a State appeal against the acquittal of individuals accused of murder during the 2002 communal riots. The Division Bench of Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. R. Mengdey and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mool Chand Tyagi emphasized that such substantial and unexplained latches in initiating criminal proceedings, especially when coupled with contradictory ocular evidence and hearsay complaints, significantly erode the credibility of the prosecution's case. The Court held that where the foundational facts regarding the registration of the crime are shrouded in delay, the benefit of the doubt must necessarily tilt in favor of the accused, reinforcing the double presumption of innocence that follows an acquittal.

The ratio decidendi of this judgment centers on the principle that an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR is often fatal to the prosecution’s narrative as it provides a window for potential tutoring, concoction, or the deliberate naming of individuals not originally known to the witnesses. The Court clarified that in the absence of a plausible explanation for an 11-day delay, the entire investigative superstructure becomes suspect. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the stringent standard for appellate interference in acquittal orders under Section 378 CrPC, holding that if the trial court’s view is a "reasonable conclusion" based on the evidence, the High Court shall not disturb the verdict merely because an alternative view is possible. This is particularly applicable when the "sole projected eyewitness" provides inconsistent versions of the roles played by the accused during the alleged commission of the offence.

The prosecution’s case stemmed from a violent incident near Idga Masjid in March 2002, where an unlawful assembly allegedly sprinkled kerosene on the deceased and set him ablaze. The primary legal question before the High Court was whether the trial court had erred in its appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the delay in the FIR and the reliability of P.W.4, the purported eyewitness. Upon examining the testimony of the complainant (P.W.2), the Court noted that he was not an eyewitness and had lodged the complaint based on hearsay information. The Bench observed that "prior to lodging the complaint, he was not aware of the names of the accused persons and that he came to know their names only after filing the complaint," a fact that pointed toward a significant risk of ex-post-facto embellishment.

Deepening the scrutiny into the prosecution's failures, the Bench highlighted the material contradictions in the testimony of P.W.4, who was projected as a direct witness to the murder. The Court found that the witness significantly altered his account during cross-examination, reversing the specific overt acts attributed to the accused. "In his examination-in-chief, he stated that accused Gulab caught hold of the victim while his son set the victim on fire," the Court noted, but observed that in cross-examination, he "changed his version and stated that accused Manoj caught hold of the victim and that Gulab set him on fire." This flip-flop, combined with his "unnatural conduct" of not seeking medical treatment for his own alleged injuries and the fact that he was present at the scene at 1:00 a.m. during a curfew without explanation, led the Court to conclude that his testimony "does not inspire confidence."

The Court also criticized the investigative deficiencies, noting that the Investigating Officer (P.W.5) admitted the unexplained FIR delay and could not even confirm the exact location from where the dead body was recovered. Integrating the principles of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Court held that the prosecution failed to establish a "chain of circumstances" or credible ocular proof. Citing the landmark precedent of Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, the Bench reaffirmed that an appellate court must bear in mind that "in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused." Since the trial court had rightly identified the lack of incriminating material in the scene panchnama and the inherent weakness of hearsay evidence, the High Court found no manifest illegality or perversity in the acquittal order.

Date: 07/02/2026