Even a Void Order Must Be Challenged Within Limitation: Punjab & Haryana High Court Sets Aside Labour Court Award for Delay

Tribunal Cannot Ignore Law of Limitation Merely Because a Union Raises the Dispute—Punishment Orders Passed a Decade Ago Cannot Be Reopened - Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed a writ petition filed by the State Transport Department, setting aside a Labour Court award that had invalidated disciplinary punishment orders issued between 1996 and 2000. The Court held that even void orders must be challenged within the statutory limitation period, and that the Labour Court erred in reopening settled disciplinary actions raised after over a decade.

Justice Harsimran Singh Sethi, delivering the verdict, ruled: “Even the void orders are to be challenged within a period of 3 years. The Tribunal acted perversely in entertaining a stale claim in contravention of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.”

“Disciplinary Punishment Orders Passed in 1996, 1999, 2000—Raised for the First Time in 2006”

The litigation arose from a reference raised by the Punjab Roadways Workers Union, which sought quashing of orders dated 27.09.1996, 22.10.1999, and 18.09.2000, whereby annual increments of the respondent-workman were withheld as punishment in disciplinary proceedings. The Tribunal (Labour Court, Ludhiana), in its award dated 28.03.2016, held that the punishment orders were illegal and directed restoration of consequential benefits.

The High Court noted that: “The grievance regarding the punishment orders was raised not by the workman himself, but by the Union, that too after more than 10 years from the passing of the punishment orders.”

This, the Court held, was contrary to law, as the orders were not directly challenged within limitation, and the Tribunal could not have gone into their validity.

“Labour Court Ignored Binding Precedent in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh (1991)”

The Court applied the landmark ruling of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh & Ashok Kumar, (1991) AIR SC 2219, where it was categorically held that even void or illegal orders must be challenged within the period prescribed by limitation laws.

Quoting the binding paragraphs of Gurdev Singh, the High Court emphasized: “A suit for declaration that an order of dismissal is void is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a limitation of 3 years from the date of cause of action. The decision of the Labour Court is thus perverse and contrary to law.”

It added: “The Tribunal’s finding that delay can be condoned merely because the dispute was raised by a Union is unsustainable in law.”

“Reference Sought Release of Increments—But This Indirectly Challenged Long-Standing Punishments”While the Union had couched the reference as one seeking release of withheld increments, the High Court saw through the subterfuge: “The claim was essentially a challenge to the punishment orders themselves. Without challenging those orders within time, the workman cannot seek revival of increments affected by them.”

The Court also recorded that there was no explanation for the delay, nor any justification for bypassing the law of limitation. It concluded: “The reference could not have been entertained in 2006 for orders passed in 1996 and 1999. The award is perverse and legally unsustainable.”

Final Judgment: Labour Court Award Dated 28.03.2016 Set Aside

Allowing the writ petition, the Court held: “The award passed by the Labour Court, Ludhiana, is perverse to the settled principle of law and cannot be upheld. The same is accordingly set aside.”

This decision reiterates a core constitutional and procedural principle—that even if a disciplinary order is bad in law, it must be challenged within a reasonable and statutory period. Courts and Tribunals cannot assume discretion to condone decades-long delays, especially in employment matters where finality of disciplinary proceedings is critical to administrative functioning.

In the Court’s own words: “No matter how unjust an order may seem, its illegality must be asserted within the window the law provides. Delay defeats rights—even if raised by a Union.”

Date of Decision: 7 March 2025