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by Admin
15 February 2026 5:01 PM
“Litigant Cannot Be Prejudiced by Delay of Court – Execution Petition Filed Within Time, Permission to Deposit Valid”, In a significant ruling under Article 227 of the Constitution, the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed a civil revision challenging the validity of orders passed by the Executing Court permitting deposit of the balance sale consideration in a suit for specific performance. Justice Virinder Aggarwal held that where the decree-holder had applied to deposit the amount within the time stipulated in the decree, the mere fact that the order permitting such deposit was passed later would not vitiate the proceedings or defeat the rights of the decree-holder.
The Court emphasized that delay attributable to the Court's own process cannot be used to penalize a litigant who was otherwise ready and willing to comply with the decree. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the narrow scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, and distinguished the binding Supreme Court judgments cited by the petitioner, finding them inapplicable to the facts at hand.
“Executing Court Must Facilitate Compliance, Not Obstruct It”: Decree Holder’s Application Filed Within Time
The case arose out of a decree for specific performance dated 23.07.2024, whereby the Trial Court directed execution and registration of a sale deed within two months and permitted deposit of the balance sale consideration within three months from receipt of the certified copy of the judgment. The decree-holder Veer Singh filed the execution petition within that time on 16.09.2024 and expressed readiness to deposit the entire amount of ₹1,80,000 along with ₹1,04,400 interest—totalling ₹2,84,400—as per the decree’s terms.
The Executing Court passed an order on 20.03.2025 permitting the deposit. This was challenged by the judgment-debtor Paramjit Singh on the ground that the permission was granted beyond the three-month period mentioned in the decree, and no application seeking extension had been filed by the decree-holder. The JD further sought rescission of an alleged unregistered sale deed under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act.
Justice Aggarwal, however, upheld the impugned orders dated 20.03.2025 and 19.08.2025, holding:
“Since the decree-holder had applied for deposit within the period stipulated by the decree, any delay in granting permission was attributable to the Executing Court and not to the decree-holder. It is well-settled that in such circumstances, the draft sale-deed cannot be rescinded, nor is there any violation of the provisions of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act.”
Court Reiterates Executing Court's Role—“Cannot Rewrite Decree, But Can Aid Its Fulfillment”
The High Court clarified that although an Executing Court cannot go beyond the terms of a decree, it has a duty to ensure that the decree is effectively implemented. Observing that the execution petition itself contained a clear undertaking to deposit the entire amount within the prescribed time, the Court held:
“Where a decree-holder undertakes to perform obligations mandated by the decree, the Court is empowered to grant such relief as may be necessary to effectuate the decree.”
Thus, the Executing Court’s action in allowing deposit of the consideration was held to be a lawful exercise of discretion, and not an instance of jurisdictional error warranting interference under Article 227.
Reliance on Supreme Court Judgments Misplaced – Distinguishable on Facts
The petitioner had relied heavily on the decisions in V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar v. C. Alagappan [(1999) 4 SCC 702], P. Shyamala v. Gundlur Mastha [2023 (2) RCR (Civil) 135 (SC)], and Chanda v. Rattni [2007 (2) RCR (Civil) 534 (SC)] to argue that courts should not condone delays or allow post-decree extensions for deposit of consideration without proper applications under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act.
However, the Court found these precedents inapplicable:
“In the cited cases, decree-holders failed to seek extension or deposit within a reasonable time… In the present case, the decree-holder sought permission to deposit the balance sale consideration along with interest within the stipulated period.”
The Court further emphasized that none of the cited judgments dealt with a scenario where the execution petition itself was filed within the prescribed time and the delay was on the part of the Court in passing the order.
Delay Attributable to Court Cannot Defeat Substantive Rights
A key principle reinforced by the Court was that no party should suffer for delays caused by the Court itself. Justice Aggarwal quoted this long-standing legal position:
“It is a settled principle of law that no litigant should be prejudiced on account of delays or procedural lapses attributable solely to the Court… the Executing Court committed no illegality or perversity in exercising its jurisdiction.”
Thus, once the decree-holder demonstrated readiness and filed the execution petition in time, the grant of permission to deposit—even if slightly belated—was within jurisdiction and consistent with equitable considerations.
Supervisory Jurisdiction Under Article 227 Not to Be Invoked Lightly
Reiterating the limited scope of supervisory powers under Article 227, the Court ruled:
“There is no scope for interference in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court… No jurisdictional error or perversity warranting interference has been established.”
The Court clarified that such jurisdiction is intended only to correct “patent lack of jurisdiction, perversity, or grave injustice”, none of which were found in the present case.
Petition Dismissed, Execution Order Upheld
Summing up its findings, the Punjab and Haryana High Court concluded that the decree-holder’s compliance with the decree was within the prescribed timeline, and the Executing Court acted within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the civil revision was dismissed as being devoid of merit.
“As the decree-holder sought permission to deposit the balance sale consideration within the stipulated period, the Executing Court committed no illegality or perversity in exercising its jurisdiction.”
Date of Decision: 12 January 2026